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With the increased demands of state and local governments, economists have been addressing
a number of new research questions for example; new tradeos in taxation, the changing roles
of supplying public goods in a federal system, and the impacts of state and local government
policies on the distribution of population across cities and rural areas. Motivated by the
empirical puzzle that state tax-revenue volatility increased 500 percent in the 2000s, relative
to previous decades, my dissertation considers volatility of tax revenue as a new tradeo
in optimal taxation. The increased demands for state tax revenue and state governments'
inability to smooth volatile revenue streams, due to self-imposed balanced budget rules,
magnies budget crises in state governments. I also demonstrate the policies governments
enact, specically taxation and zoning laws, impact the distribution of population across
cities. The policies are evaluated within a system of cities model to consider the impacts not
only on the population of levels of heterogeneous cities but also the number and set of cities




The following dissertation, in its current form, is a combination of two dissertations; one
on tax-revenue volatility and one on dynamic systems of cities. Chapters 2-4 encompass
the tax-revenue volatility dissertation. In this dissertation I produce a wide range of results
on tax-revenue volatility which I hope become the foundation for future research on the
subject. The analysis begins with a motivational empirical puzzle; What caused tax-revenue
volatility at the U.S. state level to become more volatile in the 2000s." By adapting empirical
decomposition methods to my model of tax revenue volatility I demonstrate changes in
tax rates explains most of the increase in tax revenue volatility. This result motivates
understanding how governments optimally can set tax rates to reverse the increase in tax
revenue volatility they have experienced.
The third chapter investigates the welfare consequences of tax revenue volatility conclud-
ing the optimal tax policy needs to consider tax revenue volatility both locally and globally.
In chapter two the optimal tax policy is characterized by the volatility-adjusted Ramsey
rule which demonstrates governments trade o deadweight loss and tax revenue volatility.
Chapter three demonstrates between these two considerations only tax revenue volatility
is of rst-order importance, hence locally tax revenue volatility is important. To compare
the magnitudes of the costs between tax revenue volatility and deadweight loss a standard
log-utility model is calibrated. This calibration demonstrates the cost of tax revenue volatil-
1
ity are large, $600 billion dollars a year large, and larger than costs from deadweight loss.
Therefore the third chapter provides compelling evidence that understanding tax revenue
volatility is, as in the words of Harberger describing deadweight loss almost fty-years ago,
"so interesting, so relevant, so central to our understanding of the economy we live in," that
understanding, measuring, and devising policy to mitigate these costs will be an important
area of research for years to come.1
The fourth chapter creates a method of estimating a government's minimum-variance
frontier by formalizing optimal government portfolio analysis. The previous chapters ap-
proached the problem of optimal taxation with uncertainty from the prospective of the
government maximizing a representative individual's utility. In contrast, the fourth chapter
approaches the problem from an optimal portfolio problem where the government minimizes
the welfare costs of volatility for the optimal mean level of public good production. In this
approach each tax base the government is able to tax is considered a separate asset the
government can hold in its portfolio. Through this analysis traditional portfolio analysis is
updated to account for the unique position the government holds, as a large agent, in con-
trast to the traditional small investor assumption. The theoretical model produces a method
for estimating minimum-variance frontiers for governments. The method is demonstrated
using data from U.S. state governments. A brief analysis of the minimum-variance frontiers
of state governments demonstrates the heterogeneity in mean-variance tradeos across states
and across time within a state.
Chapters 5-7 encompass the dynamic systems of cities dissertation starting with two solo
authored papers focusing on the creation of cities and their growth path and ending with
a joint paper with David Albouy on the optimal size of a city. This dissertation makes an
important contribution to the urban economics literature by creating models to discuss the
creation and growth of cities built from aggregating individual choices.
The fth chapter creates a positive model of city creation and growth that is surprisingly
1Harberger (1964)
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general yet able to match the stylized facts that cities continue to grow through time, cities
experience sequential periods of accelerated growth, and that some cities experience rushes of
migration. The key mechanism in the model is the intuitive trade o individuals face between
remaining in established cities, which provide public goods and high wages, with starting
or moving to a developing city, which provides new opportunities. The benets from public
goods and wages a city provides is a function of the population of the city. The opportunities
in the city depend on a rank function such that earlier migrants are given more opportunities
capturing the fact early migrants can start the rst bank, have a disproportionate role in
setting up the institutions of the city, and are able to claim the best lot of land. The results
are proved in general and demonstrated with a microfounded model where cities grow in a
spiral away from the central business district. The microfounded model demonstrates the
eects of income and property taxation on the growth of cities and the size of possible rushes
of migration to the city.
The sixth chapter demonstrates, in a dynamic model of city creation, a market mechanism
able to create the ecient number and set of heterogeneous cities. This paper focuses on
how barriers to migration ( e.g. information costs, moving costs, zoning laws) aect systems
of cities. Specically, how the population size, the number, and set of heterogeneous cities
changes with dierent levels of barriers to migration. I nd that no barriers to migration
cause better" cities to become oversized leading to less cities being created and interestingly
productive cities rather than high quality of life cities to be created. In contrast, high barriers
to migration cause cities to become undersized leading to more cities being created and high
quality of life rather than productive cities to be created. Surprisingly, if the barriers to
migration mimic a pricing mechanism for additional migrants the size, number, and set of
cities created becomes ecient.
The seventh chapter demonstrates federal taxes and land rents may cause cities to become
ineciently small. This chapter demonstrates in a general model the ability of across-
city wedges, such as federal taxes and land rents, to distort the distribution of population
3
in away that may cause cities to become ineciently small. The paper then creates a
microfounded model which is calibrated to demonstrate the magnitude of these across-city
wedges and the welfare loss from them. This chapter provides substantial evidence that
despite conventional wisdom that cities are always too large the largest cities in the United
States may be ineciently small.
The goal of both of these dissertations is to make an important contribution to the
respective literatures by taking a step forward in answering hard questions. In the public
nance literature, specically the optimal taxation literature, the hope is chapters 2 - 4
demonstrate the importance of tax revenue volatility and begins to provide policy revelent
answers to mitigate this cost. In the urban literature, specically the optimal city literature,
the hope is chapters 5 - 7 provide a new type of urban model, using game theory, to expand




Optimal Taxation with Volatility
A Theoretical and Empirical Decomposition
2.1 Introduction
Governments around the world are experiencing budget crises. The severity of these
budget crises may be magnied by the recent increase in the volatility of tax revenue. For
example, U.S. state governments experienced a 500 percent increase in volatility in the
2000s relative to previous decades, according to my metrics explained below. With limited
opportunities to borrow, often by statute, sudden dramatic declines in revenues have caused
state governments to make large cuts in expenditures.1 Year-over-year shocks to U.S. state
tax revenues increased by nearly $20 billion in the 2000s. The increase in uncertainty in state
nances led to increased uncertainty in the economy and increased uncertainty of individuals'
tax payments.2 Not only has tax revenue volatility increased dramatically in the last decade
but its negative impact has also increased for governments around the world because the
cost of borrowing has increased, especially for countries in Europe. This paper analyzes
the increase in tax revenue volatility experienced by U.S. state governments and the policy
1State governments' inability to smooth volatile revenue is a consequence of self-imposed balanced budget
rules which 49 states impose explicitly, though with varying strictness.
2The second of four maxims described by Adam Smith with regards to taxation is certainty. He claims,
The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great importance, that a
very considerable degree of inequality, it appears, I believe, from the experience of all nations, is not near so
great an evil as a very small degree of uncertainty." The Wealth of Nations p. 778.
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mechanisms that exist to stabilize tax revenues.
The empirical analysis quanties the three possible causes of the increased volatility
identied by the theoretical model: changes in tax rates (which change the tax bases states
rely on), economic conditions, or tax bases (e.g., what types of consumption are taxable). I
collect data on tax rates and economic conditions from numerous sources to create a panel of
all fty states from 1951-2010. I adapt empirical decomposition methods by Oaxaca (1973),
Blinder (1973), and DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) to quantify the contribution of
changes in economic conditions, tax rates, and tax bases in explaining the increase in tax
revenue volatility. These methods, appropriately adapted, allow me to quantify tax base
changes, which are otherwise nearly impossible to quantify because they are nearly impossible
to observe completely.3 I nd that changes in tax rates alone explain seventy percent of the
increase in tax revenue volatility, despite important tax base changes, such as the rise of
e-commerce, and amplied business cycles in the 2000s. This means the increase in tax
revenue volatility can be reversed by appropriate tax reform, motivating the question, how
should governments set tax rates when the volatility of tax revenue is considered."
I develop a normative model of taxation to determine the optimal tax policy when eco-
nomic production, tax revenues, and therefore public and private consumption are volatile.
Standard optimal taxation models consider deterministic economic environments. In these
environments, lump sum taxation is optimal because it eliminates deadweight loss. Re-
markably, introducing uncertainty about tax revenue collections - a salient feature of the
real-world decision facing state governments - can overturn this result. I show that a govern-
ment facing volatile economic conditions from aggregate production risk should choose to tax
state-dependent tax bases instead of using lump sum taxes. By taxing state-dependent tax
bases the government is able to distribute the aggregate production risk between public and
private consumption. Lump sum taxes are suboptimal because they concentrate all economic
volatility in private consumption. I derive the volatility-adjusted Ramsey rule which charac-
3The change I quantify as tax base changes is the structural change or treatment eect" in the empirical
decomposition.
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terizes the optimal tax policy with volatile economic conditions. This optimality condition
nests the traditional Ramsey rule and generalizes it to account for uncertainty.
Empirically, the tax bases state governments rely on have changed over the last 60 years,
with an increased reliance on income taxes. For example, between 1952 and 2008 the reliance
on income tax increased from 5 percent to 23 percent as a percentage of total state and local
tax revenue. In comparison, the reliance on the sales tax remained steady, accounting for
33 percent in 1952 and 34 percent in 2008.4 To determine if the empirical shift toward the
income tax is optimal I estimate a sucient condition derived from the volatility-adjusted
Ramsey rule. I nd twenty-six states relied too heavily on the income tax in 2005, an increase
of twelve states from 1965. In contrast, only ten states relied too heavily on the sales tax in
2005, a decrease of two states from 1965. In total thirty-six states in 2005 exposed their tax
revenues to unnecessary levels of risk by ineciently relying on the income or sales tax.
This paper makes four contributions to the literature. First, I document a large increase in
volatility in tax revenue at the state level. Second, I show this increased tax revenue volatility
is mostly due to changes in tax rates. Third, I derive a novel condition for optimal tax
policy, and fourth, I test whether states meet this condition. Through these contributions,
this paper nds strong evidence that the 500 percent increase in tax revenue volatility state
government's recently experienced is due to changes in tax rates, causing states to expose
their revenues to unnecessary levels of risk.
2.2 Literature Review
Two recent papers discuss the dramatic increase in tax revenue volatility in the 2000s
at the state level. Boyd and Dadayan (2009), discussing this fact, claim Tax revenue is
highly related to economic growth, but there also is signicant volatility in tax revenue that
4This paper focuses on the income, sales, and corporate taxes because they are the main tax bases relied
on by state and local governments. Property taxes are also important, but data for these tax rates do not
exist because the property tax is typically administered at a local level. The reliance on the property tax
decreased from 45 percent in 1952 to 31 percent in 2008.
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is not explained solely by one broad measure of the economy." They conclude by quoting
the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) on the scal situation at the state
level, The scal challenges are enormous, widespread and, unfortunately, far from over."5
McGranahan and Mattoon's 2012 research lead them to conclude, State governments are
facing a period of scal turbulence," and suggest understanding the dynamics of state tax
revenue collections is imperative to keeping the boat from capsizing.
This paper oers a structural framework to analyze the increase in shocks to uncertainty
(2nd moments) of tax revenue volatility. Bloom's 2009 paper studies the impact to the
business cycle of shocks to uncertainty due to events such as the Cuban missile crisis, the
assassination of JFK, the OPEC I oil price shock, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In Bloom's
model rm's region of inaction expands with uncertainty. This causes a drop in reallocation
of capital and labor from low to high productivity rms slowing productivity growth. Tax
revenue provides an interesting feedback loop to these shocks of uncertainty. First, tax
revenue will be aected by the productivity growth shocks through their impact on wages,
prots, and consumption, depending on the factors discussed in this paper. Second, tax
revenue shocks increase the uncertainty of government expenditures and tax policy leading to
increased uncertainty for rms. Therefore understanding how tax policy aects the resulting
magnitude of tax revenue volatility due to wage, prot, and consumption shocks is important
in dampening this feedback loop.
Empirically, this paper demonstrates that changes in tax policy caused tax revenue
volatility to increase more than the underlying volatility in the economy. This empirical
work extends empirical work based on Groves and Kahn (1952) paper on optimal tax port-
folios. Early work focused on the short-run elasticity of dierent tax revenue streams with
respect to personal income as a measure of variability (Wilford, 1965; Legler and Shapero,
1968; Mikesell, 1977). Later work considered growth in revenues or the long-run elasticity
of dierent tax revenue streams with respect to personal income (Williams and Lamb, 1973;
5State Budget Update: July 2009," National Conference of State Legislatures.
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White, 1983; Fox and Campbell, 1984). Recent work has focused on improving these esti-
mates (Dye and McGuire, 1991; Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle, 2006). In addition to extending
this empirical work my paper extends Groves and Kahn's theoretical model to produce a
volatility-adjusted Ramsey rule.
I demonstrate volatility is an important consideration in optimal taxation. Previous op-
timal taxation studies extend the basic model that minimizes aggregate deadweight loss to
account for distributional considerations (Mirrlees, 1971), externalities and complementar-
ities (Corlett and Hague, 1953; Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971; Green and Sheshinski, 1979),
administrative costs and tax avoidance (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974; An-
dreoni, Erard, and Feinstein, 1998), and dynamic considerations (Chamley, 1986; Judd, 1985;
Summers, 1981). The normative model in this paper provides an additional consideration:
costs due to volatility.
My paper considers the optimal tax policy with uncertain economic conditions in contrast
to the literature, which considers the optimal uncertain tax policy. Stiglitz (1982) demon-
strates using random tax rates can decreases excess burden, if the excess burden for an
individual as a function of revenue raised is concave. Barro (1979), making the assumption
that excess burden is convex in the amount of revenue raised, demonstrates the expected
value of a tax rate tomorrow should be equal to the current tax rate. Skinner (1988) demon-
strates the welfare gain from removing all uncertainty about future tax policy is 0.4 percent
of national income. This literature focuses on the accumulated deadweight loss occurring
with uncertainty. In contrast, my paper focuses on the costs of volatility in public and pri-
vate consumption as a result of tax policy and trading these costs o with the costs from
deadweight loss.
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2.3 Facts About Tax Revenue Volatility
2.3.1 Data
For this paper I collect data from numerous sources to be able to cross check inconsis-
tencies due to the timing of policy changes. Income (both top and bottom rates), corporate,
and sales tax rates for all states between the years 1951-2010 are collected from the Book of
States, the World Tax Database, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
biannual report Signicant Features in Fiscal Federalism," and the Tax Foundation. Data
on tax revenues for all state and local governments for the years 1951 through 2010 are
collected from the Book of States and the U.S. Census of Governments.6 Data on property
tax rates are unavailable because the rates are typically imposed at a local level.7 The anal-
ysis focuses on the income, sales, and corporate tax because these are the most important
revenue sources for state governments.
The aggregated state and local tax revenues are used in this paper to account for dierent
levels of decentralization across states. Data on state level economic conditions such as state
level GDP and personal income are collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and exist
for all states in all years between 1963 and 2010. Data on state populations are collected
from the U.S. Census Bureau and are used as a control.8
Table 2.1 and gure 2.1 demonstrates the frequency and balance of the 1108 tax rate
changes across 3000 state-year observations in the sample. These changes are roughly evenly
divided between the tax bases; the sales tax rate changes the fewest times (252 times) and
the top income tax rate changes the most (326 times). Of these changes, 603 are tax rate
6Approximately a dozen inconsistencies between the Book of States and the U.S. Census of Governments
were found. When inconsistencies were found the data from the Book of States were used, though the
analysis is robust to using the other sources.
7Data on property tax revenue is collected. In robustness specications property tax revenue is used as
an additional control variable to account for any possible horizontal externalities between the property tax
and other tax bases. In these specications these horizontal externalities do not appear to be important.
8All of the estimations are done in real aggregate terms controlling for population. Instead the estimations
could have been run in real per capita terms without controlling for population. The rst strategy is preferred
because the second unnecessarily constrains the coecient on population in the estimates.
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Table 2.1: State Tax Rate Changes
Observations Years with
Tax Rate Changes Increases Decreases At Least Increase and
One Change Decrease
Sales Tax 252 214 38 56 22
Corporate Tax 272 94 178 55 33
Top Income Tax 326 165 161 57 38
Bottom Income Tax 358 130 128 56 36
Data 1951-2010 tax rates by state collected by author from Book of States, the World
Tax Database, the Tax Foundation, and the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations biannual report.
The 1108 tax rate changes across 3000 state-year observations demonstrate the
variation used in the empirical analysis.
increases and 505 are tax rate decreases. The tax rate changes are spread across the years
in the sample such that there is a tax rate change by at least one state for each tax base in
over ninety-percent of the years observed. Furthermore, in about half of the years observed,
at least one state increases a given tax rate and another state decreases the same tax rate.
Despite the political climate, gure 2.1 provides little evidence that state governments
changed tax rates fewer times in the 2000s relative to other decades. The number of increases
and decreases in tax rates are misleading because tax rate increases tend to be larger than
tax rate decreases. For example, the bottom income tax rate is increased 130 times and
decreased 128 times but the average tax rate between 1950 and 2000 is 1.46 compared with
the average rate of 2.14 between 2000 and 2010. Similarly the top income tax rate increased
from 4.87 to 5.30, the sales tax from 3.15 to 4.82, and the corporate rate from 5.19 to 6.60.
These changes in tax rates changed the relative importance of the income and sales tax in
total tax revenues. Between 1952 and 2008 reliance on income tax revenues increased from
5 percent to 24 percent in contrast to the sales tax which increased only slightly from 33
percent to 34 percent.
The empirical design in this paper groups observations into years before the increase in
volatility and those after. The groups are dened by a structural break found using a Quandt
11
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(d) Corporate Tax Rate
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likelihood ratio (QLR) test (Quandt, 1958). Formally, the QLR, or sup-Wald, test statistic
identies structural breaks without presupposing in which year they occurred by performing
repeated Chow tests, typically on all dates in the inner seventy-percent.9,10 The maximum
QLR occurs in 2002 for the sales and corporate tax revenues and in 2000 for the income tax
revenue. For all three tax revenues, the maximum QLR value (12.26 corporate, 17.78 sales,
and 31.09 income) are larger than the critical value at the one percent level, 3.57. Following
these tests the before years are dened as 1963-2001 for the sales and corporate tax bases
and 1963-1999 for the income tax base.
2.3.2 Basic Facts
Figure 2.2 demonstrates the increase in volatility in the 2000s by graphing tax revenue
aggregated across states and its deviations from a time trend.11 For the rest of the paper,
I dene volatility as the squared deviations from trend which is a short-run measure of
variability and produces a data point for each state-year observation.12The absolute value
of deviations from trend increased by $19.1 billion in the 2000s and volatility increased by
$712 billion.
If state tax revenues became more correlated in the 2000s this could explain the increase
in volatility. However, as gure 2.3 demonstrates tax revenues became less correlated in
the 2000s. Figure 2.3 graphs the moving average of the coecient of variation across states
for each year between 1951 and 2010, demonstrating tax revenues began converging in the
9Figure A.1 in the appendix plots the QLR for the income, sales, and corporate tax revenues for all years
between 1970 and 2003.
10The inner seventy-percent of years correspond to the years between 1970 and 2003 which is the suggested
amount of observations for the QLR test.
11The time trend is estimated using a cubic time trend.
12Volatility in variable x is dened as x̃ = (xt − x̄time trend)2. This measures the short-run variability
which is the focus of the paper. The variance of tax revenue, σR = (Rt − R̄)2 conates short-run variability
and dierences due to a time trend. For example, making a state's time trend steeper would increase the
variance but would not change the short-run variability. The time trend, estimated for each state separately,
in the baseline case is a cubic time trend. The results are robust to dierent time trends including a Hodrick-
Prescott lter with a bandwidth of 6.25, as recommended by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for yearly data, which
is shown in table 2.3 and time trends with autoregressive processes, semi-parametric power series estimators,
and moving averages.
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Cubic time trend with autoregressive process.
Data: US Census 1951 - 2010 total tax revenue.
1960s but in the late 1990s began diverging.13 The increase in volatility is robust to dierent
specication and has been noted previously by Mattoon and McGranahan (2012) and Boyd
and Dadayan (2009).
Volatility, as a percent of tax revenue, increased in the 2000s for forty ve states mapped
in gure 2.4. Tax revenue volatility increased per person in the 2000s for all fty states, in
levels. The trends depicted in the aggregate data hold for a majority of states and are not
driven by a few outliers.
The increase in tax revenue volatility is especially important for state governments be-
cause of their self-imposed balanced budget rules. The rules dier in strictness and in some
cases restrict the use of rainy day funds to smooth volatile revenue streams. The inability of
state governments to smooth volatile tax revenues is demonstrated in gure 2.5 which plots
the deviations from trend of aggregate state expenditures and tax revenues.14 Tax revenue
volatility leads expenditure volatility, which is conrmed by a Granger causality test (Hiem-
13The moving average uses a seven year window on either side and includes the specic year.
14Figure 2.2 plots the deviations from trend of income, sales, and corporate tax revenue while gure 2.5
uses total tax revenue to compare with total expenditures.
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Year
Coefficient of variation, ratio of standard deviation and mean, across states.
Smoothed using a moving average with 7 year window on either side.
Data: US Census 1951 - 2010 income, sales, and corporate tax revenue.
Similar trend with total tax revenue.
Figure 2.4: 45 States Experienced Increases in Volatility.
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State and Local Tax Revenue State Expenditures
Cubic time trend with autoregressive process.
US Census 1951 - 2010 state expenditures and state and local tax revenue.
State tax revenue deviations from trend Granger cause state expenditure
deviations from trend.
stra and Jones, 1994; Baek and Brock, 1992).15 Expenditure volatility is especially costly
at the state level because due to prior commitments, expenditure volatility is concentrated
in a few items such as education, the timing causes state expenditures to be pro-cyclical
which is costly to the extent state expenditures should be counter-cyclical, and swings in
state government expenditures adds salient uncertainty to the economy.
15While tax revenue volatility Granger causes expenditure volatility the reverse is not true. The Granger
causality test is not a test of causality but a descriptive statistic.
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2.4 Model
In this section the government uses taxes to produce a public good in order to maximize
a representative individual's utility in an economy with uncertainty. A technology shock
generates uncertainty in the model and the representative individual has rational expecta-
tions over this shock. The technology shock is assumed to aect wages and prots dierently
causing wages and prots not to be perfectly correlated. The extent to which wages and
prots are correlated determines the correlation between wage income and consumption in
the model. The fact wage income and consumption are not perfectly correlated produces
an incentive for the government to hedge wage income and consumption specic risk by
taxing both sources. The purpose of this model is twofold; rst to derive an equation for the
variance of tax revenue which can be used in the empirical decomposition (section 2.5) and
second to setup a normative model to determine the optimal tax policy in the environment
where tax revenue volatility is costly (section 2.7).
A. Technology. The single-intermediate good, X, in the model is assumed to be pro-
duced by a single-input factor labor, L, and costlessly transformed into private and public
consumption goods. The eciency with which a representative rm converts the labor into
the intermediary-output diers with the state of nature, θ.16
X(L, θ) = θf(L) = θLγ
θ = µt + vt vt ∼ Log −N(0, σ2v)
µt = φµt−1 + (1− φ)µ̄+ ut ut ∼ Log −N(0, σ2u)
The technology shock is given by a combination of two shocks, a persistent shock and a transi-
tory shock. These shocks are assumed to aect wages and prots dierently depending on the
value of ω. Labor is paid its marginal product w = θwγL
γ−1 where θw = µt+ωvt. The repre-
16Writing intermediate production in this way implicitly assumes that an increase in the input increases
the output by the same percentage in all states of nature.
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sentative individual owns and receives the prots of the representative rm π = θπ(1− γ)Lγ
where θπ = µt + (1− γω)/(1− γ)vt. The exogenous parameter ω determines the correlation
between wage income and prot such that when ω = 1 they are perfectly correlated. In the
model ω is used to model the empirical fact wages and prots are not perfectly correlated,
hence there is a dierence between taxing wage income and consumption.
B. Individual Behavior. The individual has utility over the supply of labor L, the public
good g, and total private consumption c, which is split between taxed goods, βc, and untaxed
goods, (1− β)c. The individual chooses c, L, and β to maximize utility
maxc,L,β u = U(c, β, L, g)
subject to
c = (1− τcβ)((1− τw)w(θ)L+ π) = (1− τcβ)y
where τc and τw are the tax rates on consumption and wage income respectively. The
correlation between wage income and prot determines the correlation between consumption
and income. In gure 2.6 wage income, prot income, and consumption are characterized
by vectors with lengths equal to their standard deviation. Using the law of cosines, the
correlation between two vectors is depicted as the cosine of the angle between any two
vectors. For example, if the vectors are parallel the variables are perfectly correlated and if
the vectors are perpendicular the variables are independent.17 In the example depicted, if
the standard deviation of prot income increased, holding wage income's standard deviation
xed, then the length and angle between consumption and wage income would both become
17First, let τc = τw = 0 for simplicity, allowing c = wL+ π. Consumption can be represented as a vector
equal to the sum of the vectors of wage and prot income where the lengths of all of the vectors equal
the standard deviation of the variable. The cosine of the angle between wage income and consumption,
using the law of cosines, can be written as cos(θ) = (σ2c + σ
2
wL − σ2π)/(2σwLσc). The numerator can be
reduced to 2cov(wL, c) using the variance formula var(π) = var(c−wL) = var(c) + var(wL)− 2cov(wL, c).
Therefore the cosine of the angle between wage and prot income is equal to the correlation between them;
cos(θ) = cov(wL, c)/(σwLσc) = ρwL,c.
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(b) Correlation Consumption and Wage Income
larger. In this example increasing the standard deviation of prot income causes the standard
deviation of consumption to increase and causes the correlation between consumption and
wage income to decrease.18
Utility maximization requires: i) the marginal disutility from supplying labor equals the
marginal utility of the income it produces and ii) the ratio of marginal utilities from total
consumption c and β is equal to the consumption tax rate times income net of taxes. When
the consumption tax rate is zero there is no distortion between consumption goods, and
the expected marginal utility with respect to β is zero. Composing utility in terms of total
consumption c and a composition parameter β simplies the exposition of deadweight loss
because β encompasses all behavioral responses (substitution eects) between goods.19
U1(c, β, L)(1− τcβ)(1− τw)w = U3 (2.1)
U2
U1
= τc((1− τw)wL+ π) (2.2)
C. Government The government produces the public good G and nances its production
18If prot income and wage income were negatively correlated increasing the standard deviation of prot
income could decrease the standard deviation of consumption. Therefore, even if prot is more volatile than
wage income consumption may be less volatile than wage income.
19For more details see the appendix.
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with taxes on consumption and wage income. Two assumptions are made for expository
convenience: i) the supply of the public good is set equal to the tax revenue, g = R and
ii) the utility function is additive such that U1,2 = 0.
20 The expected utility of the indi-
vidual can be completely characterized by the moments of private and public consumption.
The analysis below focuses on the rst two moments, which is sucient if the production
shocks are distributed with a joint distribution characterized fully by their rst two moments
(e.g. normal, log-normal, and uniform distributions) or if the utility function is quadratic,
but the results are consistent with cases where expected utility is characterized by higher
moments.21,22 The level of social welfare can be written as
E[u] =
Z
U(c, g)f(c, R, σ2R, σ
2
c ) ≡M(C, σ2c , β, L) +G(R, σ2R) (2.3)
M1 ≥ 0, G1 ≥ 0,M4 ≤ 0,M2 ≤ 0, G2 ≤ 0
where R and c are the mean levels of the private and public consumption, σ2c and σ
2
R are
the variances of private and public consumption respectively, and G represents the expected
utility from public consumption.23 The variance of tax revenue is a function of the tax rates,







2σ2y + 2τwτcβLσy,w (2.4)
20Assuming the government must have a balanced budget abstracts away from debt issues which are not
the focus of this paper. This assumption may be less of an abstraction for state governments, forty-nine of
which have balanced budget requirements. In practice these balanced budget requirements do not preclude
state debt but they do add additional costs. In this model the ability of the government to smooth revenue
is modeled in its risk attitude.
21In the case where two moments are sucient, the indierence curves can be shown to be quasi-concave
as long as U ′′ < 0.
22Analysis in the appendix considers expected utility which is characterized by higher moments.
23The shape of M can dier from the shape of G, allowing for dierent attitudes of risk in public and
private consumption.
24σ2c = (1− τcβ)2((1− τw)2L2σw + σπ + 2(1− τw)Lσw,π
25Base factors L, β are choice variables allowed to vary with the state of nature. For expository ease they
have been treated as constants but their variance can be included.
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The variance of tax revenue given in equation (2.4) provides a structural equation for
the empirical decomposition. First, aggregate tax revenue can be decomposed into its parts;
income tax revenue volatility, sales tax revenue volatility, and the covariance of income and
sales tax revenue. Second, each of these parts can be decomposed into its parts; the tax rate,
the tax base, and the economic conditions as demonstrated in equation (2.5) for the sales
tax. In equation (2.5) the sales tax revenue volatility, the sales tax rate, and the volatility of
the economy are observed but the base β is unobserved because it is a complex combination
of economic conditions, tax rates, and tax laws. The base is estimated in equation (2.5.1) as
a function of tax rate variables τ and economic condition variables x.26 The tax variables
include tax rates from other bases (to account for tax shifting), information on the tax base
(such as the number of brackets in the tax schedule), and τc. The economic variables include
the volatility of state level GDP, personal income, population.
log(σ2Rc) = 2log(τc) + 2log(β) + log(σ
2
y) (2.5)
log(β) = δ0 + log(τ )ψ1 + log(x)ψ2 + ν (2.5.1)
log(σ2Rc) = δ0 + log(τ )δ1 + log(x)δ2 + ε (2.5.2)
For the empirical analysis the volatility is measured as the squared deviations from trend
to focus on the short-run variability, discussed previously in the descriptive statistics section.
Therefore, the volatility of state level GDP included in x in equation (2.5.2) is given by
σ2gdp,t = (gdpt − gdptime trend)2.
26The equation for the income tax base assumes the unobservable characteristics ε is additively separable




The theoretical model demonstrates the increase in tax revenue volatility is due to changes
in tax rates, amplied volatility in economic conditions, or tax base changes. Tax rates,
economic conditions, and tax revenues are observable; however, tax base changes, such as the
increase in e-commerce, are unobservable, which complicates the empirical decomposition.
Adapting empirical decomposition methods pioneered by Oaxaca (1973), Blinder (1973), and
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) allows me to quantify tax base changes in a similar
way as they quantify discrimination in pay or the eect of unions, which are also unobserved.
The baseline model is estimated using a weighting method similar to DiNardo, Fortin, and
Lemieux (1996) which can be thought of as a weighted extension of the decomposition method
described by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). For this reason I explain the method in
terms similar to Oaxaca (1973).27
Intuitively, the contributions of these factors are determined by comparing predicted tax
revenue volatility in dierent counterfactual scenarios. For example, the contribution of
tax factors is quantied by the dierence between the actual tax revenue volatility in the
2000s with the predicted tax revenue volatility in the 2000s if the tax factors in the 2000s
were equal to their values in the previous decades.28 Similarly, the contribution of economic
conditions can be quantied using the observed dierence in economic volatility. Changes
in the tax base are captured by changes in the regression coecients of the tax rates and
economic conditions.29 The dierence between the coecients estimated in the before and
after periods estimates the change in the relationship between tax revenue volatility and the
27The weighting method, described in the appendix, is chosen as the baseline case because a test of
nonlinearity in the Oaxaca (1973) estimate suggests nonlinearities exist. In this case the weighting method
is preferred because it controls for nonlinearities and is asymptotically more ecient than matching or
regression models, (Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder, 2003). In this context controlling for nonlinearities will
decrease the upward bias in the structural factor estimates from the Oaxaca (1973) analysis.
28Therefore the contribution of the base changes is the increase in volatility unexplained by the observed
characteristics, similar to the treatment on the treated (TOT).
29The empirical decomposition compares the observable characteristics and the relationship between ob-
servable characteristics between the before and after period. The identifying assumption states that on
average dierences in the residuals cancel, leaving only the observable characteristics and their relationships.
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explanatory tax rates and economic conditions, which is the dierence in the tax base.
2.5.1 Method
Equation (2.6) decomposes the three groups of factors where η1 is an indicator function
for the years after the structural break, ηstate indicates the state xed eects, and τ and
x are matrices of all of the tax and economic factors respectively. This equation nests the
following equations which estimate the volatility separately for the before and the after years
denoted by x|0 and x|1 respectively.
30 In equation 2.6 δ1 = γ1 and δ2 = γ2. The coecients
on the economic and tax variables interacted with the time group dummy, δ3 and δ4, are
equal to the dierence between the coecients from the two separate equations, γ1−φ1 and
γ2 − φ2 respectively.
log(σ2Ri) = δ0 + log(x)δ1 + log(τ )δ2 + (η1 ∗ log(x))δ3 + (η1 ∗ log(τ ))δ4 + η1 + ηstate + ε
(2.6)
log(σ2Ri|1) = γ0 + log(x|1)γ1 + log(τ|1)γ2 + ηstate + ε|1
log(σ2Ri|0) = φ0 + log(x|0)φ1 + log(τ|0)φ2 + ηstate + ε|0
The estimated dierence in volatility is given in equation 2.7 and decomposed by rearranging
terms and adding and subtracting x̄|1φ̂1 + τ̄|1φ̂2, where x̄|1 denotes the average value in
the after period. The contribution of tax base changes is captured by the rst three terms
in equation 2.7 which encompass the change in intercept and the change in coecients.
The dierences attributed to observable dierences in economic conditions and tax rates are
30The before and after years represent the years before and after the structural break found by doing a
Quandt likelihood ratio test. For more information on the Quandt likelihood ratio test see the appendix.
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captured by the fourth and fth terms respectively.31
∆̂ = Ûlog(σ2Ri|1)−Ûlog(σ2Ri|0) (2.7)
= γ̂0 + log(x̄|1)γ̂1 + log(τ̄|1)γ̂2 − φ̂0 − log(x̄|0)φ̂1 − log(τ̄|0)φ̂2
= γ̂0 − φ̂0 + log(x̄|1)(γ̂1 − φ̂1) + log(τ̄|1)(γ̂2 − φ̂2)
+ (log(x̄|1)− log(x̄|0))φ̂1
+ (log(τ̄|1)− log(τ̄|0))φ̂2
= η̂1 + log(x|1)δ̂3 + log(τ |1)δ̂4| {z }
Tax Base
+ (log(x|1)− log(x|0))δ̂1| {z }
Economic Conditions
+ (log(τ |1)− log(τ |0))δ̂2| {z }
Tax Rates
2.5.2 Identication and Specication Checks
This decomposition relies on the conditional mean of the error being zero. This assump-
tion allows the counterfactual volatility to be written as φ0 +E[x|η1 = 1]φ1 +E[τ |η1 = 1]φ2
because the error term conveniently drops out. Intuitively, this assumption assigns the dif-
ference in tax revenue volatility between the before and after periods to either dierences
in the observable characteristics (tax policy or economic conditions) or dierences in the
estimated coecients (tax base) but not unobservable characteristics.
Identifying Assumption:
The conditional mean of the error is equal to zero, E[ε|x, τ, η1, ηstate] = 0
The identication in this decomposition is threatened if there are endogenous or omitted
variables which cause the identifying assumption not to hold. The panel data is useful both
for providing additional controls and for allowing a series of specication checks. First, to
check for omitted variables the regressions are run with and without state-neighbor interacted
with time xed eects. These additional controls check for common unobservable variables
31The formulas in equation 2.7 are more complicated in the two robustness specications run and reported
in the appendix. First, when state xed eects are allowed to dier between the two groups the term does
not drop out. However, an F-test fails to reject the null all coecient estimates are the same when the state
xed eects are allowed to dier. Second, when state-neighbor xed eects are included these terms would
not drop out. These additional variables would be included in the unobserved group.
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across groups of states for example, unobserved shocks that would aect both state GDP and
tax revenues in the Northeast. Dierent state-neighbor groups are used and the estimated
coecients are robust to these controls. This specication test alleviates some concern of
omitted variables but is unable to account for state-year specic shocks.
Second, the importance of state spill-over eects is checked by including the tax rates and
economic variables from neighboring states. Third, concerns of simultaneity of tax revenue
volatility and tax policy are checked by replacing the tax rates with their two year lags. The
contemporaneous tax rate is highly correlated with the tax rate from two years prior but the
contemporaneous volatility of tax revenue could not be used to inuence the tax rate from
two years earlier. Intuitively, the volatility of tax revenue is dened as the squared deviations
from trend, or transitory shocks, which makes conditioning policies on them dicult.32 The
estimated coecients are robust to both of these specication checks, further alleviating
concerns of the validity of the identifying assumption.
Finally, the importance of tax base measures are checked by including controls for the
number of tax brackets a state's income and corporate taxes have. Intuitively and statis-
tically, the number of brackets in a given tax code is an important factor in the tax base.
In addition, the number of brackets is an independent variable highly correlated with other
variables, specically tax rates. Therefore measuring the change in coecients from omitting
the controls for tax brackets provides an estimate of the eect of omitting other time varying
tax policy changes which can be complex and nuanced.33 Time invariant state specic tax
laws are controlled for with the state xed eects. The robustness of the estimates to this
specication check alleviates concerns over the impact of other time varying tax law changes.
The ability to causally interpret the decomposition depends on three key factors. First,
32As an additional robustness check an autoregressive process is estimated to lter out any time correlation
leaving only transitory shocks. The estimates are reasonably robust to this specication.
33For example, in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin marshmallows are subject to the local food
and beverage tax unless they contain our and in 2009 Wisconsin changed the law such that
ice cream sandwiches sold in grocer's frozen food section are no longer subject to this tax.
(http://www.revenue.wi.gov/faqs/pcs/expo.html. Tax 11.51 Guidelines "Marshmallows unless they contain
our.")
25
the identifying assumption must hold. Second, empirical decompositions suer from general
equilibrium eects when the counterfactual of interest is out of sample, for example changes
in the counterfactual world without unions. However, the counterfactuals of interest in
this paper are policies in previous decades, meaning the counterfactuals are within sample.
Finally, decompositions of dierences between non-manipulatable groups, such as the before
and after years in this analysis, are subject to Holland's (1986) choice critique. However,
the grouping in this analysis fundamentally diers from race and gender, which Holland
refers to, because this analysis observes the same states in both before and after groups,
thus alleviating some of these concerns.
2.6 Results
Aggregate tax revenue volatility increased, on average, by $712 billion in the 2000s. The
rst stage of the decomposition given in equation (2.8) reports 52 percent of the aggregate
increase in tax revenue volatility is due to increases in the volatility of the income tax, 20
percent due to the sales tax, 14 due to the corporate income tax, and the remaining 14 percent
due to the covariances. The rst stage decomposition is consistent with the explanation tax














Column (1) of Table 2.2 reports the second stage decomposition of aggregate tax revenue
volatility into tax rates, economic conditions, and tax base changes. Changes in tax rates are
the most important factors explaining aggregate tax revenue volatility, explaining 70.26 per-
cent of the increase. Changes in the economic conditions explain 28.95 percent and changes
in the tax base explain only 0.78 percent. The ninety-ve percent condence intervals are
calculated by bootstrapping the sample, clustering by state, and reporting the 2.5 and 97.5
percentiles. These estimates are robust to extreme outliers and produce asymmetric con-
26
Table 2.2: Results
Percent Explain Income Sales Corporate
∆ Tax Rates 70.26 % 66.18 % 52.08 % 84.14 %
[ 58.42 , 88.49 ] [ 50.62 , 72.56 ] [ -40.99 , 67.43 ] [ 73.18 , 88.78 ]
∆ Economic Conditions 28.95 % 33.04 % 47.35 % 15.04 %
[ 10.69 , 40.69 ] [ 18.93 , 39.59 ] [ 9.99 , 66.77 ] [ 4.66 , 19.74 ]
∆ Tax Base 0.78 % 0.80 % 0.69 % 0.82 %
[ 0.70 , 0.87 ] [ 0.70 , 0.83 ] [ 0.14 , 0.81 ] [ 0.76 , 0.84 ]
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2350 2350 2350 2350
Bootstrapped 95 percentile condence interval (3000 replications) clustered by state.
Base Case: cubic time trend and kernel matching to produce weights.
Weighted estimates of equation 2.6.
Volatility of revenue and economic variables calculated as (x− xtime trend)2.
dence intervals. An F-test rejects the null that changes in economic conditions are more
important than changes in tax rates in explaining the increase in tax revenue volatility, con-
rming the intuition from the ninety-ve percent condence intervals. Columns (2) through
(4) report the decomposition separately for the income, sales, and corporate tax respectively.
Similar to the changes in aggregate tax revenue volatility, changes in income and corporate
tax revenue volatility is explained principally by changes in tax rates followed by changes
in economic conditions. In contrast, the evidence that tax rate changes explain the increase
in sales tax revenue volatility is weaker because the ninety-ve percent condence interval
includes zero.
Intuitively, the condence intervals are determined by the variation across states in how
much each factor explains the increase in tax revenue volatility. For the tax base, the
condence intervals are very precise implying there is very little variation across states in
the amount of the increase in tax revenue volatility explained by changes in tax base. In
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contrast, the condence intervals for tax rate changes for the sales tax are large. Intuitively,
there is a lot of variation across states in the changes in sales tax rates because of the
variation in how states implement the sales tax. Therefore, the estimate of the importance
of changes in tax rates for the sales tax varies across bootstrap samples depending on the
states in the sample, causing a large condence interval.
Changes in the tax base are not economically important in explaining the tax revenue
volatility. Intuitively, for changes in the tax base to be an important factor, the changes in
the tax base would have to change the volatility of the base. For example, if online shopping
caused the sales tax base to be left with only large durable goods, such as cars, then this
change in the tax base would have caused a large increase in tax revenue volatility because
large durable goods are more volatile than the sales tax base as a whole. In contrast, if the
consumption goods being bought online are a representative bundle of the sales tax base, at
least with respect to volatility, then even if the sales tax base decreased signicantly because
of online shopping the volatility of the base may not change. These results suggest changes
in the tax base have not changed the volatility of the tax base.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 2.3 report two alternative methods for estimating tax
revenue volatility. The baseline case given in the rst column estimates a cubic time trend
and uses a kernel estimation to produce weights. The second column reports the results
with inverse probability weights estimated by a probit. The third column reports the results
with a time trend estimated by a Hodrick-Prescott lter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). The
results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar in both of the alternative methods.
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Table 2.3: Alternative Model Specications
Baseline IPW HP Filter
Income
∆ Tax Rates 66.18 % 64.19 % 80.88 %
[ 50.62 , 72.56 ] [ 35.38 , 71.68 ] [ 61.5 , 89.83 ]
∆ Economic Conditions 33.04 % 35.06 % 18.26 %
[ 18.93 , 39.59 ] [ 19.08 , 44.28 ] [ -7.19 , 26.91 ]
∆ Tax Base 0.8 % 0.76 % 0.87 %
[ 0.7 , 0.83 ] [ 0.64 , 0.82 ] [ 0.82 , 0.89 ]
Sales
∆ Tax Rates 52.08 % 50.44 % 49.38 %
[ -40.99 , 67.43 ] [ -62.15 , 66.75 ] [ 26.81 , 57.58 ]
∆ Economic Conditions 47.35 % 48.98 % 49.82 %
[ 9.99 , 66.77 ] [ 0.23 , 72.25 ] [ 30.58 , 58.07 ]
∆ Tax Base 0.69 % 0.63 % 0.79 %
[ 0.14 , 0.81 ] [ -0.04 , 0.78 ] [ 0.66 , 0.84 ]
Corporate
∆ Tax Rates 84.14 % 83.79 % 73.23 %
[ 73.18 , 88.78 ] [ 71.35 , 88.6 ] [ 58.17 , 80.71 ]
∆ Economic Conditions 15.04 % 15.45 % 25.97 %
[ 4.66 , 19.74 ] [ 4.14 , 20.66 ] [ 6.25 , 32.84 ]
∆ Tax Base 0.82 % 0.78 % 0.79 %
[ 0.76 , 0.84 ] [ 0.71 , 0.82 ] [ 0.72 , 0.82 ]
Bootstrapped 95 percentile condence interval (3000 replications) clustered by state.
Bootstrap clustered by state.
Inverse probability weights constructed from probit estimates.
Weighted estimates of equation 2.6 with dierent model specications.
Volatility of revenue and economic variables calculated as (x− xtime trend)2.
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2.7 Ramsey Problem Decomposition
The government's objective function diers from those in traditional optimal taxation
because the mean and variance of both private and public consumption enters explicitly. The
government maximizes the expected utility of the representative individual who has utility
over both private and public consumption. Previously in this paper it was shown that the
expected utility function can be written as a function of the mean and variance of public
and private consumption with minimal additional assumptions.34 Aggregate production
uncertainty, which is assumed to be uninsurable, enters the individual's income through
uncertainty in wages and prots such that wages and prots are not perfectly correlated. The
aggregate production uncertainty is split between public and private consumption depending
on the tax rates on wage income and consumption.
This section begins with the full government's problem, which consists of costs from
volatile public and private consumption as well as the typical costs from behavioral changes
by the representative individual due to the use of distortionary taxes. This analysis pro-
duces a volatility-adjusted Ramsey rule which characterizes the government's optimal tax
rates when uncertainty and behavioral distortions exist. The analysis then turns to three
cases which decompose this condition into its separate parts. These cases are depicted in the
box below. The rst case considers the planner's problem of distributing certain aggregate
production between public and private consumption. The second case considers the planner's
problem of distributing uncertain aggregate production between public and private consump-
tion. Finally, the third case considers the government's problem of taxing the representative
individual's certain wage income and consumption to provide public consumption.
34The expected utility function can be written as a function of the higher moments of public and private
consumption. When the distribution functions of public and private consumption are characterized by the
rst two moments (e.g. normal, log-normal, and uniform distributions) the expected utility function reduces




Planner Case 1 Case 2
Pareto Optimum Volatility Modied
Competitive Case 3 Full Model
Behavioral Changes
(PF literature)
The timing of the model diers between the certain and uncertain cases as given below.
In the certain cases (cases 1 and 3) nature decides the aggregate production state of the world
before the government or individual makes their decisions. In the uncertain case (case 2) the
government must make its state-independent decision before the aggregate production state
is determined, causing uncertainty for the government. In both the certain and uncertain
cases the individual's decisions are made after the aggregate production state of the world
is determined; hence, there is no uncertainty for the individual in any case.
Certain Case Uncertain Case
Order of Decisions Choices Order of Decisions Choices
1st - Nature θ 1st - Government τ or ρ
2nd - Government τ 2nd - Nature θ
3rd - Individual c, L, β 3rd - Individual c, L, β
4th - Production occurs 4th - Production occurs
5th - Utility realized 5th - Utility realized
Full Government's Problem. The government chooses the tax rates on wage income and
consumption before the state is realized and the individual chooses the amount of labor to
supply and the consumption composition after the state is realized. Each of the government's
tax bases are state-dependent, meaning conventional approaches to evaluating alternative
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tax structures (e.g., deadweight loss for equal revenue streams) encounter complications
because diering tax structures will change the pattern of returns across states of nature. If
the government is risk neutral comparing the expected loss of utility for an expected level
of revenue will be sucient. However, if the government is sensitive to both the level and
volatility associated with a revenue stream, then comparing expected utility losses will be
inadequate. The government's attitude toward risk depends upon the individual's preferences
and the ability of the government to smooth revenue.35
maxτc,τw M(c, σ
2




c = (1− τcβ)(wL(1− τw) + π) σ2c = (1− τcβ)2σ2y
R = τcβ(wL(1− τw) + π) + τwwL σ2R = τ 2c β2σ2y + τ 2wL2σ2w + 2τcβτwLσy,w
The government's rst-order conditions given in equations (SCτc) and (SCτw) encompass
the full tradeo between the costs from volatile public and private consumption and the
deadweight loss due to behavioral changes by the individual in response to distortionary
taxes. The rst-order conditions can be broken into three parts; the marginal benet of
public and private consumption, the loss due to behavioral changes, and the loss due to
volatility.
The loss due to behavioral changes consists of the weighted sum of the elasticities of
labor and β with respect to the given tax rate where the weights scale the elasticities by
their impact on utility.36 Similarly, the loss due to volatility consists of the weighted sum of
the elasticities of the variance of private and public consumption with respect to the given
tax rate.37 The losses due to behavioral changes and volatility create wedges that cause
35y = wL(1− τw) + π and σy = (1− τw)2L2σ2w + σ2π + 2(1− τw)Lσw,π





(1−τcβ)wLτw , ωL,τw =
G1wL(τcβ(1−τw)+τw)
(1−τcβ)wLτw .








, ωσ2c ,τw =
−M2σ2c
(1−τcβ)wLτw , ωσ2R,τw =
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the marginal benet of public consumption to dier from the marginal benet of private
consumption.
FOCτc : G1 = M1−ωβ,τcεβ,τc − ωL,τcεL,τc| {z }
Behavioral
+ωσ2c ,τcεσ2c ,τc + ωσ2R,τcεσ2R,τc| {z }
Volatility
(SCτc)
FOCτw : G1 = M1 − ωβ,τwεβ,τw − ωL,τwεL,τw + ωσ2c ,τwεσ2c ,τw + ωσ2R,τwεσ2R,τw (SCτw)
The wedge due to behavioral changes is always nonnegative but the wedge due to volatility
can be positive or negative because the variance of tax revenue is U-shaped with respect to
an individual tax rate. Therefore, the marginal cost from volatility with respect to a given
tax rate is positive if the tax rate is relatively larger than the other tax rates, causing it to
be on the upward sloping part of the tax revenue curve.
The ecient provision of public consumption is determined by the volatility-adjusted
Samuelson conditions given in equations (SCτc) and (SCτw) which diers from the tradi-
tional Samuelson condition by the presence of the two wedge terms. The provision of public
consumption with these two wedge terms can be greater or less than the provision without
the wedge terms because the wedge due to volatility can be positive or negative. If the
volatility wedge is suciently negative then the ecient public good provision is larger than
in the case without these wedges (e.g. case 1).38 The volatility wedge becomes more negative
as the individual becomes more risk averse with respect to private consumption. When this
occurs, the government has an incentive to raise its tax rates to shift risk into the public
good, but raising the tax rates also increases the provision of public consumption.
The optimal tax rates are characterized by the volatility-adjusted Ramsey rule given in
equation (2.9) and produced by combining the rst-order conditions in equations (SCτc)
and (SCτw). The volatility-adjusted Ramsey rule states the sum of the elasticity of the tax
−G2σ2R
(1−τcβ)wLτw .
38The volatility wedge is suciently negative when the sum of the volatility wedge and the behavioral
wedge is negative.
33
base and the elasticity of the cost from volatility, both with respect to a given tax rate and
weighted by their contribution to utility, should be equal across tax rates.39,40 The utility
weights determine the relative importance of behavioral changes and volatility. The welfare
weight on volatility encompasses the risk preferences of the representative individual. These
risk preferences can be thought of as encompassing the relative ability of the individual and
government to smooth volatile income streams which, for simplicity, has been left out of this
model.
ωB,τcεB,τc + ωσ,τcεσ,τc = ωB,τwεB,τw + ωσ,τwεσ,τw (2.9)
This condition nests the traditional Ramsey rule, which in a special case reduces to setting
tax rates that are inversely proportional to their elasticities of demand. Similar intuition
holds in the volatility-adjusted Ramsey rule. A tax base will be taxed relatively higher as
the individual becomes less responsive to the tax rate, captured by the base elasticities. In
addition, the volatility-adjusted Ramsey rule demonstrates that the tax base with smaller
costs due to volatility will be taxed relatively higher, captured by the volatility elasticities.
There are two considerations with the costs of volatility. First, changing the tax rates on
wage income and consumption changes the distribution of risk between public and private
consumption. Therefore, by taxing state-dependent tax bases the government is able to
share some of the aggregate production risk within public good consumption. Second, the
government is able to hedge some of the idiosyncratic risk involved with a given tax base
by taxing multiple tax bases. Therefore, it is possible to decrease the volatility of public
consumption by raising a tax rate.
To decompose the volatility-adjusted Ramsey rule the analysis turns to three special
cases. Each of these cases highlights a dierent part of the full tradeo faced by the govern-
ment.
Case 1: Planner's Problem with Certainty. In this case the planner chooses L, c, R, and
39The Ramsey rule expanded:
−ωL,τcεL,τc−ωβ,τcεβ,τc +ωσ2c ,τcεσ2c ,τc +ωσ2R,τcεσ2R,τc = −ωL,τwεL,τw−ωβ,τwεβ,τw +ωσ2c ,τwεσ2c ,τw +ωσ2R,τwεσ2R,τw
40ωB,τi = −ωβ,τi , ωσ,τi = ωσ2c ,τi , εB,τi = εβ,τi +(ωL,τi/ωβ,τi)εL,τi , and εσ,τi = εσ2c ,τi +(ωσ2R,τi/ωσ2c ,τi)εσ2R,τi
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β (labor, the level of public and private consumption, and the composition of private con-
sumption) after the state of nature is realized. The planner produces the ecient allocation









The rst-order condition with respect to labor states the marginal cost of supplying labor
should equal the marginal benet. The rst-order condition with respect to β states the
marginal benet should be zero, implying that a shift of consumption either towards or away
from taxable consumption would decrease utility. The rst-order conditions with respect
to public consumption dictate the marginal benets from public and private consumption
should be equal.41
FOCL : M4(c, σ
2
c , β, L) = M1(c, σ
2
c , β, L)θf
′(L)
FOCβ : M3 = 0
FOCR : G1(R, σ
2
R) = M1(c, σ
2
c , β, L) (SC.1)
The last rst-order condition, given by equation (SC.1), is the Samuelson condition charac-
terizing the ecient provision of public consumption. In contrast to the Samuelson condition
given in the full government's problem this condition does not have the wedges due to be-
havioral or volatility costs. The behavioral wedge can be thought of as an additional cost
41Equal marginal benets between public and private goods results from the assumption of a representative
individual and the assumption that the intermediate good is costless to transform into public and private
consumption.
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to the government from transforming private consumption into public consumption. The
volatility wedge can be either an additional cost or an additional benet of transforming pri-
vate consumption into public consumption. Therefore, the provision of public consumption
in this case could be greater or smaller than in the full government's problem depending on
the magnitudes of the wedges in the full government problem.
Case 2: Planner's Problem with Uncertainty. In this case the planner chooses ρ, L,
and β (the fraction of uncertain production to allocate to the public sector, labor, and the
composition of private consumption). The planner allocates resources without losses due








c = (1− ρ)θf(L) σ2c = (1− ρ)2f(L)2σ2θ
R = ρθf(L) σ2R = ρ
2f(L)2σ2θ
The rst-order condition with respect to labor states that the marginal cost of supplying
labor should equal the marginal benet, where the change in volatility is included. The rst-
order condition with respect to β states the marginal benet should be zero, which is the
same as in the rst case and therefore omitted below. Finally, the rst-order condition with
respect to ρ states the marginal benet of public consumption should equal the marginal
benet of private consumption plus the marginal cost due to volatility from shifting aggregate
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production from private consumption to public consumption.
FOCL : M4 =





(1− ρ)2M2 + ρ2G2

2f(L)f ′(L)σθ




(1− ρ)M2 − ρG2

(SC.2)
The last rst-order condition given in equation (SC.2) is the Samuelson condition, in this
case with uncertainty. In this case, the provision of public consumption can be greater or less
than the case with certainty (case 1) depending on the benets of risk sharing. Specically,
if the marginal cost from private consumption volatility is larger than the marginal cost from
public consumption volatility then the government has an additional incentive to increase
the provision of public consumption.42
Table 2.4 demonstrates the marginal eects on the mean and variance of private and
public consumption as production is shifted to the public sector. Because the planner can
shift production without loss due to behavioral changes, the marginal eects cancel for the
mean, shown in the rst column of table 2.4. The variance of public and private consumption
is convex in production meaning a shift in production can increase or decrease the sum of
the variances.43 For example, if the risk preferences for public and private consumption are
represented by the same linear function, the best allocation of risk occurs when ρ = 1/2 and
the cost of risk increases convexly away from this point as demonstrated in gure 2.7.
42This can be seen by noting that the provision of public consumption is larger in this case than in the rst
case when the marginal benet of public consumption is less than the marginal benet of private consumption
G1 < M1. This occurs when the volatility wedge is negative. The volatility wedge is negative when the
marginal cost from private consumption volatility is larger than the marginal cost from public consumption
volatility [−(1− ρ)M2] > [−ρG2], given that M2 < 0 and G2 < 0.
43Notice however volatility in the economy does not depend on ρ since volatility in the economy is simply
σ2θ . This is also apparent if public and private consumption are considered perfect substitutes, in which case,
the planner would care about the variance of c+R. The variance of c+R is the variance of c plus the variance
of R plus 2 times the covariance. In this case: σ2c + σ
2
R + 2σc,R = (1− ρ)2σ2θ + ρ2σ2θ + 2(1− ρ)ρσ2θ = σ2θ .
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C −E[θf(L)] −2(1− ρ)σ2θ
R E[θf(L)] 2ρσ2θ
Total 0 −2σ2θ + 4ρσ2θ
Figure 2.7: Risk is U-shaped With Respect To ρ
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Case 3: Government's Problem with Certainty. In this case the government and repre-
sentative individual make their choices after the state of nature is realized. The government
chooses the tax rates and the individual chooses both β and L. The government's objective
function is given below.
maxτc,τw M(c, σ
2




c = (1− τcβ)(wL(1− τw) + π)
R = τcβ(wL(1− τw) + π) + τwwL
The rst-order conditions with respect to the consumption and wage income tax rates
are the Samuelson conditions for this case and state that the marginal benet of public
consumption should equal the marginal benet of private consumption plus the marginal
cost from behavioral changes. The wedge due to the marginal cost from behavioral changes
is nonnegative and hence, in this case the provision of public consumption is less than the
provision in the rst case.44 The wedge consists of the elasticities of the tax base factors β and
L which characterize the responsiveness of the individual to a given tax. If the individual is
very responsive to a tax rate change the elasticities will be large in magnitude.45 The utility
weights ωβ and ωL scale the changes in β and labor by their impact on utility.
FOCτc : G1 = M1 − ωβ,τcεβ,τc − ωL,τcεL,τc (SC.3τc)
FOCτw : G1 = M1 − ωβ,τwεβ,τw − ωL,τwεL,τw (SC.3τw)
The result that tax rates should be set proportional to the inverse of their price elasticities is
a special case of equations (SC.3τc) and (SC.3τc) where the cross-price elasticities are equal
to zero. Below, this result is demonstrated for the consumption tax rate and its distortion on
β from equation (SC.3τc). However, this could also be done with equation (SC.3τw) for the
44The wedge is nonnegative because ωβ,τi > 0, ωL,τi > 0, εβ,τi < 0 and εL,τi < 0.
45The elasticities are negative; hence, the more responsive the individual is to a tax rate change the more
negative the elasticity is.
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wage income tax rate. The price of β captures the dierence in prices between the taxed and
untaxed set of consumption goods, assumed to be one in this model.46 Although this result
holds only in the special case where the cross-price elasticity is equal to zero and there is
certainty in aggregate production, the intuition that tax bases with larger elasticities should
be taxed at a lower level holds generally.
G1 = M1 − ωβ,τcεβ,τc − ωL,τcεL,τc ωβ,τc = G1, assume εL,τc = 0



























Combining the two rst-order conditions produces the Ramsey rule in the case of certain
aggregate production, given in equation (2.10) below. The Ramsey rule states the marginal
distortion caused by a given tax should be equal across tax bases. The Ramsey rule is
a generalization of the inverse elasticity rule demonstrated above. The Ramsay rule for
this case (certainty in aggregate production) is generalized to the case with uncertainty in
aggregate production in the full government's problem by volatility-adjusted Ramsey rule.
ωβ,τcεβ,τc + ωL,τcεL,τc| {z }
ωB,τwεB,τw
= ωβ,τwεβ,τw + ωL,τwεL,τw| {z }
ωB,τwεB,τw
(2.10)
2.8 Imbalanced State Government Portfolios
This section produces a sucient condition for determining whether a government in-
eciently relies on a given tax base by rewriting the volatility-adjusted Ramsey rule. The
sucient condition is then estimated using data from U.S. states to determine which states
46The elasticity of β with respect to its price is negative, as is v, therefore the left hand side is positive.
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ineciently rely on the income and sales tax bases. The previous section writes the volatility-
adjusted Ramsey rule in terms of the elasticities of labor and β to highlight the behavioral
costs from taxation. This section writes the volatility-adjusted Ramsey rule in terms of the
elasticity of tax revenue with respect to a tax rate to produce a sucient condition that does
not depend on the functional form of utility.
The volatility-adjusted Ramsey rule can be written as the weighted sum of the weighted
elasticities of tax revenue and the variance of tax revenue as in equation (2.11).47 The
weighted elasticities are the elasticities weighted by the relative amount of tax revenue col-
lected by that base.48 The welfare weights in this equation are the same for the consumption
and wage income tax rates but depend on the functional form of utility.49 However, if the
weighted elasticities of both tax revenue and the variance of tax revenue are larger in magni-
tude for a given tax base relative to another tax base then the volatility-adjusted Ramsey rule
is violated irrespective of the welfare weights. Therefore, it is sucient to demonstrate that
the weighted elasticities are both larger for a given tax base to demonstrate a government
ineciently relies on that tax base.
ωRε̂R,τc + ωσ2R ε̂σ2R,τc = ωRε̂R,τw + ωσ2R ε̂σ2R,τw (2.11)
The four elasticities in equation (2.11) are estimated to determine whether a government
relies ineciently on a given tax base. This section estimates the elasticity of tax revenue
and the elasticity of the variance of tax revenue with respect to the income and sales tax
47The additional assumption that ε̂σc,τc = ε̂σc,τw is made for simplicity. This assumes the variance of
private consumption depends on the amount of revenue collected but not how it is collected. Without this
assumption, another elasticity for each tax base would need to be estimated to determine the sucient
condition.
48The weighted elasticities are given by the following expressions: ε̂R,τc =
R
τcβy








τwwL(1−τcβ)εR,τw , ε̂σ2R,τw =
σ2R
τwwL(1−τcβ)εσ2R,τw .




rate for each U.S. state.50
log(Ri) = π0 + log(τi)π1 + log(τ )π2 + log(x)π3 (2.12)
The elasticity of tax revenue with respect to a tax rate is π1. From equation 2.13 the
elasticity of the variance of tax revenue with respect to the tax rate can be estimated in
a similar manner where εσR,τi = ξ1. Finally, both of these elasticities are appropriately
weighted to produce the weighted elasticities in the volatility-adjusted Ramsey rule.
log(σ2Ri) = ξ0 + log(τi)ξ1 + log(τ)ξ2 + log(x)ξ3 (2.13)
I estimate equations (2.12) and (2.13) using a three step process. The rst step estimates
inverse probability weights which estimate the similarity between states in their observable
characteristics.51 The second step estimates a weighted, seemingly unrelated regression of
equations (2.12) and (2.13) for each state. These equations could be estimated for each
state using only data from the state for the years 1963-2010 but other state's experiences
are informative and are used to supplement the state's data by weighting other states based
on how informative its experience is. For example, Wisconsin's data has a high weight in
Minnesota's estimation but a low weight in California's because Wisconsin and Minnesota
are more similar than Wisconsin and California.
The third and nal step uses the estimated elasticities and calculates time-varying elas-
ticities. The time-varying elasticities are calculated by multiplying the estimated mean elas-
ticities by the mean of the ratio of the dependent and independent variables and the ratio of
the independent and dependent variable for a given year, shown in equation (2.14).52 These
50This section focuses on the income and sales tax because they are the two major sources of tax revenue
for most states.
51The weights can be calculated parametrically using a probit or semi-parametrically using a kernel esti-
mation. The baseline results reported use a probit and the results are robust to using a kernel estimation.
52This nal step assumes the derivative in the elasticity is constant over time.
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calculations produce four elasticities for each state for all years between 1963 through 2010.53
Comparing these elasticities determines whether the sucient condition for imbalance is met












In 1965 fourteen states relied too heavily on the income tax and twelve relied too heavily
on the sales tax, with the remainder not satisfying the sucient condition for imbalance,
mapped in gure 2.8. The number of states that ineciently relied on the income tax
increased by twelve between 1965 and 2005. In contrast, the number of states that reliedg
ineciently on the sales tax decreased by two in the same time period. Figure 2.9 maps the
twenty-six states that relied too heavily on the income tax and the ten states that relied too
heavily on the sales tax in 2005. Comparing these two maps reinforces the result that tax
policy is important in explaining the increase in volatility by demonstrating the increased
reliance on the income tax between 1965 and 2005.54
State governments expose their tax revenues to unnecessary levels of risk when they rely
ineciently on one tax base. In decades with little economic volatility, tax revenue from
states that rely ineciently on a tax base look similar to those that do not. However, in
decades with increased economic volatility, such as the 2000s, states that rely ineciently
on a tax base experience elevated levels of tax revenue volatility. I nd a positive correlation
between states that hold imbalanced tax portfolios and states with the largest increases in
volatility in the 2000s. The correlation is positive for both states that ineciently rely on the
income tax and those that ineciently rely on the sales tax, demonstrating the importance
of balance and not just stable tax bases.
53These calculations produce 9400 elasticities. The weighted tax rates and revenues are used to impute
tax rates and revenues that are zero.
54To determine whether a state's tax portfolio is imbalanced two sets of elasticities are compared. The
dierences are reported in gures 2.8 and 2.9. These dierences are statistically signicant at the ve
percent level for all states except for Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota, Arkansas, and New
Mexico for the variance elasticities and California, Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, New York, Oklahoma,
and Wisconsin for the base elasticities.
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Figure 2.8: Imbalanced State Tax Portfolios 1965.
Figure 2.9: Imbalanced State Tax Portfolios 2005.
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2.9 Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is to provide theoretic and empirical evidence of the
importance of tax revenue volatility. Empirically, tax revenue volatility at the state level
has increased dramatically in the 2000s. This paper provides strong evidence that changes
in tax policy, specically the increased reliance on the income tax base, explains most of the
increase in tax revenue volatility.
An optimal tax system must consider the costs of revenue volatility. I update the Ramsey
rule to include the costs of volatility, demonstrating the tradeo governments face between
costs from volatility and deadweight loss due to behavioral changes. The volatility-adjusted
Ramsey rule is applied to the data to test whether state governments set their tax rates
eciently. Between 1965 and 2005 the number of states that set their tax rates ineciently
increased by almost forty percent such that by 2005 almost three-fourths of all states could
change their tax portfolios to lower the costs from volatility and deadweight loss due to
behavioral changes without decreasing their level of tax revenue.
The methods in this paper can be applied to other governments and can help diagnose the
causes of their tax revenue volatility allowing them to create policies to dampen it. Damp-
ening tax revenue volatility may be even more important for developing countries because of
the capital market frictions they face which make smoothing tax revenue shocks costly. The
empirical test of the volatility-adjusted Ramsey rule provides governments with a benchmark
to test whether they are ineciently relying on a given tax base. Eciently relying on dif-
ferent tax bases is important because it may dampen the feedback loop between government
uncertainty and production uncertainty which can cause slow productivity growth.
This paper focused on tax policy which is only one of three important ways governments
can handle uncertainty. The interplay between tax policy and government expenditures and
savings (through the use of rainy day funds) remains an important area of research. For ex-
ample, the extent to which tax revenues should be procyclical depends crucially on whether
government expenditures are complements or substitutes to private consumption. It would
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be interesting to know whether governments that spend more on goods and services com-
plementary to private consumption have tax revenues that are more procyclical. My paper
serves as a starting point for these investigations into how governments manage uncertainty
to minimize its negative impacts to the economy.
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CHAPTER III
Welfare Consequences of Volatile Tax Revenue
Recent increases in tax revenue volatility, especially at the state level in the United
States, have led to an increased discussion of the impact of volatility on optimal taxation,
optimal levels of public goods, and societal welfare. Tax policy has been shown to be an
important mechanism for explaining the increase in state tax revenue volatility in the 2000s,
even considering the signicant increases in economic volatility and important changes in
tax bases (Seegert, 2012). This paper quanties the importance of considering tax revenue
volatility when setting tax policy in two ways. First, following Harberger's 1964 paper which
shows deadweight loss is of second-order importance, I show the cost of volatility is of rst-
order importance with respect to a tax rate change. Second, by calibrating a stochastic
general equilibrium model the welfare cost of policy-makers ignoring volatility while setting
tax policy is estimated to be $600 billion per year, which is four times greater than the cost
of ignoring deadweight loss.
The government has two concerns when considering the optimal response to tax revenue
volatility. First, the government must consider how to distribute the underlying production
risk in the economy.1 The government could employ lump-sum taxes, but this concentrates
risk in private consumption. By taxing dierent state-dependent bases, such as income or
consumption, the government can instead absorb some of the production risk in the public
1The production risk is modeled as shocks to technology, which aect both the wage and prot received
by the representative individual. The shock, and therefore the wage and prot, is unknown at the time the
government makes its decision.
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good. Diversifying the risk between public and private consumption is welfare improving
and thus, lump-sum taxes are not ecient when production risk exists.
Second, the government must consider the balance between tax bases. By taxing dierent
bases the government can hedge some of the idiosyncratic risk associated with a given tax
base. The ability of the government to hedge idiosyncratic risk depends on the variance-
covariance matrix of the available tax bases.
The government must tradeo these concerns of volatility with the cost of deadweight loss
caused by imposing taxes that distort people's behavior. In this tradeo between volatility
and deadweight loss, deadweight loss is of second-order importance. In contrast, volatility
is of rst-order importance. Harberger's 1954 paper demonstrates that deadweight loss is of
second-order importance by taking a Taylor expansion of the dierence between expenditure
functions before and after a tax rate change. Volatility is demonstrated to be of rst-order
importance by taking a Taylor expansion of the dierence between expected utility functions
before and after a tax rate change in a manner similar to Harberger (1964).
The order of importance characterizes the likelihood a small deviation from the optimum
will cause a welfare loss. There will be no loss in welfare due to a suciently small deviation
for costs that are second-order importance. In contrast, for costs that are of rst-order
importance even small deviations from the optimum will cause welfare losses.
Although volatility is of rst-order importance and deadweight loss is of second-order
importance, rst-order costs are not always larger in magnitude than second-order costs.
Second-order costs can become large in magnitude if the deviation is large and the objective
function is relatively nonlinear. For this reason, a simple model is calibrated to quantify
the costs of volatility and deadweight loss. The model, calibrated to the United States from




This section presents the model in this paper using the parameterized functions from
the calibrated model. However, for the analysis of rst and second order importance the
functions are left general. Each period begins with the government's choice of tax rates and
the provision of the public good. Second, nature chooses the production state of the world.
Third, the representative individual chooses her labor supply and consumption. Finally,
production and utility are realized. The model is discussed using backwards induction,
starting with the realization of production and utility and ending with the government's
optimal choice of tax rates and public good provision.
A. Production An intermediate good is transformed without cost into public and private
consumption. The intermediate good is produced with labor, L, and a production technology,
θ, according to the production function in equation (3.1). The production function exhibits
decreasing returns to scale with respect to labor, γ < 1, and constant returns to scale
with respect to production technology. Production technology is subject to transitory and
persistent shocks according to equation (3.2).
x = f(θt, Lt) = θtL
γ
t (3.1)








These shocks aect the wage and prot according to equation (3.3). The ω parameter
determines the extent to which wages are subject to transitory shocks.2 In this way the
variance of the wage is allowed to dier from the variance of prots. In addition, the
correlation between wages and prots are determined by ω. Wages and prots are perfectly
correlated when ω is equal to one and can be positively or negatively correlated when ω diers
2Note that χ is determined mechanically from f(L) = wL+ π.
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from one.3 The calibrated model estimates ω using data on the correlation and variances of
wage and prot income in the United States.
B. Individual Behavior The representative individual has log utility over the amount of
labor to supply, L, public consumption, g, and private consumption, c. Private consumption
is divided into goods that are taxed, βc, and untaxed, (1 − β)c.4 Individuals maximize
utility by choosing their labor supply and division of private consumption captured by β.
Individuals use their wage income, taxed at the rate τw, and untaxed prot income, π, to
pay for private consumption. The wage they receive is subject to production shocks known
to the individual before she makes her labor supply decision.
U(c, β, L; g) = α1log(βc) + α2log((1− β)c) + α3log(g) + α4log(1− L) (3.4)
c = (1− τcβ)[(1− τw)wL+ π] = (1− τcβ)y
The individual optimization produces equations for labor and β from the rst-order condi-
tions in equations (3.5) and (3.6). In equation (3.5) U2, the derivative of utility with respect
to β, is equal to zero when the consumption tax rate is zero. In this case there is no distortion
between consumption goods because there is no consumption tax. When the consumption
tax rate is not zero, the ratio of the marginal benets of private consumption and β is equal
to τcy, which is the additional tax revenue the government collects due to a marginal change
in β. In the parameterized model, labor is a function of the income tax rate, the wage,





3The ω is a reduced-form parameter encompassing bargaining and other frictions in the labor market.
4The budget constraint can be written as (1− τw)wL+ π = (1 + tc)c1 + c2. First, make the consumption
good substitutions; c1 = βc and c2 = (1− β)c. Second, rearrange the budget constraint such that the right
hand side equals c(1−tcβ). Third, dene τc = tc/(1+tcβ) and substitute into the budget constraint. Finally,
rearrange to get the budget constraint in the text.
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L =
(α1 + α2)(1− τw)w − α4π




= (1− τcβ)(1− τw)w (3.6)
C. Government The government maximizes the expected value of the indirect utility
function, found by substituting the equations for labor, β, and consumption into the repre-
sentative individual's utility function. Two assumptions are made for expository convenience:
i) the supply of the public good is set equal to the tax revenue and ii) the utility function
is additively separable such that U1,4 = 0.
6 These assumptions allow the social welfare
function to be written as in equation (4.3), where c̄ and R̄ are the mean levels of private
and public consumption and σ2c and σ
2
R are the variances of private and public consumption
respectively. The function M(·) represents the expected utility from private consumption,
including leisure, and the function G(·) represents the expected utility from public consump-
tion. The shape of these functions quanties the costs from volatility, implicitly dening the
risk attitudes of public and private consumption.7
E[U(β, c, L; g)] =
Z
U(c, β, L; g)f(θ) ≡M(c̄, σ2c , β, L, σ2L) +G(R̄, σ2R) (3.7)


























In general, the expected utility function is characterized by a function of the moments of
the variables in the utility function (e.g. mean, variance, skewness). In the parameterized
β =
(α1 + α2)(1 + τc) + α1τc −

−8α1(α1 + α2)τc + ((α1 + α2)(1 + τc) + α1τc)2
1/2
4(α1 + α2)τc
6Assuming that the government must have a balanced budget abstracts away from debt issues which are
not the focus of this paper. This assumption may be less of an abstraction for state governments, forty-nine
of which have balanced budget requirements. In practice these balanced budget requirements do not preclude
state debt but they do add additional costs. In this model the ability of the government to smooth revenue
is modeled in its risk attitude.
7M1 ≥ 0, G1 ≥ 0,M2 ≤ 0, G2 ≤ 0
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example the expected utility function M(·) + G(·) is reduced to a function of the rst two
moments because the shocks in the model are assumed to be log-normal. Therefore, the
following section assumes the expected utility function is a function of the rst two moments
only, however the results are robust to including higher moments.
3.2 Order of Importance of Volatility and Deadweight loss
This section considers the welfare costs due to tax rate changes on consumption goods.
The producer price for good i, pi, is assumed to be xed and the consumer price for good i
is assumed to equal qi = pi + ti, where ti is the tax rate. The welfare costs can be broken
into three parts; deadweight loss, income eects, and volatility. Deadweight loss is dened
as the costs from individuals' behavioral responses or the substitution eect. The income
eects capture the change in utility due to shifting consumption between private and public
consumption.8 Finally, the volatility costs captures the loss to risk-averse individuals of
volatile private and public consumption.9
The total loss function due to tax rate changes can be constructed as the dierence
between an individual's expenditure functions, utility functions, or expected utility functions
before and after the tax rate changes. The literature has focused on expenditure functions
because it produces an approximation which can be empirically estimated however, this
measure ignores costs to volatility which are captured by the expected utility function.
Constructing the loss function as the dierence in utility functions provides intuition, based
on the envelope theorem, for the result that deadweight loss is of second-order importance.
The dierence in expenditure functions before and after the tax rate changes is the
additional income needed to compensate an individual for the tax rate changes (Harberger,
8With lump-sum taxes the ecient split of consumption sets the marginal benets of public and private
consumption equal. If the consumption split is not ecient a shift of consumption toward the ecient split
increases welfare and a shift away decreases welfare.
9For example, with lump-sum taxes consumption volatility is concentrated in private consumption, how-
ever the government can distribute some of the volatility to public consumption by taxing state-dependent
tax bases.
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1964; Diamond and McFadden, 1974; Green and Sheshinski, 1979). To isolate the deadweight
loss the literature sets the income eects to zero by assuming the tax revenues collected are
rebated lump-sum back to the individual. This is done by subtracting the tax revenue
collected from the dierence in the expenditure functions.
Harberger approximates this loss function using a Taylor series approximation and demon-
strates deadweight loss can be estimated by the second-order term in the Taylor series expan-
sion. This approximation is useful because the utility function would have to be known to
estimate the loss with expenditure functions but, the second-order approximation depends
only on the slope of the demand function. This result also implies deadweight loss is of
second-order importance because there are no rst-order terms in the Taylor series expan-
sion due to deadweight loss.10 Hence, to a linear approximation of a small change in the tax
rate there is no welfare loss due to deadweight loss.
The dierence in expected utility functions before and after the tax rate changes is the
additional expected utility needed to compensate an individual for the tax rate changes. For
a risk-averse individual these costs include changes in the volatility of public and private
consumption induced by the tax rate changes. The expected utility function captures this
cost because it is a function of the variance of public and private consumption, as shown in
the previous section.
As an intermediary step the welfare costs are constructed as the dierence in utility
functions. An application of the envelope theorem demonstrates deadweight loss is of second-
order importance and that this result does not depend on the absence of other distortions or
taxes in the economy. This contrasts with the fact that costs from volatility are of rst-order
importance, which is shown using the expected utility formula for loss.
10There are rst-order terms in the Taylor series expansion of the loss function corresponding to the income
eects however, the literature assumes these eects cancel.
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3.2.1 Expenditure Function Loss Function
Deadweight loss can be written as the dierence in expenditure functions for prices that
exist before and after a tax change, E(p + t, u) − E(p, u), minus the change in tax revenue
collected, T (p + t, p, u), where p and t are price and tax vectors. The second line in equa-
tion (3.8) approximates the loss function, L(p + t, p, u), using a second-order Taylor series
expansion.11 The rst term in the second line of equation (3.8) is the rst-order term of the
Taylor series expansion. Using Shepard's lemma the rst-order term reduces to the quantity
demanded multiplied by the tax rate which cancels with the tax revenue collected. Hence,
the rst-order term captures the income eect which is not part of deadweight loss. Dead-
weight loss is captured by the substitution eect which is approximated as the second-order
term of the Taylor series expansion given in line 3 of equation (3.8) and hence is of second-
order importance. This derivation demonstrates deadweight loss can be approximated by
a function of only the slopes of the compensated demand functions, suggested by Hotelling
(1938), Hicks (1939), and Harberger (1964).
L(p+ t, p, u) = E(p+ t, u)− E(p, u)− T (p+ t, p, u)
≈ ∂E(p, u)
∂t


















The cancelation of the rst-order terms depends on the assumption that there were no
previous tax distortions. In their 1979 paper Green and Sheshinski show that if there are
taxes previous to a change in tax revenue there would be a rst-order term representing
the change in the previous tax revenue. Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) demonstrate the rst-
order term is negative if the tax rate change is on goods complementary to other taxed goods
11This approximation is done in Harberger (1964); Diamond and McFadden (1974); Green and Sheshinski
(1979).
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and positive if the taxed goods are substitutes.12 In these cases the rst-order term does
not represent deadweight loss, dened as the utility loss due to behavioral responses, but
represents changes in tax revenue. To provide additional intuition for why the rst-order
eects are not due to behavioral responses the loss function is constructed in terms of utility
functions.
3.2.2 Utility Function Loss Function
Deadweight loss can be constructed as the dierence in utility before and after a tax
change as in the rst line in equation (E.1). The utility change from the change in public
consumption, g, due to the change in tax rates is given by U3
∂g1
∂t
. The rst-order Taylor
series approximation is given in line 2 of equation (E.1).













(p+ t1 − p− t2)| {z }
∆t
= ∆t(U1sx − U1
∂x1
∂m
































) = ∆tU1(sx − sx) = 0
The Slutsky decomposition given in line 3 of equation (E.1) separates the approximation into
the income and substitution eects where sx represents the derivative of the compensated
demand for good x. The income eect, given in line 4 of equation (E.1), compares the utility
from public consumption, the rst term in the income eect, and private consumption, the
12The rst-order term may also have dierent signs due to horizontal and vertical externalities. For
example, the rst-order term could be negative due to a negative vertical externality on federal income tax
revenue caused by a change in the state level income tax rate.
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second and third terms in the income eect. In this case without volatility the income
eect equals the FOC from the government's optimization, therefore if the Taylor series
approximation is taken around the optimum the income eect is zero. In this case without
volatility if the Taylor series approximation is taken around the optimum the income eect
is zero because the income eect equals the FOC from the government's optimization.13
The rst-order approximation of deadweight loss (substitution eect) is zero for any set
of tax rates not only the optimal set. Line 5 of equation (E.1) demonstrates the individual's
optimization, specically the FOC U2
U1
= 1/px, causes the deadweight loss rst-order term
to be zero.14 Therefore, deadweight loss being of second-order importance does not depend
on the government's optimization or on the absence of other distortions in the economy but
only on the individual's optimization.
An application of the envelope theorem in this case conrms the rst-order term is zero.
For example, plot the utility of the individual against the relative price. If the individual
always consumes the old bundle regardless of the relative price, assuming she has enough
income to buy the old bundle, the utility would be represented as a horizontal line in utility
relative-price space.15 Separately plot the maximized utility for each relative price. This
curve lies weakly above the horizontal line, touching at the old relative price which made the
old bundle the optimal bundle. Therefore, by the envelope theorem there is no rst-order
eect from the relative price change.
3.2.3 Expected Utility Function Loss Function
Finally, the appropriate measure of the total loss resulting from tax rate changes include
deadweight loss, income eects, and volatility. Constructing the total loss function as the
dierence in expected utility functions before and after the change in tax rates, given in
13The income eect is also zero if, following the literature, there is no public good and the tax revenues
are rebated lump-sum back to the individual.
14Line 5 of equation (E.1) totally dierentiates the budget constraint to get sy = −pxsx and uses the
individual's rst order condition to get U2/U1 = 1/px.
15The individual does have enough income to always buy the old bundle if the tax revenue is returned to
her with a lump-sum transfer.
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equation (3.10), captures all three of theses costs. As shown in the previous section, expected
utility can be written as M(c̄2, σ
2
c,2, β2) + G(R̄2, σ
2
R,2) where M(·) is the expected utility in
private consumption and G(·) is the expected utility in public consumption. For risk-averse
individuals these functions include higher moments. For simplicity, the expected utility
functions have been restricted to the cases in which they can be fully characterized by their
rst two moments (mean and variance) but the results are robust to allowing for additional
moments.16 The loss function is estimated using a rst-order Taylor series approximation
given in line 2 of equation (3.10) to demonstrate the rst-order approximation of the cost
from volatility is not zero.
L̄ = M(c̄2, σ
2
c,2, β2) +G(R̄2, σ
2
R,2)−M(c̄1, σ2c,1, β1)−G(R̄1, σ2R,1) (3.10)

















The rst-order term representing deadweight loss is given by the utility cost of the individual
shifting between taxed and untaxed goods. In equation (3.10) this term is given by M3
∂β1
∂p




= τcy which is a rst-order term accounting for the change in tax revenue but
not a cost from behavioral changes. Therefore, once again the rst-order approximation of
deadweight loss is zero because of the individual's optimization.
In contrast, the rst-order approximation of the cost from volatility given by the changes
in the variances of private and public consumption is not zero. In equation (3.10) the costs






. At the optimum the government trades o costs
from deadweight loss and volatility, hence the cost from volatility is not minimized because
the government accepts a higher cost of volatility in order to lower the cost of deadweight
loss. If deadweight loss did not exist the government would minimize the cost of volatility
16Let the expected utility be given by M(c̄2, σ
2
c,2, β2,Ωc,2) + G(R̄2, σ
2
R,2,Ωg,2) where Ωc,2 and Ωg,2 are
vectors of higher moments of private and public consumption. The last line in equation (3.10 would then be










and the rst-order term would be zero at the optimum. Even though the cost of deadweight
loss is also not minimized at the optimum the rst-order term for deadweight loss is still zero
because of the individual's optimization. In contrast, the individual's optimization does not
minimize the cost of volatility. Therefore, the cost from volatility is of rst-order importance
around the optimum and at any point at which the cost from volatility is not minimized.
Figures (3.1) and (3.2) demonstrate the intuition graphically for why volatility is of rst-
order importance and deadweight loss is of second-order importance. Figure (3.1) depicts
utility with respect to β. The Taylor series expansion is taken around the optimum values,
represented by the peak of the concave function due to the individual's optimization. Even
if the Taylor series expansion were taken around tax rates that were not optimal, the indi-
vidual's optimization would still cause the Taylor series expansion to be taken at values at
the peak of the concave function. At the peak, the linear approximation to a change in β is
zero.
Figure (3.2) depicts the utility cost of volatility (captured byM(·, σ2c (τ), ·, ·)+G(·, σ2g(τ)))
with respect to a tax rate. The cost is U-shaped meaning an increase in the tax rate decreases
the cost of volatility for small values of the tax rate and increases the cost for large values.
The Taylor expansion is taken around the optimum values, away from the nadir because
the government trades o some additional cost to volatility for less deadweight loss. In this
example, the linear approximation to a change in the tax rate is positive.
The linear approximation of deadweight loss and volatility depend on the slope at which
the Taylor series approximation is taken. If the approximation is taken at the peak and
nadir of the two curves the linear approximations of deadweight loss and volatility are both
zero. In contrast, if the approximation is taken away from the peak and nadir of the two
curves the linear approximations of deadweight loss and volatility are both not zero. The
individual's optimization causes the approximation to be taken at the peak of the curve
for deadweight loss, for any tax rates the approximation is taken around. In contrast, the
individual's optimization does not cause the approximation to be taken around the nadir
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of the cost of volatility. In addition, if the Taylor series approximation is taken around the
optimal tax rates then by the government's FOCs the approximation will not be around the
nadir and hence, the cost of volatility is of rst-order importance.
Figures (3.1) and (3.2) highlight the fact that the total cost of deadweight loss could be
larger than volatility in magnitudes despite the fact that deadweight loss is of second-order
importance and volatility is of rst-order importance. In the following section a calibrated




3.3.1 Volatility-unaware and volatility-conscious governments.
This subsection calculates the rst-order conditions for a government that does not take
into account the costs of volatility (volatility-unaware") and a government that does ac-
count for the costs of volatility (volatility-conscious"). The volatility-unaware government
maximizes utility of the representative individual. The government is constrained to collect
an exogenously given level of expected revenue g. This constraint is a common constraint
in the optimal taxation literature but it abstracts from the costs of volatility. In contrast,
the volatility-conscious government maximizes the representative individual's expected util-
ity. In this case, the variances of public and private consumption enter the government's
objective function directly.
C.1 Volatility-Unaware Government. The volatility-unaware government sets the income
and consumption tax rates to maximize utility subject to the constraint that government
revenues, on average, equal an exogenous level of revenue g used to produce the public good.
The government maximizes the indirect utility function, which substitutes the equilibrium
values for β, L, c from the individual's optimization into the utility function.
U(τw, τc; g) = α1log(βc) + α2log((1− β)c) + α3log(g) + α4log(1− L)
g = τcβE[y] + τwE[wL]












= 0 envelope theorem
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The use of the envelope theorem in simplifying the rst-order condition of the volatility-
unaware government provides additional intuition for why deadweight loss is of second order
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importance. The eects of raising the consumption tax rate can be split into an income eect,
transferring income from the individual to the government, and a substitution eect due to
changes in the individual's consumption behavior, captured by ∂β/∂τc. The individual's
rst-order condition with respect to β is the term that multiplies ∂β/∂τc causing this term
to be zero, at least to a rst-order approximation. Therefore, the welfare cost of raising
the consumption tax rate due to behavioral changes in consumption is mitigated by the



















































The typical considerations in optimal taxation are present in the rst-order conditions for
the volatility-unaware government. The rst term on both sides of equation (3.12) represent
the income eect, transferring income from the individual to the government weighted by the
marginal utility of private and public consumption. The second term on the left hand side
represents the leakage from the income transfer due to behavioral responses of the individual.
The leakage increases the cost of providing the public good because some income is lost to
both the individual and government when the government uses distortionary taxes to raise
revenue. The third term on the left hand side captures the interplay between taxes, the
horizontal externality. In this model, raising the income tax rate causes the individual to
spend less, thus decreasing the consumption tax revenue. Finally, the second term on the
right hand side captures the general equilibrium eects taxes have on wages and prots.
The volatility-conscious government has these same considerations but also considers how
tax rates change the volatility of public and private consumption.
C.2 Volatility-Conscious Government. The volatility-conscious government sets the in-
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come and consumption tax rates to maximize the expected utility of the representative
individual. The government is constrained by a budget constraint and the resulting vari-
ance of public consumption. Notice the objective function for the government includes the
variances of log labor and public and private consumption.


























The rst-order conditions for the volatility-conscious government includes the variances of

















































In equation (3.13) ∂σ2c/∂τc is negative. In equation (3.13) ∂σ
2
g/∂τc can be positive or negative.
This derivative is negative when the consumption tax is being used relatively less than the
income tax. In this case the benet from hedging income tax-specic risk is high. When










































magnitudes of these additional terms quantify the benets of the government absorbing some
of the production risk.
3.3.2 Calibration
A model period is calibrated to be one year in length. All parameters of the model are set
internally using simulated generalized method of moments. There are four utility function





The production function parameters dene the level of output, share of output to labor and
prot, and the variances of the technological shocks. These nine parameters are calibrated
using simulated method of moments.
The rst moment is the share of private consumption that is taxable, captured in the
model by β. Mikesell (Mar. 5, 2012) estimates the average taxable share of private consump-
tion to be 46.7 percent between 1970 and 2010 at the state level. In contrast, he nds the
taxable share to be 34.5 percent in 2010, representing a signicant decrease in the consump-
tion tax base. He also nds considerable heterogeneity across states in their average tax base
between 1970 and 2010. Massachusetts has the smallest average tax base, at 27.2 percent,
and Hawaii has the largest, at 106 percent. The baseline calibration uses 46.7 percent to
constrain β and the sensitivity analysis considers β ∈ [27.2, 106].
The literature surveyed by Domeij and Floden (2006) on the Frisch labor supply elasticity
suggests a range between 0 and .5 although the authors argue these estimates are likely to
be biased downwards by up to 50 percent suggesting a range between 0 and 1. Kimball and
Shapiro (2008) estimate a Frisch elasticity of close to 1, which has been used in other public
nance calibrations (e.g., House and Shapiro (2006) and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)). For
the log utility specication used in this paper, a Frisch elasticity close to 1 implies a labor
supply of 0.5 because ηFrisch = 1/L− 1. The second moment in the baseline calibration uses
a labor supply of 0.5.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis reports that state and local expenditures are 11 percent
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of gross domestic product. In the model, gross domestic product is given by the sum of public
and private consumption. Therefore the third moment sets the ratio of public consumption
to total consumption to be .11 and characterizes α3 relative to α1 and α2. The fourth moment
normalizes the utility parameters to be shares by setting their sum to one.
The following ve moments calibrate production in the model using data from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis. First, wage income per person is calculated to be $15, 214.59, which is
the mean wage income from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Personal Income and Outlays
section in real terms chained to 2005 dollars. Similarly, prot income is calculated to be
$8860.90 per person. These two moments inform the values of the labor share of production,
γ, and the level of technology state, µ. The variance and covariance of wage and prot income
are used as moments to calibrate the variance of the shocks σ2u and σ
2
ε and the parameter ω.
The wage income coecient of variation (the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean) is
0.034. The coecient of variation for prot income is 0.083, meaning income from prots is
more volatile than wage income. The correlation between wage and prot income is 0.227.
All but one simulated moment, listed in Table 3.1, is within 3 percent of its target. Five
of the nine simulated moments are within 1 percent of their target: the labor supply, utility
normalization, the coecient of variation for wage and prot income, and the correlation be-
tween wage income and prots. The share of government expenditures to total consumption
is 8 percent below its target simulated moment and is the furthest moment from its target.
The simulated wage income is 1.8 percent higher than its target and the simulated prot is
1.8 percent below its target. Finally, β is 2.2 percent higher than its target.
The parameters from the calibration are given in Table 3.2. When the consumption tax
rate is zero β equals the ratio of α1 to the sum of α1 and α2. Therefore the nondistorted β is
0.496, which is 6 percent larger than the target distorted β. The labor production share, γ is
close to its stylized fact value of 0.66. The coecient of variation of the production technology
is .0017 which implies that a one standard deviation shock to production is .17 percent (less
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Table 3.1: Calibrated Targets and Moments
Moment Symbol Target Value
Share private consumption β 0.467 0.4775
Labor supply L 0.5000 .5000
Share public consumption g/(c+ g) 0.11 0.1013
Utility normalization α1 + α2 + α3 + α4 1 1
Wage income wL $15, 214 $15, 490
Prot income π $8, 860 $8, 700
Coecient of variation wage income cv(wL) σwL/w̄L̄ 0.0340 0.0341
Coecient of variation prot income cv(π) σπ/π̄ 0.083 0.0826
Correlation of wage and prot income σ2π,wL/(σπσwL) 0.2265 0.2266
Table 3.2: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Meaning Value Reason
α1 Share taxable consumption 0.2945 Mikesell (2012)
α2 Share untaxable consumption 0.2992 Mikesell (2012)
α3 Share public consumption 0.0421 Government expenditures (BEA)
α4 Share leisure 0.3642 Frisch elasticity
γ Share labor 0.6406 Wage and prot income (BEA)
µ Production technology 37, 692 Wage and prot income (BEA)
σv Persistent shock 1, 148.8 Variance wage and prot income (BEA)
σ2ε Temporary shock 2, 539.8 Variance wage and prot income (BEA)
ω Wage smoothing 0.0226 Correlation wage and prot income (BEA)
than one percent) of the mean production technology.18 Therefore, the calibrated shocks in
the model are moderate to small.
18Coecient of variation equals standard deviation over mean. The standard deviation of the production







Table 3.3: Quantifying Volatility and Deadweight Loss
Government Consideration Uncertainty Utility Percent U1
U1 Volatility and deadweight loss Yes 5.600153 100%
U2 Deadweight loss No 5.650754 100.9%
U3 Lump-sum taxes No 5.700688 100.8%
U4 Deadweight loss only Yes 5.550783 99.1%
U5 Volatility only Yes 5.590296 99.8%
U6 Lump-sum Yes 5.580723 99.7%
Cost Comparison % Private Consumption Aggregate
Traditional
Volatility U2 − U1 8.897% $603 Billion
Deadweight loss U3 − U2 8.773% $594 Billion
New
Volatility U1 − U4 8.671% $587 Billion
Deadweight loss U1 − U5 1.674% $113 Billion
Additional
Ecient vs Lump-sum U1 − U6 3.327% $225 Billion
U.S. population 311,591,917 US Census Bureau, July 2011.
Cost calculations based on equation (3.17) with simulated average consumption $21, 739.55.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Calculating Welfare Costs.
This section quanties the costs of volatility and compares it to deadweight loss with two
separate methods. The rst method compares utility with and without the specic cost. For
example, the cost of volatility is quantied comparing utility with and without production
risk. The second method compares utility given tax rates that are calculated considering
dierent costs (e.g., with or without volatility costs and/or deadweight loss). The rst
method follows cost estimates from Musgrave (1959), Feldstein (2008), and others in tax
incidence. The second method quanties the costs from policy makers ignoring important
aspects of optimal taxation, specically deadweight loss and volatility.
Table 3.3 lists the six utilities calculated and the ve comparisons of utilities that quantify
the costs of volatility and deadweight loss. The rst comparison quanties the cost of
volatility comparing utility with and without production risk ((U1) and (U2) respectively).
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In both cases the tax rates are set using the optimal tax rates calculated using the rst-
order conditions (3.13) and (3.14), but the tax rates dier because the setting diers.19 The
second comparison quanties the cost of deadweight loss comparing utility with lump-sum
taxes (U3) and utility with distortionary taxes (U2), both in a setting without production
risk. These comparisons are between utility with and without volatility in the rst case, and
between utility with and without deadweight loss in the second case.
The third comparison quanties the cost of volatility comparing utility with the ecient
tax rates (taking into account volatility costs and deadweight loss) and tax rates set con-
sidering deadweight loss only (ignoring the costs from volatility). The fourth comparison
quanties the cost of deadweight loss comparing utility with the ecient tax rates and tax
rates set considering volatility costs only (ignoring deadweight loss). The tax rates in these
two cases are calculated accounting for dierent sets of terms in the rst-order conditions












































































Each of these utility comparisons can be stated in terms of private consumption by nding the
additional private consumption needed to provide the same level of utility. The calculation
below demonstrates this calculation for utility with distortionary taxes (U2) and utility with
lump-sum taxes (U3). The percentage of additional private consumption needed in the case
19The rst-order conditions (3.13) and (3.14) reduce to the rst-order conditions (3.11) and (3.12) in the
absence of production risk.
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of distortionary taxes to equal the utility with lump-sum taxes is given by x. A similar
calculation is made for each of the utility comparisons.
U2(c(1 + x), β, L; g) =U3(c, β, L; g)
(α1 + α2)log(1 + x) =U3(c, β, L; g)− Udistort(c, β, L; g)
x =exp
 




⇒ xc =U3(c, β, L; g)− U2(c, β, L; g) (3.17)
Table 3.3 reports the welfare cost of volatility and deadweight loss for both the traditional
and new methodologies. Using the traditional method, the welfare cost of volatility and
deadweight loss are both approximately $600 billion dollars a year. Using the new method,
the welfare cost of volatility is $587 billion dollars per year and the cost of deadweight loss is
$113 billion dollars per year. The dierence between the optimal tax rates and the tax rates
set while ignoring the costs of volatility is larger than the dierence between the optimal
tax rates and the tax rates set while ignoring the costs of deadweight loss. Because the
deviation from the optimal tax rates caused by ignoring the costs of volatility is larger than
the deviation from ignoring deadweight loss, the welfare cost is larger for volatility than
deadweight loss.
While both methods quantify the costs of volatility and deadweight loss they ask funda-
mentally dierent questions. The traditional method asks what `would the benet to society
be if volatility and deadweight loss were eliminated'. The welfare estimates of approximately
$600 billion for volatility and deadweight loss demonstrate that both of these are signicant
costs in the economy. The new method asks what `would the benet to society be from
having policy makers set tax rates considering the costs of deadweight loss and volatility'.
These welfare estimates demonstrate that policymakers should be more concerned with the
costs of volatility than deadweight loss because the potential welfare costs from ignoring
volatility are 4 times larger than the costs of ignoring deadweight loss.
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The nal comparison given in Table 3.3 quanties the benet of distributing the produc-
tion risk across public and private consumption. This compares optimal tax rates, accounting
for both volatility and deadweight loss, with lump-sum taxes, both in a setting with pro-
duction risk. The optimal tax rates distribute some of the risk between public and private
consumption but produce deadweight loss by using distortionary taxes. In contrast, lump-
sum taxes concentrate the production risk in private consumption but produce no deadweight
loss. The result demonstrates that the government's optimal tax rates provide substantial,
$225 billion per year, benet over lump-sum taxes, reinforcing the result that volatility costs
are larger in magnitude than deadweight loss.
3.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity of the calibration to the weighting matrix, in the simulated method of
moments, is determined by running the calibration with 1000 random weighting matrices
where each weight is allowed to take on a value between 1 and 100.20 The penalty function for
each of the moments diers with their relative weights. For example, allowing the weighting
function to dier from the identity matrix (the baseline weighting function) by changing
the rst value on the diagonal to equal 100, as opposed to 1, increases the penalty function
on only the rst moment. The resulting simulated method of moments decreases the error
between the simulated and target moment for the rst moment at the cost of allowing other
simulated moments to dier more from their targets. The simulated moments remained
within 15 percent of their target in all of the 1000 random weighting functions used and the
resulting calibrations were qualitatively similar.
The sensitivity of the calculated utilities to the calibration is determined by calculating
the utilities 3000 times with varying calibration. The utilities are calculated using parameters
drawn from a normal distribution with a mean equal to their calibrated value and a standard
20The baseline calibration is determined by running simulated method of moments with the identity matrix
as the weighting matrix.
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deviation equal to ve percent of their calibrated value.21 The standard deviation of the
resulting 3000 utility calculations is 1.2 percent of the baseline calculation. Therefore the
calibration is relatively robust to the weighting matrix used and the utilities are relatively
robust to errors in the calibration.
3.5 Conclusion
Costs from volatility have largely been ignored in the optimal taxation literature because
the unique characteristics of the U.S. federal government make these costs negligible. How-
ever, for other governments, especially state governments, volatility is a real and important
cost. This paper demonstrates theoretically the importance of considering volatility, in both
public and private consumption, for governments setting tax rates. Optimally governments
tradeo costs from volatility and deadweight loss, but this paper shows that, of these two
considerations, only volatility is of rst-order importance.
The magnitude of the costs from volatility is estimated using a model calibrated to the
United States using data from 1970 - 2010. Although volatility is of rst-order importance
and deadweight loss is of second-order importance, either of these two costs could have had
a larger magnitude than the other. The results from the calibrated model demonstrate that
the magnitude of the cost from volatility is larger than the cost due to deadweight loss. In
terms of private consumption, the magnitude of the cost from setting tax rates ignoring the
costs of volatility is $600 billion. Therefore, volatility is of utmost importance for policy
makers to consider when setting tax policy.
This paper focuses on the tradeo between volatility and deadweight loss; however, there
are other important tradeos considered in the optimal taxation literature. One of these
tradeos is distributional concerns across heterogenous individuals. The eect of tax revenue
volatility across individuals in the income distribution may be heterogeneous depending on
21The parameters are constrained in two ways; rst, to be positive if necessary, and in the case of the
utility parameters to sum to one.
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how governments respond to shocks to their revenue streams. Empirically, how governments
respond to these shocks and the resulting distributional eects remain an open question in the
literature. Therefore, although I've demonstrated the importance of tax revenue volatility in





An Estimation of Government Tax Revenue
Minimum-Variance Frontiers
Government budget crises in the 2000s were magnied by an increase in tax revenue
volatility. For example, state governments in the United States experienced a 500 per-
cent increase in volatility in the 2000s relative to previous decades. State governments are
particularly sensitive to tax revenue volatility because of their balanced budget rules and
other frictions which make smoothing tax revenues dicult. Governments can decrease the
variance of their tax revenues by holding the ecient portfolio" of taxes. In this conceptu-
alization, each tax base is a potential asset held by the government and the tax rate on a
given base is the weight the government puts on the asset. Conceptualizing government -
nances as an optimal portfolio problem highlights the ability of governments to hedge risk by
taxing dierent bases, but this method must be adapted to account for numerous dierences
between a government and an individual investor.
The rst of these dierences results from the obvious disparity in size between individual
investors and governments. When an individual investor increases her holdings of a given
asset, the mean return of the asset is not aected. However, when the government increases
the weight on a given asset by increasing the tax rate, the asset's mean return decreases
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because the tax base shrinks as a result of individual behavioral responses to the tax increase.
The decreased return is the leakage caused by behavioral responses by individuals.
The second dierence occurs because, in contrast to the individual investor, the assets
in the government's portfolio are interdependent. When a government increases its income
tax rate, this aects sales tax and corporate tax returns. For example, individual behavioral
responses of how much to consume and how much income to shift between income and
corporate tax bases depends on the income tax rate. The eect of a given tax rate on other
tax bases is a horizontal externality that complicates government nance.
The third dierence occurs because, in contrast to the individual investor, the govern-
ment's objective function is not to minimize the variance of tax revenue for a given expected
rate of return but to maximize expected utility. One aspect that needs to be considered when
maximizing expected utility is the cost from volatile tax revenue streams. Other aspects the
government must consider include costs due to deadweight loss and the ecient risk-sharing
between public and private consumption.
This paper conducts the analysis of the mean-variance tradeo made by governments
within a utility framework. The analysis demonstrates the tradeos governments face be-
tween volatility and deadweight loss and between public and private consumption volatility.
Therefore, the government aims to optimize, not minimize, tax revenue volatility.
The theoretical model is applicable to governments that are constrained, in some way,
from perfectly smoothing their revenue causing their expenditures to be exposed to risk in
revenue. For example, U.S. state governments are limited in their ability to smooth revenue
because of self-imposed balanced budget rules. In addition, European governments' expen-
ditures are currently exposed to additional risk in revenues because of limits in borrowing
caused by the Euro-zone debt crises. Borrowing constraints can also cause developing coun-
tries' expenditures to be exposed to risk in their revenue streams. In fact, all governments
are exposed to revenue shocks to some extent because of their uncertainty about whether an
observed shock is temporary or permanent. Therefore, explaining tax revenue volatility and
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the ways in which tax policy can be used to stabilize government expenditures is important
for governments world-wide.
As an application of the theoretical model, I create a method to estimate the minimum
variance governments can achieve for a given expected level of tax revenue: a minimum-
variance frontier. Following the results of the theoretical model, each tax base-rate pair is
considered a separate asset. To implement this method, counterfactual portfolio returns rst
had to be estimated because data exist for only one portfolio in any given year (the actual
portfolio held by the government).
I demonstrate the method with a few examples using data from U.S. state governments.
Estimating state-specic minimum-variance frontiers allows for across-state analysis of the
relative mean-variance tradeos. In addition, the dierent historic portfolios held by gov-
ernments can be plotted to determine how government portfolios have changed over time
relative to the minimum-variance frontier.
4.1 Literature
This paper contributes to the optimal taxation literature by formalizing the tradeo of
tax revenue volatility within the context of portfolio analysis. Uncertainty has been discussed
in many dierent contexts within the optimal taxation literature. Mossin (1969) and Stiglitz
(1969) study the eect of taxes on risk taking by individuals. Varian (1980) discusses the
potential for taxation to act as social-insurance. tax revenue volatility, which is the focus of
this paper, is a separate consequence of uncertainty.
This paper also contributes to the literature started by Groves and Kahn (1952) on tax
portfolios by formalizing optimal portfolio theory for governments. This literature has fo-
cused on the income elasticities and stability of state and local taxes noting that elasticities
change over time (Groves and Kahn, 1952) and with the business cycle (Fox and Campbell,
1984; Otsuka and Braun, 1999). Dye and McGuire (1991) compare state sales and income
taxes in an attempt to determine which tax base is more stable, but nd that their stabil-
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ities cannot be systematically dierentiated. Sobel and Holcombe (1996) extend Dye and
McGuire's analysis by including more tax instruments in a new time series technique but
nd similar ambiguities. Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle (2006) use disaggregated data to rene
the literatures results. Their results suggest that neither the personal income tax nor the
sales tax is universally more volatile than the other. Instead of comparing individual tax
bases, my paper adapts optimal portfolio theory to demonstrate that a mix of tax bases may
provide the most stabile tax revenues.
4.2 Model Setup
A Timing The economy is assumed to be a one period snapshot of a dynamic model
where the state of nature within the period is uncertain ex ante. The timing is given below,
but note the government moves before the state of nature is realized, causing uncertainty
from the government's point of view; in contrast, the individual does not face uncertainty
because she moves after the state of nature is realized. The government does not know the
realization of the wage and prot, but is assumed to know the distribution.
Order of Decisions Choices
1st - Government τc, τw
2nd - Nature w, π
3rd - Individual c, L, β
4th - Production occurs
5th - Utility realized
B. Individual Behavior. The individual has utility over her supply of labor L, the public
good g, and total private consumption c, which is split between goods that are taxed, c1 ≡ βc,
and goods that are untaxed c2 ≡ (1− β)c. The individual chooses c, L, and β to maximize
utility
maxc,β,L u = U(c, β, L,G, ) subject to y = c(1 + tcβ)
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where tc is the tax rate on consumption and y = (1 − tw)wL + π is income net of the
wage income tax.1 Wages and prots are assumed to be stochastic, resulting in stochastic
consumption and wage income. Consumption and its mean and variance can be written as,
c =(1− τcβ)((1− tw)wL+ π) where τc = tc/(1− tcβ)
c̄ =(1− τcβ)((1− tw)w̄L̄+ π̄) σ2c = (1− τcβ)2((1− tw)2σ2wL + σ2π + 2(1− tw)σwL,π)
Consumption and wage income will not be perfectly correlated as long as wages and prots
are not perfectly correlated, which can be seen in gure 4.1. Figure 4.1 represents consump-
tion as a vector equal to the sum of the vectors of wage and prot income where the lengths
of all of the vectors equal the standard deviation of the variable. Using the law of cosines,
the correlation between two vectors is depicted as the cosine of the angle between any two
vectors. For example, if the vectors are parallel the variables are perfectly correlated and if
the vectors are perpendicular the variables are independent.
The ability of the government to hedge idiosyncratic risk between consumption and wage
income tax bases depends on the correlation of these two variables.2 In this example if
the standard deviation of the prot shock increases, the correlation between consumption
and wage income decreases. This can be seen graphically by increasing the length of the
prot vector extending from the end of the wage income vector, which results in a larger
angle between consumption and wage income (and also decreases the cosine of the angle and
therefore the correlation).3
1wL(1− tw) + π = y = (1− β)c+ βc(1 + tc) = c(1 + tcβ)
2First, let τc = tw = 0 for simplicity, allowing c = wL+ π. The cosine of the angle between wage income
and consumption, using the law of cosines, can be written as cos(θ) = (σ2c + σ
2
wL − σ2π)/(2σwLσc). The
numerator can be reduced to 2cov(wL, c) using the variance formula var(π) = var(c − wL) = var(c) +
var(wL) − 2cov(wL, c). Therefore the cosine of the angle between wage and prot income is equal to the
correlation between them; cos(θ) = cov(wL, c)/(σwLσc) = ρwL,c.
3In this example increasing the standard deviation of prot income increases the standard deviation of
consumption. However, if prot income and wage income were negatively correlated, increasing the standard
deviation of prot income could decrease the standard deviation of consumption.
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(b) Correlation Consumption and Income
Utility maximization requires that: i) the marginal disutility from supplying labor equals
the marginal utility of the income it produces and ii) the ratio of marginal utilities from total
consumption c and β is equal to the consumption tax rate multiplied by net income. When
the consumption tax rate is zero there is no distortion between consumption goods, and the
marginal utility with respect to β is zero. Composing utility in terms of total consumption,
c, and β simplies the composition of deadweight loss because β encompasses all behavioral
responses between goods.
U1(c, β, L,G)(1− τcβ)(1− tw)w = U3 (4.1)
U2
U1
= τc((1− tw)wL+ π) (4.2)
C. Government The government produces the public good g and nances its produc-
tion with taxes on consumption and wage income. Both of the government's tax bases are
state-dependent and uncertain when the government makes its decision. Therefore, the gov-
ernment maximizes the expected utility of the representative individual, which generally
can be written as a function of the moments (e.g. mean, variance, skewness) of the state-
dependent variables. This analysis restricts attention to the cases where expected utility
is fully characterized by a function of the rst two moments (mean and variance), but is
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robust to considering higher moments. This restriction holds if the joint distribution of the
state-dependent variables is normal or any distribution fully characterized by the rst two
moments (e.g. log-normal and uniform).4 The utility function is assumed to be additively
separable such that U1,4 = 0 so the level of social welfare can be written as
E[u] =
Z
U(c, g)f(c, R, σ2R, σ
2
c ) ≡M(C, σ2c , β, L) +G(R, σ2R) (4.3)








where c̄ and R̄ are the mean levels of the private and public consumption, σ2c and σ
2
R are the
variances of private and public consumption respectively, and G(·) represents the expected
utility from public consumption and M(·) represents the expected utility from private con-
sumption. The shape ofM(·) can dier from the shape ofG(·), allowing for dierent attitudes
towards volatility in public and private consumption. Specically, the relative magnitudes
of M2 and G2 determine the relative benet of stable public or private consumption. There-
fore, even though the government and individual are not allowed to smooth shocks through
saving, the relative magnitudes of M2 and G2 can be thought of as the relative ability of the
government and individual to smooth public and private consumption. For example, if the
individual is able to perfectly smooth private consumption her utility could be written as
being linear in private consumption and M2 = 0.
4.3 Tax Portfolio Analysis
The government's optimal portfolio problem diers from traditional optimal portfolio
analysis in three important ways. First, the government is a large relative to the market,
4Assuming the representative individual's utility function is quadratic is another example of when the
expected utility function would be characterized fully by the rst two moments of the state dependent
variables and is used frequently in the nance literature.
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meaning the weight it puts on an asset aects the asset's returns along with other assets'
returns. For example, as the government increases its tax rate on wage income, individuals
supply less labor causing the wage income tax base to decrease. In addition, as the govern-
ment increases its tax rate on wage income, the individual has less income to consume thus
decreasing the consumption tax base. Second, the government, in maximizing the represen-
tative individual's utility, considers the welfare cost of volatility in both public and private
consumption. Finally, the government, in maximizing the representative individual's utility,
trades o the costs from volatility (in both public and private consumption) with deadweight
loss caused by the government using taxes that distort individual's behavior.
This section begins with the general government's optimal portfolio problem which is
written as minimizing the welfare cost of public and private volatility. The analysis then turns
to a series of special cases that demonstrate the additional complexities in the government's
optimal portfolio problem. In all of the special cases the government is constrained to
bring in a given level of mean revenue, abstracting away from dierences in rst moments
(deadweight loss). First, the government's optimal portfolio problem is considered when the
representative individual is risk-neutral with respect to the private good. In this case the
government's objective function reduces to minimizing the variance of the public good.
In the second case the government's optimal portfolio problem is considered when the
representative individual has the same risk attitude over public and private consumption. In
this case the government's objective function reduces to minimizing the sum of the variances
of public and private consumption. Finally, the government's optimal portfolio problem
is considered when the representative individual's risk attitude diers between public and
private consumption. This case diers from the full problem only by abstracting from changes
in the rst moments of public and private consumption.
Full Government's Optimal Portfolio Problem In the full model the government mini-
mizes the negative welfare impact of volatility with endogenous levels of public and private
consumption. In other words, the government minimizes the negative of utility which is the
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dual of the Ramsey problem from Seegert (2012). Equation (4.4) provides the condition for
the optimal pair of consumption and wage income tax rates. The condition demonstrates the
three key dierences of the government's optimal portfolio analysis from traditional optimal
portfolio analysis.
First, the elasticities of the variance of public consumption with respect to a tax rate
encompasses the ways in which the tax bases change according to the government's weight
on each of the tax bases. Second, the welfare cost of both public and private consumption
volatility is captured by the numerators of the two terms on the left-hand side of equation
(4.4). The welfare weights ωM and ωG weight the elasticities in the numerator based on the
risk preferences between public and private consumption. For example, if the representative
individual prefers stable private consumption over stable public consumption ωM > ωG and
if the government is suciently better at smoothing tax revenues than the representative
individual is at smoothing her private consumption ωM < ωG. Finally, the tradeo with
deadweight loss is demonstrated by the two terms on the right-hand side.
mintw,τc −
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The condition in equation (4.4) can be broken up into four parts; two depicting the marginal
costs of the consumption tax and two the wage income tax (the rst and second terms of both
sides respectively) and two the costs from volatility and two the costs from deadweight loss
(the left-hand side and the right-hand side respectively). The two parts on the left-hand side
quantify the marginal costs due to changes in the variance of public and private consumption.
The rst term on the left hand side is made up of three elasticities. The elasticities in the
numerator are the elasticity of the variances of public and private consumption with respect
to the consumption tax rate. These elasticities are weighted by their marginal importance
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on utility. For example, ωM = −M2(σ2c/R) where −M2 = ∂M(C, σ2c , β, L)/∂σ2c is positive
and equal to the marginal welfare of changes in the variance of private consumption. The
elasticity in the denominator is the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to the consumption
tax rate. Therefore together this rst term provides the marginal welfare cost of increasing
the consumption tax rate on the variance of public and private consumption relative to
its change in tax revenue. Similarly, the second term provides the marginal welfare cost
of increasing the wage income tax rate on the variance of public and private consumption
relative to its change in tax revenue.
The right-hand side of equation (4.4) is the welfare cost due to deadweight loss of the
consumption and wage income tax rates. The rst term on the right-hand side is the marginal
change in deadweight loss of increasing the consumption tax rate relative to the change in
tax revenue. Intuitively, increasing the consumption tax rate aects the individual's decision
on which goods to consume (β) and how much labor to supply (L). The welfare cost of these
changes are quantied by the numerator of the rst term on the right-hand side where
ωβ = −M3(β/R) is the welfare weight applied to the elasticity of β with respect to the
consumption tax rate and ωL = −M4(L/R) is the welfare weight applied to the elasticity of
labor with respect to the consumption tax rate. Similarly, the second term on the right-hand
side is the marginal change in deadweight loss of increasing the wage income tax rate relative
to its change in tax revenue.
The government's ecient pair of consumption and wage income tax rates equalize the
marginal welfare costs due to the variance of public and private consumption (the left-hand
side of equation (4.4)) with the marginal welfare costs due to deadweight loss (the right-hand
side of equation (4.4)).
C.1 Risk Neutral Preferences with respect to Private Consumption. In this case the
government's objective function reduces to minimizing the variance of tax revenue. Here,











2σ2w + 2twLtcβσc,w (4.5)
Subject to: R̄ = τcβc̄+ twLw̄
This optimization diers from typical optimal portfolio analysis because an individual in-
vestor is a small player while the government is a large player. When an individual investor
increases her holdings of a given asset the mean return of the asset is not aected. When the
government increases its weight on a given asset, by increasing the tax rate, the asset's mean
return decreases. The decrease is the leakage caused by behavioral responses by individuals.
Similarly, because the government is a large player, the weight the government places on a
given asset aects the other assets in its portfolio as well. For example, lowering the income
tax rate may induce individuals to shift income from the corporate tax base to the income
tax base. Therefore the government must consider the ways asset returns change due to
a change in the tax rate. For this example, some of these terms are assumed to simplify.
Specically, prot, wages, and labor are assumed to be independent of the consumption tax
rate and β is assumed to be independent of the wage income tax rate.
The rst-order conditions given in equations (4.6) and (4.7) demonstrate the additional
complexity of the government's optimal portfolio analysis. In traditional portfolio analysis
the assets' returns do not change with the weights, and hence only the direct eect would be
included. The government's optimal portfolio problem must consider the ways asset returns
change with the weight due to leakage, horizontal externalities, and second moment eects.
In equation (4.6) the leakage is captured by including the elasticity of labor supply with
respect to the wage income tax rate. The second term represents the horizontal externality,
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier. This term considers the change in consumption due
to a change in the wage income tax rate. Finally, the ways the variances and covariance
of consumption and wage income change, due to a change in the wage income tax rate, is
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2σ2c + 2βtwLσw,c − λβc)(1 + εβ,tc) (4.7)
The optimal wage income and consumption tax rates can be found from these rst-order
conditions. If the government does not consider the leakage, horizontal externalities, and
second moment eects associated with each tax base, the government will incorrectly set
the tax rates given by t∗w and t
∗
c . However, if the government does consider the leakage,
horizontal externalites, and second moment eects, the government will optimally set the
tax rates given by t∗∗w and t
∗∗
c where θw = 1 + εw,tw which is one plus the elasticity of
the wage with respect to the wage income tax rate; similarly θwL = 2 + εw,tw + εL,tw and
θL = 1 + εL,tw . When governments fail to account for the leakage, horizontal externalities,
and second moment eects they underestimate the added volatility associated with a revenue
increase and expose their revenues to unnecessary levels of risk.
t∗w =
w̄σ2c − ȳσw,c














β[θwLc̄2σ2w − (θwL + θL)c̄w̄σc,w + θwLσ2c w̄2]
R̄
In this special case the tax rate pairs on the minimum-variance frontier are characterized
by the condition in equation (MVF.1). This condition states that the ratio of the elasticity
of the variance and the elasticity of the mean of tax revenue with respect to the tax rate
are equal across tax rates. In nance, the minimum-variance frontier is often called the
ecient frontier, but through this series of special cases the analysis demonstrates for the
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C.2 Homogeneous Risk Attitudes Over Public and Private Consumption. In this case the
government's objective function reduces to minimizing the sum of the variances of public and
private consumption for a given expected level of public and private consumption. When







Subject to: R̄ = τcβc̄+ twLw̄
In this case the minimum-variance frontier provides the minimum of the sum of the
variances of public and private consumption for a given mean level of tax revenue. Compared
to case one, the minimum-variance frontier in this case adds the elasticity of the variance of
private consumption with respect to the tax rate.
εσ2R,τc + εσ2c ,τc
εR,τc
=
εσ2R,tw + εσ2c ,tw
εR,tw
(MVF.2)
C.3 Heterogeneous Risk Attitudes Over Public and Private Consumption. In this case the
government's objective function generalizes case two, by allowing the risk attitude to dier
between public and private consumption. The rst-order conditions, when combined, pro-
duce the condition for the minimum-variance frontier in equation (MVF.3). In this case,
the minimum-variance frontier provides the minimum welfare cost of public and private
consumption for a given mean level of tax revenue.
mintw,τc − [M(·, σ2R, ·, ·) +G(·, σ2c )] (4.9)
Subject to: R̄ = τcβc̄+ twLw̄
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Compared to case two, the minimum-variance frontier in this case adds welfare weights
to the elasticities in the numerator. The welfare weight on the elasticity of the variance of
private consumption with respect to a tax rate is the negative of the derivative of utility
with respect to the variance of private consumption multiplied by the ratio of the variance of
private consumption and tax revenue, ωM = −M2σ2c/R. Similarly, the welfare weight on the
elasticity of the variance of public consumption with respect to a tax rate is ωG = −G2σ2R/R.
ωMεσ2c ,τc + ωGεσ2R,τc
εR,τc
−
ωMεσ2c ,tw + ωGεσ2R,tw
εR,tw
= 0 (MVF.3)
The minimum-variance frontier in this case is the same as the minimum-variance frontier in
the full government's optimal portfolio problem. However, the ecient condition in the full
government's problem, given in equation (4.4), diers from the minimum-variance frontier.
Specically, the right-hand side of the full government's condition in equation (4.4) is not
zero because of the utility cost of deadweight loss. The optimal tax rates characterized by
the condition in equation (4.4) tradeo utility from tax revenue with the cost of deadweight
loss and volatility. Hence, a government with the ecient tax rates could change its tax
rates to decrease the welfare cost of volatility but would cause an increase in deadweight loss
larger than the decrease in the cost of volatility. Therefore, in general, the ecient portfolio
for the government will not be on the minimum-variance frontier.
4.4 Empirical Method
In nance, the ecient frontier is estimated using historical returns with the implicit as-
sumption that the mean return and variance-covariance matrix are invariant to the portfolio
that is held. While this is a reasonable assumption in nance because investors are small
relative to the market, the previous section demonstrates it is not reasonable when applied
to governments. Therefore, this section adapts nance theory to produce a method for es-
timating the ecient frontier in a way that allows both the mean and variance-covariance
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matrix to depend on the portfolio that is held.
The returns of a portfolio can be written, as in equation 4.10, as the weighted sum of the
returns of the possible assets. The objective is to nd weights to minimize the variance of
the portfolio for a given mean return. The minimum-variance frontier is found by calculating
the ecient portfolio for dierent mean returns.
R = w1r1 + w2r2 + ... = rw (4.10)
The ecient weights are found by solving the rst-order condition of the objective function
with respect to the weights. The ecient weights, with some rearranging, are equal to the
ordinary-least-squares coecient from a regression of a constant R̄ on the returns of the
possible assets through time. The ecient weights can be determined by a simple ordinary-
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The ordinary-least-squares regression is biased without an intercept term; therefore, the
mean of the portfolio is equal to the predicted average return, which may not equal the
5The result that the ecient weights on a portfolio can be determined by a simple ordinary-least-squares
regression was rst shown by Britten-Jones (1999).
87
average return used in the regression µ = R̂ 6= R̄ and the variance of the portfolio is given
by the residual's variance.6
To adapt this method to governments, the leakage, horizontal externalities, and second
moment eects need to be accounted for to produce the actual mean-variance tradeo.
To account for leakage, each tax rate-base pair is considered its own asset. For example,
the returns to a ve percent income tax and a three percent income tax are considered
separate assets because their mean and variance diers. Therefore, the assets from which
the government chooses are expanded from three (income, sales, and corporate tax bases)
to 3xN where N represents the number of dierent tax rates considered. However, the
government is constrained to hold only one asset per tax base (e.g. the government cannot
simultaneously hold a ve percent income tax and a three percent income tax). The benet
of dening government assets in this way is that it allows the returns from a three percent
income tax to dier from the returns of a ve percent income tax in a less than proportional
way, accounting for individuals' behavioral responses. The drawback of this approach is
that the returns from all of these dierent assets are unobserved empirically and need to be
estimated.
Horizontal externalities cause the returns of a given asset (e.g. a ve percent income tax)
to dier with the other assets held by the government (e.g. a three percent sales tax or a four
percent sales tax). To account for these horizontal externalities the returns of a given asset
are estimated conditional on the other assets held by the government. Therefore, to account
for horizontal externalities the returns of an entire portfolio (e.g. a ve percent income tax,
a three percent sales tax, and a one percent corporate tax) are estimated. The benet of
estimating the returns at the portfolio level is that the horizontal externalities and second
moment eects are taken into account. The drawback is that the weights estimated using
the procedure above dene the mix between portfolios rather than the mix between assets.
6µ = R̄− ū = R̄− (R̂− R̄) = R̂
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4.5 Application: State-Level Minimum-Variance Frontiers
This section demonstrates the method and benet of estimating minimum-variance fron-
tiers. First, the data are described using simplices to depict how tax portfolios in the data
have changed over time. Second, the portfolio returns are estimated using a weighted re-
gression. Finally, the estimated portfolio returns are used to estimate minimum-variance
frontiers which quantify the mean-variance tradeo faced by governments. The analysis
demonstrates the ability to compare the mean-variance tradeo across governments and
within a government across time.
4.5.1 Data and Basic Facts
Data from U.S. state governments is used to demonstrate the method of estimating
minimum-variance frontiers. This data provides a balanced panel of fty states through
forty-eight years (1963-2010). Data on tax rates (top income, bottom income, sales, and cor-
porate), tax revenues, and tax base characteristics are collected for all states from the Book
of States and cross-checked with the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
biannual report Signicant Features in Fiscal Federalism," and the Tax Foundation. State
level economic conditions such as state level GDP and personal income are used as controls
and are collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Graphing state government's tax portfolios onto a 2-simplex demonstrates how much a
government relies on each tax bases. A 2-simplex is a triangle drawn in two-space that
represents three-space. In this case, the dimensions are tax revenues collected from income,
sales, and corporate tax bases as a percent of the sum of these three tax bases.7 Figure
4.2 is an example of a 2-simplex that depicts the percent of tax revenue from income, sales,
and corporate tax bases (three-space) in two-space. The nodes of the simplex denoted by
A, B, and C represent tax portfolios that rely on only one tax base.8 Point A represents
7The simplex is characterized by ∆2 = {(sincome, ssales, scorporate ∈ R3|sincome+ ssales+ scorporate = 1)},
where sincome is the percent of revenue collected from the income tax.
8Each node of the triangle represents a portfolio made up entirely of one tax base with nodes at
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a tax portfolio that relies only on the sales tax, point B a tax portfolio that relies only on
the income tax, and C only the corporate tax. Interior points represent mixtures between
the three tax bases. Point D represents a tax portfolio that relies equally on all three tax
bases. Point E represents a tax portfolio that relies fty percent on corporate tax revenue
and fty percent on income tax revenue. Movements along the dashed lines xx, yy, and zz
represent changes in the reliance of two of the three tax bases. For example moving along
the dashed line zz shifts the reliance on sales and income taxes but keeps the reliance on the
corporate tax xed. Similarly, moving along the line yy shifts the reliance on the sales and
income taxes but for a a tax portfolio that relies less on the corporate tax than portfolios
along the line zz. Finally, moving along the line xx represents tax portfolios shifting between
the income and corporate tax holding xed the reliance on the sales tax.
Figure 4.3 plots the aggregate state and local tax portfolios for each year between 1951
and 2010. Between 1951 and 2010 the aggregate tax portfolio shifted away from the sales
tax and toward the income tax (the horizontal-axis). In this same period, the aggregate tax
portfolio shifted away from the corporate tax (the vertical-axis). Figure 4.4 plots each state's
tax portfolio in 1955 and 2005 to demonstrate the disaggregated shift in tax portfolios. The
disaggregated data in gure 4.4 demonstrate that a large number of states shifted their tax
portfolios to rely more heavily on income taxes and less heavily on sales taxes. Despite
this general trend, there are still seven states without an income tax in 2005.9 In contrast,
reliance on corporate tax revenue decreased signicantly for a few states but the majority
of states made only minor changes to their reliance on the corporate tax. The general trend
between 1955 and 2005 was for states to become more similar in how heavily they rely on
corporate taxes.
(0, 0), (1, 0), and (.5, .866) corresponding to a portfolio entirely of sales, income, or corporate tax revenue
respectively.
9States without income taxes: FL, NV, SD, TN, TX, WA, WY.
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.3 .35 .4 .45 .5 .55
Sales vs Income
Simplex: Top node 100 percent corporate tax revenue (.5,.866),
left node 100 percent sales tax (0,0), right node 100 percent income tax (1,0).
Data: State tax revenue from the US Census.
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0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Sales vs Income
Portfolios 1955 Portfolios 2005
Simplex: Top node 100 percent corporate tax revenue (.5,.866),
left node 100 percent sales tax (0,0), right node 100 percent income tax (1,0).
Alaska and New Hampshire not shown.
Data: State tax revenue from the US Census.
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4.5.2 Estimating Minimum-Variance Frontiers
The rst step in calculating minimum-variance frontiers is estimating the portfolio re-
turns. Panel data is advantageous for calculating portfolio returns because it helps with the
limitation that data exist for only one tax portfolio for a given state-year observation (i.e., the
tax portfolio that actually existed for that state-year). With panel data additional portfolios
can be formed by appropriately weighting observations from other states according to the
inverse probability weights. Inverse probability weights calculate the probability that any
state-year observation could have been observed in a given state, based on the characteristics
of the state-year observation. For example, the probability that observations in Wisconsin
could have been observed in Minnesota is higher than the probability that observations in
Wisconsin could have been observed in California. The inverse probability weights are cal-
culated using a probit model with a dependent variable described by an indicator function
equal to one if the observation occurred in a given state, and tax rate and economic variables
as the independent variables. A separate probit is run for each state calculating fty weights,
one for each state, for each state-year observation.
Tax revenue returns for dierent portfolios are calculated using coecients estimated from
the weighted regression in 4.11 where β3 and β4 are vectors of coecients for the tax and
economic variables respectively and Ttβ1 is a vector of time trend variables.
10 In principal, an
unlimited number of portfolio returns can be calculated from this regression by substituting
dierent sets of tax rates. In practice, the number of portfolios depend on how many values
a given tax rate is allowed to take. If the number of dierent values is constant across the
four dierent tax rates the number of portfolios is given by 4n where n is the number of
values each tax rate can take. For this application each tax rate is allowed to take on ten
dierent values that are evenly spaced between zero and the maximum tax rate observed
in the data, producing 1, 048, 576 dierent portfolios. The regression method calculates the
optimal mix of the calculated portfolio returns estimating a continuous minimum-variance
10Including the time trend variables is equivalent to detrending the variables with respect to time.
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frontier from discrete choices of portfolios.
log(Ri,t) = β0 + ttβ1 + log(τi,t)β3 + log(xi,t)β4 + ε (4.11)
4.5.3 Analysis of Minimum-Variance Frontiers
Figure 4.5 graphs the estimated minimum-variance frontiers for Idaho (solid line) and
Nevada (dashed line). Idaho's minimum-variance frontier is considerably steeper than Nevada's
implying Idaho's tax base is less volatile than Nevada's. Estimating minimum-variance fron-
tiers for state governments is useful for understanding an individual state's mean-variance
tradeo and for comparing mean-variance tradeos across states. This comparison is par-
ticularly useful in considering the costs to dierent states due to changes in federal policies.
For example, consider the costs to state governments from a decrease in intergovernmental
transfers from the federal government. Even if this decrease was proportional across states
the costs may not be because the increase in volatility caused by states responses diers
across states. In this example, Nevada faces larger costs in terms of volatility than Idaho
does due to the increase in tax revenue collections.
Figure 4.6 graphs California's estimated minimum-variance frontier and the actual port-
folios (open circles) in the past 48 years. The horizontal distance between a portfolio and
the ecient frontier is the additional variance the portfolio has relative to a portfolio with
the same mean on the minimum-variance frontier. Similarly, the vertical distance between
a portfolio and the minimum-variance frontier is how much less mean revenue the portfolio
has relative to a portfolio with the same variance on the minimum-variance frontier.
Through time California has increased both the mean and variance of the tax revenues
it collects. The arch formed by the actual portfolios held by California in the past 48 years
is atter than the estimated minimum-variance frontier. Hence, California has exposed its
revenues to inecient levels of risk, quantied by the distance between the actual portfolio
and the minimum-variance frontier. Although other considerations of optimal taxation may
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cause state governments to choose portfolios o of the minimum-variance frontier, comparing
these portfolios with the estimated minimum-variance frontier quanties the cost in terms
of additional volatility (or lower mean) from choosing such a portfolio.
This paper focuses on the tradeo between volatility and deadweight which causes gov-
ernments to eciently choose portfolios that are not on their minimum-variance frontier.
In general, tradeos involving redistribution may also cause governments to be o of their
minimum-variance frontier, which may help explain the dierence between California's minimum-
variance frontier and actual portfolios. However, volatility is an additional cost state gov-
ernments need to consider when making their decisions on redistribution.
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Figure 4.5: Idaho and Nevada Estimated Minimum-Variance Frontiers.




























Figure 4.6: California Minimum-Variance Frontier and Actual Portfolios.































The economics literature has long understood that states have few if any of the unique
powers that make uctuating tax yields a matter of minor concern to the federal government"
(Groves and Kahn, 1952). This paper considers the desire of stable tax revenues for state
and local governments through an optimal portfolio analysis within a utility framework. The
optimal portfolio analysis demonstrates the ability of governments to hedge idiosyncratic risk
involved with a given tax base. Traditional portfolio analysis is adapted to account for the
unique position of a government as a large player. The utility framework demonstrates the
tradeos faced by governments between volatility and deadweight loss and between public
and private consumption volatility. Therefore, in general the government's objective is to
produce the optimal level of tax revenue volatility, but not necessarily to minimize tax
revenue volatility.
This paper develops a method for estimating the minimum-variance frontier for govern-
ments, which have assets that respond to the weight placed on them. Data from U.S. state
governments are used to demonstrate the method, providing a comparison of state tax port-
folios across states and historically within states. This analysis quanties the cost in terms
of forgone mean levels of revenue (or additional variance) of the portfolios state governments
have held historically. Groves and Kahn in their 1952 paper discuss the tradeo between
stability in tax revenue and the desire for redistribution of wealth. With the method from
this paper of estimating government minimum-variance frontiers governments can quantify
the cost of additional volatility caused by their redistribution policies which is necessary for
them to make an informed decision on what level of redistribution to implement.
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CHAPTER V
A Sequential Growth Model of Cities with Rushes
The dynamic model of city creation and growth, created in this paper, provides a unied
model able to explain the empirical evidence that cities grow sequentially, continue to grow
overtime, and can be formed by rushes of migration. Recent empirical studies have discovered
that cities tend to grow in sequence, each experiencing a period of accelerated growth one
after another (Cuberes, 2009). Despite the inux of empirical evidence of the robustness of
this phenomenon across time and systems of cities the underlying reasons remain an open
question. This paper provides a theoretical framework in which individual choices in a self-
organized economy produces dynamics of city creation and growth consistent with the three
stylized facts mentioned above.
Rushes of migration are a fundamental aspect of dynamic city growth empirically but
absent in most theoretical work. Most urban models are static in nature and therefore unable
to capture the dynamics necessary to explain rushes of migration. The dynamic model in this
paper incorporates rushes of migration within a city growth model providing a mechanism
for rushes of migration and characterizing the size of these rushes. Rational and optimizing
individuals in the model rush into a city to take advantage of opportunities in new and
growing cities while giving up income and benets of the cities they previously resided in.
Therefore, how fast the opportunities decrease with respect to population is an important
factor in determining whether a rush of migration will exist and if it does how large it will
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be.
The model is based upon three fundamental aspects of a system of cities. The rst is
that individuals are the key economic actor in population allocations across cities and the
formation of new cities. The history of cities, especially in the United States, is full of
pioneers moving west to create initial outposts. As waves of migrants moved out of existing
cities these outposts sprang into towns and eventually new cities. In the model, a large set of
homogeneous individuals act as perfectly competitive entrepreneurs deciding when to create
and populate new cities.
Second, established cities provide higher incomes, more public goods, and other benets
newly created cities cannot provide. Individuals migrating out of established cities give up
these benets of city life which growing cities are unable to provide, at least immediately.
Finally, there are opportunities for individuals in growing cities not existent in established
cities which compensate migrants. The initial settlers of a town are able to choose the best
land, have larger impacts on the types of institutions within the city, and collect monopoly
rents from newcomers. Creation of, and migration to, new cities in this model is determined
by individuals making the tradeo between the benets provided in established cities and
the opportunities that exist in new ones.
The model produces an endogenous life-cycle of a city characterized by three phases.
In the rst stage a city is created either by a single speculator or a rush of migration. In
the second stage cities enter a period of accelerated growth driven by the opportunities it
provides to migrants. Finally, cities enter a phase of steady state growth where migration
depends upon free mobility of the exogenously growing population in the system of cities.
This paper characterizes the self-organized life-cycle of cities in full generality (section
5.2). This model demonstrates the generality of the key mechanisms of city growth. The
general model is solved explicitly in a parametric model (section 5.3) which is used to compare
with an ecient growth path characterized by Fujita in his 1978 work. Finally, comparative
statistics of the parametric model provide predictions of how city growth is aected by
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property and income taxes (section 5.4)
5.1 Literature
Krugman in his 1996 paper suggests that the focus of new city creation should be on
self-organization. However, the literature, often for simplicity, has used large agents such as
developers (Henderson, 1974; Rossi-Hansberg and Wright, 2007; Helsley and Strange, 1997)
or public governments (Henderson and Venables, 2009) to create new cities. The use of large
agents circumvents a coordination problem that exists with self-organized cities. In previous
models of self-organized cities, individuals create cities only in the unrealistic scenario when
the benet of being in a city of size one is the same as being in an established city (Anas,
1992). This caused cities to grow into Malthusian mega-cities which would bifurcate when
a new city was formed. These models are unattractive because they predict city dynamics
that are not empirically supported.
In contrast, this paper provides a self-organized system of cities that is able to match the
three stylized facts of city growth found in the empirical literature: 1) almost all cities grow
every decade (Black and Henderson, 2003; Henderson and Wang, 2005) 2) city growth follows
a sequential growth path (Cuberes, 2004) 3) some cities experience rushes in migration.
5.2 Model
Each city produces Ni ∗ yi(Ni) where Ni is the city's population and yi is the average
product which each city resident is assumed to receive. Average product in a city is assumed
to be continuous and single-peaked with respect to population capturing the economies
and diseconomies of scale with respect to population. For cities with small populations
the average product is increasing in population because the economies of scale outweigh the
diseconomies of scale and conversely for cities with large populations. Cities are heterogenous
in how much they produce for a given level of population. Cities that produce more for all
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common levels of population are dened as being superior.
When migrants enter a city, they are assigned a rank in the order they arrive; the rst
person in a city is given rank one, the second rank two, and so forth. Upon entering the
city, migrants are each given a benet based on their individual rank R(k).1 This function
is a general function accounting for all of the benets of being an early migrant to a city.
Individuals forgo their rank benet when they migrate our of a city and receive instead the
rank benet according to their rank in the new city. The rank benet may be positive or
negative, but for simplicity the slope of the rank function is assumed to change signs no more
than once and at some rank kΘ, the rank function remains constant for all further ranks.
The following characterization of a city's life cycle is conducted within the context of
one initial city, city 1, growing according to steady state growth and from which a new city,
city 2, will be formed. This simplication is used for notational purposes only. The initial
city can be thought of as a composite city of many cities. For notational purposes it is
also useful to assume that the exogenous population growth, η(t), occurs in the initial city,
even after the new city has formed. The exogenous population growth η(t) is allowed to be
non-monotonic but for simplicity is assumed to be known. New residents to city 1 receive
the average product of the city but because city 1 is in steady state growth their rank is
greater than kΘ and the rank benet is constant and is normalized to zero. Therefore, the
homogeneous population in the initial city has no rank benet and will be potential migrants
to the new city.2
Although these simplications are merely for notation, this context lends itself to an
1One natural realization of the benet of moving to a city early is that early migrants may be given
land to live on. Earlier migrants receive land closer to the central business district (CBD) in a monocentric
city. Later migrants receive land further away from the CBD and as a result spend more of their income on
commuting costs. Migrants with rank greater than kΘ would not be given land and would have to buy or
rent land within the city. In the next section individuals will have utility over the lot of land they receive,
both in its distance from the CBD and its area. The rank function will then be microfounded as the utility
individuals receive from the lot of land they are given when they migrate to the new city. In this section the
rank function will remain a general function.
2Residents of the initial city that do not receive a rank benet will forgo fewer benets in migrating to
the new city than residents with rank benets. Therefore, residents without rank benets will be willing to
migrate to a new city under circumstances that other residents will not be willing to migrate under.
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example from the United States' early history, where the initial city is New York City, which
receives an exogenous amount of population from immigration. As New York grows, a group
of people eventually move west and form a new city, which continues to receive migrants
from New York.
5.2.1 General Life Cycle of a City
This subsection characterizes the general life cycle of a city in full generality through a
series of results. The initial population in the existing city is assumed to be a continuum of
population with measure N̄(0) and is assumed to be perfectly mobile. The average product
produced within the existing city is y(N̄(0)). The payo an individual in the initial city
without a rank benet receives for staying in the city is equal to the present value of the





Production in the initial city is a function of its population, N1(t), which increases by the rate
of urban population growth η(t) and decreases by the rate of migration out of the city q(t).
A migrant to the new city receives the average product in the new city y2(N2(t)) and rank
benet R(k). This function depends upon when the individual arrived in the new city relative
to other migrants, the individual's rank k. The functional form of R(τ) is left as general
as possible in this section but is assumed to be continuous, continuously dierentiable, and
have a slope that changes signs no more than once. In this model, a migrant to the new
city has no incentive to move back to city 1 because they would forgo their rank benet in
the new city. An individual who migrates to the new city at time τ with rank k receives the
present value of the stream of average products in cities 1 and 2, depending on when she
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The formation and life cycle of a new city can be characterized by a symmetric Nash equilib-
rium.3 The symmetric Nash equilibrium is a mixed equilibrium where all potential migrants
play a mixed strategy according to the CDF Q : [τ , τ̄ ]→ [0, λ] which is non-decreasing and
right-continuous.4 This CDF determines the ow of migration q(t). The ow of migration
may experience discontinuous jumps of masses of people all migrating at the same time. In
this case, individuals are randomly given a rank and individuals have rational expectations
of what rank they will be.
The symmetric Nash equilibrium is found using an indierence condition and two bound-
ary conditions. The indierence condition, which is a necessary condition for equilibrium,
equates the payos in the entire support of Q(t) ensuring that individuals are indierent
about when to migrate. The indierence condition, given in equation 5.3 is found by taking
the derivative of equation (5.2) with respect to τ and setting it equal to zero for τ ∈ [τ , τ̄ ].
Using Leibniz's rule, this derivative produces the condition at time τ the average production
in the initial city must equal the average production in the new city plus the rank benet
for an individual who is rank k(τ) plus the present value benet of being rank k, as opposed
to rank k + 1.







The two boundary conditions endogenously determine τ and τ̄ which determine when the
new city is created and when it enters steady state growth respectively. The rst boundary
condition (5.5) ensures that at τ potential migrants are indierent between migrating and
staying in the initial city. If this boundary condition did not hold, there would be an incentive
3The set of equilibria is limited to symmetric equilibria because all potential migrants from the existing
city are initially identical.
4There is also a pure strategy equilibrium where individuals move with certainty at a given time. However,
the aggregate migration pattern q(t) will be the same in this equilibrium, leaving the analysis unchanged.
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for early migrants to deviate from the equilibrium path and migrate earlier or later. The
second boundary condition (5.6) ensures migrants at time τ̄ are indierent between migrating







y2(N2(τ̄ − dt)) +
∞Z
τ̄
e−rtR(k(τ̄ − dt))dt = y1(N1(τ̄)) (5.6)
The τ border condition ensures the new city is created when the present value of the income
in city 1 is equal to the benet of starting (and living in) a new city. The present value of
income in city 1 increases and then decreases with respect to time as population in the city
increases from the exogenous population growth. The benet of starting a city depends on
the rank benet of being the rst person and the income growth path in the new city which
is xed with respect to time. This implies it is possible for the τ border condition to be met
at two points, one where the present value of income in city 1 is increasing and one where it
is decreasing. However, if the new city is created when the present value of income in city 1
is increasing there exists an incentive for individuals to pre-empt the creation of the new city
start the city earlier. Therefore in equilibrium the average product in city 1 is decreasing
with respect to population.6
5The rst border condition (5.5) can be rewritten noting that at τ̄ the new city enters steady state growth
and y2(N2) + Θ2 = y1(N1), Θ2 is the present value of the rank benet in city 2 of migrants of rank greater
than kΘ. Dene R̄(JI) as the rank benet either of the lone speculator, R̄(JI) = R(1), or the average rank
benet in the initial rush of people size JI , R̄(JI) =
R JI
0 R(k)/J
Idk. Intuitively, the rewritten rst border
condition states that the present value of the rank benet of creating a city must equal the present value of






e−rt(y1(N1)− y2(N2))dt+ Θ2 (5.4)
6When the present value of income in city 1 is decreasing individuals do not have an incentive to imme-
diately pre-empt the creation of the new city.
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5.2.2 Life-Cycle Results
A city is formed either by a single speculator or a mass of people in a rush at time τ ,
endogenously pinned down by the border condition in equation 5.5. For a city to form the
single speculator, or mass of people in a rush, must not have an incentive to deviate and
migrate later. The incentives for individuals to create and migrate to the new city depend
on the income and opportunities the city oers. The opportunities in a city compensate
early migrants for forgoing higher incomes in established cities. As the new city grows the
dierence between incomes in the new and established cities decreases meaning later migrants
do not need as many opportunities in the new city to compensate them for migrating.
If the opportunities in the city are smaller for later migrants then the migration pattern
endogenously ensures the loss in income is exactly compensated for by the opportunities in
the new city. The migration pattern does this by varying the time path of income in the
new city which depends on population. If the opportunities in a city are always increasing
for later migrants then this city will not be formed. When the opportunities are always
increasing for later migrants there is always be an incentive for migrants to deviate and
migrate later forgoing less income and receiving better opportunities. This example provides
the intuition for the necessary condition for a city to be formed.
Necessary Condition for City Formation: For a city to form, its rank function must be less
than or equal to the average rank function for some rank greater than one.
The necessary condition ensures the opportunities are smaller for later migrants during
the accelerated growth period. If the opportunities are initially increasing for later migrants
the necessary condition ensures at some point the opportunities become smaller for later
migrants. In this case the following section demonstrates the city will be created by a rush
of migration and the size of the rush is large enough such that the opportunities are smaller
for migrants after the rush of migration.
After creation, the city experiences a period of accelerated growth between time τ and
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τ̄ according to q(t) given in equation 5.9. The population growth in the accelerated growth
period is found by taking the integral of the last term of the indierence condition (5.3)
and rearranging.7 This condition produces an ordinary dierential equation in q(t) and Q(t)
which will be solved in the following section given functional forms. Even without functional
forms the migration pattern can be characterized by this condition.
q(t) =
y2r +Rr − y1r
R′
(5.7)
During the accelerated growth period the opportunities in the city are decreasing for later
migrant. However, the income in the new city is increasing at a rate to keep migrants
indierent between when to migrate to the new city. The accelerated growth period ends
when rank kΘi is reached and may end in a rush of migration. The rush of migration at the
end of the accelerated growth period ensures the income in the new city, net of the constant
rank benets Θ2, is equal to the income in the initial city. Therefore, in steady state incomes
are decreasing with respect to population.
Result 1 Sequential Growth: A new city is not started until all existing city have reached
steady state growth.
Although people in the model are forward looking, the new city is not started until exist-
ing cities have reached their peak populations. Result 1 states that the model endogenously
provides constraints to `excessive speculation' by individuals. In addition, result 1 denes
the population dynamic of the model where cities take turns growing at an accelerated rate.
Result 1 follows from the τ boundary condition ensuring the new city is created at a point
at which the initial city's income is decreasing with respect to population which occurs only
in steady state.
In steady state migration to and from cities ensure the payo individuals receive, the
average product plus the rank benet constant Θi, is equalized across all cities. Once a city
7All of the math for this section can be found in the Appendix.
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reaches steady state growth it is assumed to remain in steady state growth forever.8
Result 2 Continued City Growth: Existing cities continue to grow by η(t) − q(t) after they
reach steady state growth.
Result 2 is an important characteristic of city growth that almost all cities grow every
decade. The growth of existing cities depends on the shape of the average product curve.
When there are multiple existing cities they split the population η(t)−q(t) such that average
product remains constant across cities. Even though average product remains constant if
cities are heterogeneous then their growth in steady state can also be heterogenous. Cities
that have average product curves with respect to population that have steeper slopes will
grow slower. Section 5.4 investigates how income and property taxes aect the average
product curves and thus city growth.
5.2.3 Rushes of Migration
Rushes of migration occur in the model because individuals move across cities instanta-
neously to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities that arise from changes in opportunities
in new cities and dierences in income across cities. The size of the rush depends on the size
of the arbitrage opportunity. There are two possible times a city may experience a rush of
migration. The rst is when a city is created, τ , due to opportunities in the new city. The
second, is when a city enters steady state, τ̄ , due to dierences in income produced in city
1 and city 2.
Result 3 Initial Rush: A new city is formed by a rush of people if and only if the rank function
is initially increasing and later decreasing.
Although the average product in the new city is smaller than in the initial city, the
dierence shrinks over time, providing a benet to migrating later. However, the benet of
8An extension of the current model would allow amenity levels to change over time according to a poisson
process. This change to the city would allow it to break out of steady state growth while it adjusted to its new
steady state growth path. The rust belt in the United States may have experienced a negative production
amenity shock causing these mature cities to enter a period of adjustment to lower levels of population.
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migrating earlier is a higher rank benet which will compensate for initial losses in average
product. In the case where there is not a rush in population and the rank benet is initially
increasing and later decreasing function, the earliest migrants will have an incentive to
deviate, waiting to migrate later and receiving both a higher average product and higher rank
benets. Therefore any mixed-strategy equilibria must be characterized by a discontinuous
jump in population at τ where the expected rank benet compensates for lower average
product.
To ensure rushing migrants, {1, J I}, do not have an incentive to wait and migrate `late'
at time τ rush +dt, the expected rank payo must be greater than or equal to the rank payo
for migrant J I +dk. Similarly, to ensure that migrants who do not participate in the rush do
not have an incentive to migrate early (i.e., with the rush) the rank payo for the migrant
J I + dk must be greater than or equal to the expected rank payo of the rush. Therefore,






R(k)dk = R(J) for some J > 1 (5.8)
It must also be true that no one has an incentive to pre-empt the rush and migrate at time
τ − dt, which would ensure an early migrant the rank benet for the rst migrant. To
ensure that no one has an incentive to pre-empt the rush, the expected rank benet must
be greater than the rank benet for the rst migrant. For condition (5.8) to hold, the rank
function's slope must change signs. The following argument is depicted in gures (5.1) and
(5.2). Dene point J I as the point at which the average rank benet equals the rank benet
of J I . Dene point H as the point at which the rank benet switches signs. Dene point E
as the point at which the rank benet is equal to the rank benet of the rst migrant. If
the rank function is initially decreasing, the average rank payo at any point h less than H
is greater than the rank benet at point h. In addition, the average rank payo at point E
is less than the rank payo at point E. Therefore, by continuity, point J I is smaller than
point E and the rank payo of the rst migrant is greater than the rank payo at point J I .
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Therefore, there is no rush if the rank function is initially decreasing. However, if the rank
function is initially increasing, the average rank payo at any point h less than H is less
than the rank benet at point h and the average rank payo at point E is greater than the
rank payo at point E. Therefore by continuity, point J I is less than point E and the rank
payo of the rst migrant is less than the rank payo at point J I . This ensures that no one
has an incentive to pre-empt the rush of migration to the new city. Therefore, a rush implies
that the rank function is initially increasing and decreases after a nite argument such that
there exists a nite argument, J I , where the function equals its average.9
The second time a city may experience a rush of migration occurs when the city enters
steady state characterized by the τ̄ border condition. This condition equates the average
product in city 1 and the average product in city 2, net of the constant rank benet. If
just prior to the beginning of steady state, τ̄ − dt, the average products in the two cities,
adjusted by Θ, are not converging, there will be a jump in income in the second city at time
τ̄ . For migrants to remain indierent, the jump in income must be oset by a jump in the
expected rank benet. However, since the rank function is continuous, a jump in expected
rank benets implies a rush of migration.
Result 4: Terminal Rush: The new city experiences a rush of population at τ̄ if the average
product in the new city at τ̄ is not equal to the average product in the new city at τ̄ − dt.
5.2.4 Characterization of Migration
The general model characterizes the dynamic growth of cities according to the migration
function q(t). This section characterizes the migration function with a series of comparative
statistics. Specically, how the growth of a city changes with respect to the dierence in
opportunities between ranks is the main result of this section. Other comparative statistics
demonstrate how the growth of a city changes; as the opportunities in the new city become
9Under very specic conditions a city may be formed by a rush of migration and enter directly into steady
state. These conditions are given in the appendix. When these conditions do not hold a rush of migration
large enough to put a city in steady state is not an equilibrium.
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better, as the change in income with respect to population decreases, as individuals become
more patient, and as the exogenous rate of population growth increases.
The comparative statistics come from the migration function q(t) given in equation 5.7.
Another formation of the migration function comes from taking the derivative of the indif-









It is natural to think migration to a new city would increase as the benet of being the
k person relative to being the k + 1 person in a city increases, counter to result 5. This
counterintuitive comparative statistic comes from the indierence condition which states
migrants must be indierent across all migrating times in the accelerated growth period.
To maintain indierence, the cost of being the kth person must increase as the benet of
being the kth person increases. Slowing the migration rate increases the cost of being the
kth person by decreasing the present value of income received by the kth person. Therefore,
increasing the benet between two ranks decreases the migration rate. This result is depicted
in gure (5.4).
Comparative Statistic 1: The migration to a city decreases as the dierence in opportunities
between two ranks increases.
In the limiting case where only the rst person receives a rank benet, the rst person
will form a city and wait for a rush of migration that will bring the city into steady state.
The rst person will wait in the city until the entire benet of being rst is `eaten away' by
the prolonged period of low income in the new city.
In the limiting case where all migrants receive the same rank benet, the city will be
formed and immediately enter steady state by one large rush. Since all migrants receive
the same benet they must receive the same cost to remain indierent. The only way the
migrants can receive the same present value stream of average products is if they all migrate
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at the same time. This limiting case corresponds to the previous literature that implicitly
had a constant rank function.
Comparative Statistic 2: Increasing all opportunities in a city by the same amount causes
the new city to be formed earlier, but the rate of migration in the accelerated growth period
to be the same.
Increasing all opportunities in a city causes the benet of creating the city to become
larger. The rst border condition (5.5) ensures individuals are indierent between creating
the new city and staying in the established city. To ensure indierence, the cost of starting
the city must also increase. This implies that the new city must be started earlier causing
the dierence in incomes at the time the new city is created to be larger.10
In the limiting case where the benet of being rank one in the new city is increased,
leaving the benets to all other migrants unchanged, then the new city will be started
earlier but only the migration of the rst migrant will change.11 When the benet of being
the rst migrant increases migration occurs earlier, for the same reasons as comparative
statistic 2. However, because the rank benets did not change for any of the other migrants
their migration pattern will not change, to ensure they remain indierent between migrating
and staying in the established city. Interestingly, to ensure that individuals are indierent
between being the rst migrant and some later migrant, the entire added benet of being
rank one will be `eaten away' by the cost of moving to the new city earlier. Therefore, a
policy of giving a lump sum of money to the creator of a city, aimed at rising welfare by
creating an incentives to start cities earlier, will cause the city to be formed earlier but will
have no eect on welfare.12







−rty1(N1) − y2(N2)dt on the other side. Because the rank function remained unchanged




−rty2(N2)dt to be the same. Therefore, the average benet in the established city, which will
be foregone by the migrants, must be greater to counter the increase in the benet of starting the new city.
This implies the new city will be formed earlier because the average benet in the established city decreases
as the population increases.
11This claim follows from the rst two comparative statistics.
12A lump sum may not be a realistic policy instrument, but tax breaks and other incentives do exist for
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Comparative Statistic 3: The rate of migration to a city increases as migrants become less
patient.
When migrants are less patient the cost of moving to a new city increases and the benet
of moving to a new city decreases because the rank benet pays o over time. To ensure
migrants are indierent, the migration rate must increase, lowering the cost of migrating
early.
Comparative Statistic 4: Migration to a new city increases as the exogenous rate of population
growth increases.
This comparative statistic follows directly from the second migration condition (5.9).
Intuitively, as the exogenous rate of population growth increases, the dierence in costs
between migrating at time τ and time τ + dt increases. Increasing migration to the new city
decreases the dierence in costs associated with migrating at time τ relative to time τ + dt.
Therefore, migration to the new city increases as the exogenous rate of population growth
increases, ensuring that migrants remain indierent between migrating at time τ and τ +dt.
Note however an exogenous growth rate of zero at some point in time does not imply there
will be no migration at that time.
Comparative Statistic 5: The rate of migration to a city decreases as the dierence in income
with respect to population of a city decreases.
As the dierence in income decreases with respect to population, the change in cost of
migrating at time τ and time τ + dt decreases. In this case migration to the city decreases,
increasing the cost of migrating at time τ relative to time τ +dt, thus maintaining migrants'
indierence. This result is important in understanding dierences in migration patterns
between cities. Consider two heterogenous cities, A and B, depicted in gure (5.3), which
dier in the level of income at each level of population but are maximized at the same
population level. Because the cities' average products are maximized at the same population
developers of new cities.
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level, the marginal average product must be larger in the city with the greater average
product at its peak, city A. Therefore, by comparative statistic 5, city A grows faster in its
accelerated growth period than city B.
This section has produced and characterized a self-organized model of city formation.
This is the rst model, to the author's knowledge, that has produced a self-organized model
of city formation that can match the empirical facts that cities tend to grow sequentially
(result 1), some cities experience population rushes (results 3 and 4), and virtually all cities
increase in size through time (result 2). Migration was characterized in full generality with
this model, allowing the reader to consider in what manner heterogeneous cities would grow.
Therefore, this model is well suited to explain dierent growth patterns as a result of het-
erogeneous natural amenities and policies that dene cities. The following section provides
a microfoundation for city formation that provides a tangible example for the results in this
section.
5.3 Microfoundations of City formation
Each city is broken into individual lots of land with P lots in the center used for produc-
tion in the central business district (CBD) and all other lots reserved for residential use. The
city is modeled as a spiral, with lots ordered from the center. Cities are not literally a spiral,
but the spiral framework produces a few nice properties. First, modeling a city as a spiral
allows individual lots of land to dier in area and distance from the CBD. Second, the area
of each lot increases with distance from the CBD, modeling a decrease in density away from
the CBD. Third, the dierences in area and distance are continuous functions making the
rank function smooth.13 It is convenient to use an Archimedean spiral where the radius for
a given angle θ is given by r = bθ. The spiral is broken into lots where each lot is bounded
by two lines radiating from the center of the city. All lots are assumed to be bounded by two
13In contrast, the typical assumption in urban literature is that cities are linear, or monocentric and grow
in rings. These assumptions would cause the rank function to be a step function because lots within a ring
would all be identical.
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lines that form a constant angle θ̄ = 2π/s, where s is the number of lots per rotation. Figure
(5.6) depicts the arrangement of lots within a city, for notational simplicity P = s+ 1, such
that the CBD is the rst rotation of plots plus one lot in the city and s = 2bπ.
A composite good c is produced within the city by rms that have constant-returns-to-
scale technology in labor employed, and are subject to city-wide scale externalities. With
constant returns to scale in labor, each individual can be considered their own rm without
loss of generality. Each rm benets from urban scale economies through interactions with
other rms via learning spill-overs, causing per-worker output to rise with city population.14
The production of rms is given by f(A,L) = AN ξL, which is a function of a production
amenity level A, labor employed L, and city population N , where ξ ≤ 1 represents the urban
scale economies.
Production of the composite good c also produces pollution p(F (A,N))ψ which is an
increasing and convex function of city-wide production, F (A,N), where ψ > 1, in a manner
consistent with Tolley's 1974 description.15. Therefore, each individual earns income in the
city equal to the average net product of the city, given in equation (5.10) where β = ξψ and
B = pAψ. 16
y(N) = AN ξ −BNβ (5.10)
Individuals supply one unit of labor inelastically to their rm and receive the average product
in the city in exchange. Individuals also receive income from their land holdings, which is
an exogenously chosen combination of land within the city they live in, and land in all
other cities, following Albouy and Seegert (2010). From this income, individuals pay for
their consumption of the composite good c, a commuting cost mrφ, where r is the distance
14For further microfoundations of urban scale economies see Duranton and Puga (2004).
15The nature of pollution and congestion is that extra pollutants and vehicles do not shift production
functions at all at low amounts, and extra amounts have increasingly severe eects as levels are raised until
ultimately fumes kill and there are so many vehicles that trac cannot move." Tolley (1974). Therefore,
pollution is modeled as being convex in production.
16Average production is a concave function because ψ > 1. The population within the city that produces
the greatest average product is given by Npeak = ((ξA)/(βB))(1/(β−ξ).
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from the CBD to where the individual lives, and rent if they do not own their lot of land.17
This gives the budget constraint given in equation (5.12) where ρ is the fraction of land the
individual holds as investment in the city they live in, (1 − ρ) is the fraction of land the
individual holds in all other cities, and δ and ∆ are the average rents within the city they
live in and the average rent across all cities respectively. Individuals have utility over their
consumption of the composite good c and the area of the lot of land, α that they live on
according to the utility function given below.
U(c, α) = d αγ + c (5.11)
y(N) + ρδ + (1− ρ)∆ = c+ rent(r, α) +mrφ (5.12)
The city grows as individuals move into the next open lot in the spiral of lots. The rst kΘ
migrants to the city are given their lots for free. Therefore, the rst migrants benet from
having the lots closest to the CBD and not having to pay rent. All other migrants are forced
to pay rent which depends on the distance from the center, the area of the lot, and the last
inhabited lot in the city such that migrants are indierent about which lot they live on. The
rent gradient given in equation (5.13) can be found by rearranging the indierence condition
between any lot k and the last occupied lot in the city k̄.
δ(k) = πγd((2k + P )γ − (2k̄ + P )γ)−m(kφ − k̄φ) (5.13)
Utility can be written in terms of the area of an individual's lot of land and its distance from
the CBD, as well as their income, by substituting the composite consumption good from the
budget constraint (5.12) into the utility function (5.11). The rank function, which captures
the benets of being an early migrant, is given by the utility a migrant receives from the lot
17In the urban literature there has been an increasing acknowledgement that commuting costs do not
increase linearly with population or distance. To account for this, the commuting cost increases at a rate rφ
where φ captures the rate of increase with respect to distance.
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of land they are given. The rank benet for all migrants that rent will be identical and have
a present value equal to Θi for city i.
18
U(r, α,N) = d α(k)γ −mr(k)φ − δ(r, α)| {z }
Rank Function
+y(N) + ρδ + (1− ρ)∆ (5.14)
The area of lot k is found by integrating between the two curves bθ and b(θ − 2π) in polar
coordinates between the angles θ̄k and θ̄(k − 1). The distance of the lot from the CBD
is given by the point in the lot closest to the city center. Given the simplications that
production uses the rst rotation of lots, plus one, P = s + 1, and the number of lots per
rotation is given by s = 2bπ, the lot area as a function of rank is given by π(2k + P ) and
the distance from the CBD is given by k. The rank function for migrants that are given a
lot of land is given in equation 5.15.
R(k) = dπγ(2k + P )γ −mkφ (5.15)
Result 3 demonstrates that a city will be formed by a rush if the rank function is initially
increasing and later decreasing. In this microfounded example there is a rush of migration if
γ is small relative to φ, specically γ < φ(1− p/2k)− p/2k. Allowing γ = 1 and φ = 2, the
sucient condition is met and the size of the rush, J , can be solved for analytically using





The size of the jump increases with the utility weight of land, d, and decreases with the
commuting cost m. Intuitively, an increase in the benet of the area of land will increase the




−ρt(darea(k))γ − mr(k)φ − rent(r, area))dt =
R∞
t e
−ρt(darea(k̄)γ − mr(k̄)φ)dt. From this
combination of the rank function it is clear that the rank function is constant for all ranks greater than Θi.
117
achieves the peak rank benet, kpeak = dπ/m, and increases the slope of the rank benet
function, ∂R(K)/∂k = 2dπ − 2mk, both of which cause the size of the rush to increase.
Similarly, decreasing m increases kpeak and the slope of the benet function causing the size
of the rush to increase.
An analytical solution of the ordinary dierential equation in condition (5.7) can be found
when it can be rearranged into the linear ordinary dierential equation form q(t)+h(t)Q(t) =
g(t). When ξ = φ = γ = 1, β = 2 and η(t) = v,the migration condition can be rearranged in
the appropriate form. For notational ease, let τ = 0 and let N1 = N0 + vt−Q(t), where N0
is the level of population in city 1 at which τ city 2 is formed. Using the linear dierential




















(dπp− y(N0 + vt))
From this condition the results of the previous section can be conrmed. The following sec-
tions provide some applications of the microfounded model. The rst application compares
the self-organized economy with the social planner problem.
5.4 Applications
5.4.1 Social Planner
In 1978, Fujita wrote a book the optimal distribution of population across cities as the
total population increased. In contrast, this paper's model is a positive model of how a
self-organized system distributes population across cities. However, it is useful to compare
the self-organized allocation presented in this paper with the socially optimal allocation of
population. The objective of the social planner is to maximize the present value of the total
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product in the economy over all time, subject to the fact that the total population must be
allocated across all cities. In addition, there is an optional constraint that is sometimes used,
stating that city population can never decrease. This condition is justied when there exists









Ṅi = η(t) (5.19)
Ṅi ≥ 0 (5.20)
With only the rst constraint, the necessary Euler equation states that the marginal product,
mpi = Ni∂yi/∂Ni + yi, must be equal across all cities that have positive population. This is
a very restrictive condition that would not allow cities to grow slowly over time. Essentially,
the socially optimal creation of cities would consist of cities formed by rushes large enough
to bring cities directly into steady state such that the marginal products across all cities were
equal.
−λ̇ = e−rtmpi (5.21)
The additional constraint that population in a city cannot decrease rules out a rush large
enough to bring a city into steady state because such an increase in population in one city
would cause other cities' populations to decrease. The new Euler equation states that if two
cities are growing at the same time their marginal products must be equal. This condition
rules out the creation of a new city when another city has not yet reached steady state. This
optimality condition also holds in the self-organized system by result 1.
λ̇− µ̇ = e−rtmpi (5.22)
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When this condition is include, the Euler equation can be integrated, producing a condition
about the shadow value of an additional worker in a city. For the migration pattern to be
optimal, the shadow value of placing an additional worker in the new city has to equal the
value of the worker in the existing cities at the time the new city is created and must be
greater than the value of the worker in the existing city until the new city stops growing.




This condition allows for cities to grow slowly over time but rules out any rushes in popu-
lation. Therefore optimal migration is either characterized by a large rush that brings cities
into steady state or by a continuous function void of any rushes. In the case where cities
are optimally formed by largerushes the self-organized migration in general will be too slow
relative to the optimum. However in the case that optimality rules out rushes, it could
be that self-organized migration is too fast or too slow. Self-organized migration depends
crucially on the rank function to determine the speed of migration. The optimum migration
is determined by the marginal product by a given city. Therefore, by comparing the rank
function and the resulting self-organized migration pattern with the marginal product in a
city and the optimal migration pattern the social planner could decide how to manipulate
the rank function as to align the self-organized and optimal migration patterns.
5.4.2 City Growth and Taxation
The rank benet in the microfounded example is ownership of better land. Property tax
levels depend upon the structure of revenue sharing between local and state governments.
Therefore across states, local governments have dierent property tax revenue requirements.
An individual that creates a city in a state with high property tax revenue requirements will
receive less benet from their lot of land. Therefore, the rank function will be shifted down
in high property tax states. In addition, if the property tax is assessed as a proportion of
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land value, the rank function will become atter because the earlier migrants will have to
pay relatively more in property tax than later migrants. By results 5 and 6 we know that
a city created in a state with higher than average property taxes will be formed later and
experience faster migration than the average city.
With an income tax, the average benet provided in a city is given by (1− t)AN ξ−BNβ.
As the income tax increases, the average benet decreases and the slope of the average benet
decreases. The income tax produces a wedge that causes cities to benet less from increased
population. Therefore, by result 10, cities that are created in states with high income taxes
will experience slower migration.
5.5 Conclusion
This paper has produced a theoretical framework that characterizes a self-organized city's
life cycle from creation to steady state growth. The advantage of the model in this paper
is that even though cities are created and populated by individuals without developers, the
self-organized system of cities does not suer from a coordination problem. This allows the
model to produce an endogenous pattern of growth for cities that is consistent with the
empirical evidence.
The model presented in this paper also produced useful applications. The self-organized
system of cities was compared with the socially ecient system of cities, as described by
Fujita et al. (1978). In addition, the model produced testable hypotheses about the eects
of property and income taxes on the growth of cities. The main contribution of this paper
is to provide a new framework of self-organized cities. Further research is needed both
theoretically and empirically to expand and test the implications of this model.
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Figure 5.1: There is not an initial rush when the rank function is initially decreasing.
Figure 5.2: There is an initial rush when the rank function is initially increasing.
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Figure 5.3: City A Grows Faster Than City B (Production Dierences)
Figure 5.4: City A Grows Faster Than City B (Rank Dierences)
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Figure 5.5: Size of a Rush to Form a City
Figure 5.6: Lots of Land in a City
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CHAPTER VI
Barriers to Migration in a System of Cities
The mobility of individuals in a country aects whether urban population is concentrated
in a few cities or dispersed among many cities. The distribution of population fundamentally
aects the economic growth in a country. Hence, creating the ecient level of mobility within
a country is crucial for economic growth especially if in the next 40 years urban population
increases by 2.8 billion, or 80 percent, as the United Nations projects. This paper considers
the ecient level of mobility within a system of cities and contrasts the resulting distribution
of population with systems of cities with dierent levels of mobility. This paper considers
the distribution of population across cities (the intensive margin) as well as the number and
set of heterogeneous cities a system of cities creates (the extensive margin).
Barriers to migration limit the ability of individuals to move across cities. The barriers
may be moving costs, information, or explicit policies such as zoning laws. These barriers
may be benecial in limiting the over-population of cities which occurs when individuals do
not internalize the externalities they cause on current residents. In contrast, these barriers
may be costly if they allow clubs to monopolize the heterogeneous amenities cities oer. This
paper characterizes the barriers to migration a benevolent social planner sets to eciently
distribute population within a system of cities and explores mechanisms that can create this
distribution within a competitive equilibrium.
This paper proposes a two-stage model of city formation and population distribution
125
where individuals create cities in the rst stage and move across cities in the second stage.
The model compares the distribution of population with four levels of barriers to migration.
The rst distribution of population is chosen by a social planner that maximize the total
benet produced in the system of cities. The second distribution results from a competitive
equilibrium with free mobility across cities. The third distribution of population results from
a competitive equilibrium with cities able to set population limits. The fourth distribution
of population results from a competitive equilibrium where cities are able to charge migrants
a fee to enter the city.
In the second stage individuals move across cities to maximize their individual benet,
disregarding any externalities their choices may have. Each individual is assumed to receive
the average benet produced within the city in which they reside. When there is free mobility
across cities individuals move to equalize the average benet across cities causing cities to
become ineciently over-populated. The intuition is the same as in the two-road example
proposed by Pigou (1952), where one road is slow but provides a constant speed independent
of the number of drivers on it and the other is fast (if empty) but congestible. Eciency
requires that the marginal benet of an additional car on each of these two roads to be equal.
However, uncoordinated individuals equalize the average benets, causing too much trac
on the congestible road, and hence the need for a Pigouvian tax".
If migrants are charged a fee set by a revenue-maximizing city planner the distribution of
population across cities is ecient. This result is identical to the response in Knight (1924) to
Pigou (1952) in which he demonstrates the toll set by a revenue-maximizing toll-setter causes
the distribution of cars across the two roads to be ecient. This paper extends this intuition
of the intensive margin to the extensive margin to determine whether revenue-maximizing
city planners create the ecient number and set of heterogeneous cities.
Section 6.1 denes the model and the four levels of barriers to migration within a system
of cities. Section 6.2 solves for and compares the distribution of population across cities in
the four cases. Similarly, sections 6.3 and 6.4 solve for and compare the number and set
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of cities created. Section ACW extends the analysis to the case when there are spill-overs
across cities.
6.1 Model
6.1.1 Foundations of the Model
Much of the current urban research is built upon Henderson's seminal paper on city sizes
and types. The model presented in Henderson's 1974 paper has been extended to systems of
cities by Henderson (1986), Ioannides (1979), and Henderson and Ioannides (1981). The goal
of these extensions is to determine what causes some systems to have growth concentrated in
one major city while in other systems growth is dispersed by the creation of new cities. While
these models have provided a variety of interesting results they have proven cumbersome.
In these models new cities are created by land developers that cap city size. Each
city's population is capped at the population that maximizes the per resident utility. Cities
accommodate additional population only when the total population can not be divided into
cities with their utility-maximizing populations. New cities are created as soon as the total
population is large enough to populate all cities with their utility-maximizing populations.1
The main result from these models is that cities will be created with time intervals that
become shorter as total population increases.
Further developments in modeling city growth and formation attempted to compare
laissez-faire and planned city creation in Anas (1992). These extensions found that a system
of cities characterized by laissez-faire policies would create cities at a slower rate than a
system of cities organized by a planner. In addition, the laissez-faire system of cities would
be characterized by panic-migrations," as Anas stated in his 1992 paper. These cycles of
booms and busts are caused by a coordination failure amongst individuals who are unwilling
to create a new city unilaterally until current cities are grossly-overpopulated. Given the dire
1This constraint on creating a new city is an equilibrium stability condition.
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patterns of laissez-faire city creation this model requires periodic government intervention
to improve welfare.
Given the undesirable aspects of city growth inherent in laissez-faire systems of cities,
subsequent literature focused on large agents" such as land developers to create cities.
Helsley and Strange in their 1994 paper introduced the idea that durable capital could
be used by land developers to solve the coordination problem amongst individuals. Later
dynamic models by Cuberes , Venables, and Henderson used this idea from Helsley and
Strange's static model to solve the coordination problem.
Despite the tractability of using land developers Krugman in his 1996 paper emphasizes
the desirability of creating urban models solely as a result of individuals' choices. Follow-
ing this emphasis Seegert's 2011 paper creates a model of forward-looking individuals that
tradeo benets that exist in established cities with opportunities that exist in new cities,
which when aggregated characterizes the dynamic growth of cities. In the following model
individuals create cities and move across them in a two stage game. The dynamic choices of
individuals aggregate to characterize which cities are created and the population that resides
within them.
6.1.2 Setup of the Model
Cities combine positive and negative externalities through higher wages and higher costs
of living. These forces characterize a total benet function, TBj, for each city j, that is
increasing in population, convex for small populations, and concave for large populations
with only one inection point. Therefore, the average benet is single peaked with respect
to population and is maximized at the point the marginal benet intersects the average.
The dierence between the average and the marginal benet is dened as the within-city
wedge, WCW , which is zero at the peak of the average benet curve, positive to the right,
and negative to the left. The within city wedge represents the canonical wedge in economics
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that exists when individuals consider the average instead of the marginal eects.
WCWj(Nj) = SABj(Nj)− SMBj(Nj) (6.1)
At the outset, there is an empty plane of J potential city sites and a hinterland indexed
by 0 which provides a constant payo, regardless of the number of individuals inhabiting
it. There is an exogenous amount of population, N tot, that is assumed to be homogeneous
with no preference for a given city site. Population in any given city is assumed to be any
nonnegative real number, abstracting from indivisibility problems.2 Population is distributed
across an endogenous number K ⊂ J of inhabited cities, which may include the hinterland.
This model is a two-stage game with complete information with sequential moves in each
stage.3 Individuals know the order of moves and observe the choices made by everyone else.
The equilibrium concept of this two-stage model is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium
and is solved by backwards induction. The trembling-hand perfect equilibrium concept is a
renement of subgame perfect equilibrium which in this context excludes unstable equilibria.
In the rst stage cities and barriers to migration are created. The model analyzes four
cases with dierent possible barriers to migration; a tax set by the social planner, free
mobility, a city specic population cap, and a fee set by the city creator. In the second stage
individuals move across cities to maximize their payo. An individual's payo is the average
benet produced in the city they reside in minus any taxes or fees they must pay for living
in the city.
In the rst case a total benet maximizing social planner creates the ecient distribution
of population. The planner does this by creating cities and setting city specic taxes in the
rst stage. In the second stage individuals sequentially decide which city to move to after
observing the set of cities and taxes created by the planner in the rst stage.
In the second case there is free mobility because individuals lack the ability to create
2This assumption is justied when populations are large.
3The order in which individual's move is random between the two stages but known to everyone before
the game begins.
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barriers to migration. In the rst stage individuals choose sequentially which, if any, city
to create. Individuals that create a city in the rst stage are obliged to live in the city
they create in the second stage. All other individuals in the second stage sequentially decide
which city to reside in.
The third case models a system of cities created by individuals with a quantity mechanism
which allows individuals that create cities to set the maximum population in their city. In
the rst stage individuals choose sequentially which, if any, city to create and the maximum
population. In the second stage individuals sequentially decide which city to reside in.
In the fourth case individuals create cities and are able to set a fee all other individuals
must pay to reside in the city. In the rst stage individuals choose sequentially which, if
any, city to create and the fee others must pay to enter. In the second stage individuals
sequentially decide which city to reside in knowing the menu of fees charged by each city.
The following sections determine, by backwards induction, the distribution of population
(section 6.2), the number of cities created (section 6.3), and which cities are created (section
6.4) for each of the four cases.
6.2 Stage Two Analysis: Distribution of Population
In this section the distribution of population across cities is determined assuming the
number and set of cities inhabited is exogenous and that the exogenous total population
is large enough that the hinterland is populated in equilibrium and in all cases. The full
equilibrium problem is solved by backwards induction starting with the distribution of pop-
ulation in stage-two. Therefore this section, which determines the population distribution
across cities, is the rst step in solving the full problem.
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6.2.1 Case One: Planner Optimization
A benevolent social planner maximizes total benet created by setting a city specic
lump-sum tax, τj, which is paid by all individuals residing in the city.
4 The full planner's
problem, given in equation (6.2), is a mixed integer problem where the tax rate τj is any real
number and xj ∈ {0, 1} is equal to one if the city is inhabited and zero otherwise. In this
section the planner takes as given the set of cities K that are inhabited. After observing the
set of cities created and their associated taxes individuals move across cities equalizing the
payo they receive, the planner's mobility condition given in equation (6.3). The planner
is able to determine the population in each city by setting the city specic tax rates and
is constrained to ensure that the sum of populations across inhabited cities is equal to the
total population,
PJ






SABj(Nj)− τj = SABk(Nk)− τk ∀j, k ∈ K (6.3)
The rst order conditions for all inhabited cities with respect to the tax rates are SMBj(Nj,1) =
λ, where λ is the lagrangian multiplier, j indexes city, and 1 indexes population in case 1.
Therefore, the planner sets the tax rates to equalize the marginal benets in each inhabited
city.5
6.2.2 Case Two: No Mechanism-Free Mobility
In the system of cities with with no mechanism to limit migration there is free mobility
in the second stage. In equilibrium all individuals must be content with their choice of
residence which in this case implies that all individuals must receive the same payo. If this
4Tax revenue is redistributed evenly to all resident.
5The rst order conditions for all inhabited cities with respect to the tax rates are xj(∂Nj/∂τj)SABj +
xj(∂Nj/∂τj)Nj(∂SABj/∂Nj) = λxj(∂Nj/∂τj) which can be reduced to SABj +Nj(∂SABj/∂Nj) = λ. To
get the rst order condition given in the text note that SABj +Nj(∂SABj/∂Nj) = SMBj .
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were not the case some individuals would have an incentive, ex post, to move to a dierent
city. Therefore in equilibrium with free mobility all inhabited cities produce the same average
benet according to the free-mobility mobility condition given in equation (6.4) where j, k
index cities, K represents the set of inhabited cities, and 2 indexes the equilibrium population
for case 2.
SABj(Nj,2) = SABk(Nk,2) ∀j, k ∈ K (6.4)
6.2.3 Case Three: Quantity Mechanism-Limited Mobility
City creators in the rst stage with the ability to cap population do so to maximize their
benet which is the per-resident benet produced within the city. The per-resident benet
is maximized when the average benet is equal to the marginal benet. In equilibrium
these limits are binding for all cities causing the average benet produced in each city to be
heterogeneous. Individuals may want to migrate to a dierent city if the benet they receive
in their current city is less than that in another city. However, the population cap for the
given city restricts additional migrants from moving into the city.6
SABj(Nj,3) = SMBj(Nj,3) ∀j ∈ K (6.5)
6.2.4 Case Four: Price Mechanism-Intermediate Mobility
In this case individuals are able to move across cities freely but must pay a fee to enter the
city. In equilibrium all individuals must be content with their choice of residence implying
the average benet produced in a city minus the fee they must pay to enter the city must
be equal across inhabited cities, the price-mechanism mobility condition given in equation
(6.6).
SABj(Nj,4)− fj = SABk(Nk,4)− fk ∀j, k ∈ K (6.6)
6If the maximum per-resident benet produced in a city is less than the benet produced in the hinterland
then the city will be empty in equilibrium.
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The city creator sets the fee in the rst stage to maximize the prot from the fees.7 The
equilibrium fee is found by substituting the condition in equation (6.6) into the city creator's
objective function in equation (6.7) and taking the rst order condition with respect to the
fee noting that the population Nj,4(fj) is a function of the fee.
8
maxfj fjNj (6.7)
The fee charged in equilibrium for all inhabited cities is the within-city wedge, fj = WCWj.
The condition in equation (6.8) is the equilibrium condition for a system of cities with a price
mechanism and is found by substituting the equilibrium fee into the price mechanism mobility
condition given in equation (6.6). This condition states that the fees set by decentralized
prot maximizing individuals cause individuals in the second stage to move across cities in
a way that equalizes the marginal benet across all inhabited cities.
SMBj(Nj,4) = SMBj(Nj,4) ∀j, k ∈ K (6.8)
6.2.5 Population Distribution Analysis
Figure 6.1 graphs the average and marginal benet of a given city with respect to pop-
ulation with the equilibrium populations in the four cases marked. Across the four cases
the population residing in the hinterland diers such that the population in all cities for a
7Maximizing the prot from fees is the correct objective function for the city creator because population is









where Ω is the density function of population and Ω(ω) represents the density at point
ω which represents the city creator. In the case where population is an integer Ω(ω) = 1 representing a unit
mass for each individual. However, in the case where population is a real number Ω(ω) = 0. Substituting
Ω(ω) = 0 into the more general objective function we note that it reduces to maximizing the prot from the
fees.
8The new objective function is (SABj − SABk + fk)Nj . The rst order condition is
(∂SABj/∂Nj)(∂Nj/∂fj)Nj+(∂Nj/∂fj)(SABj−SABk+fk) = 0. Rearranging (∂SABj/∂Nj)Nj+SABj =
SABk − fk which is fk = SABk −SMBj . Substituting fk and fj from the rst order conditions into condi-
tion 6.6 gives SABj(Nj,4)− (SABj − SMBk) = SABk(Nk,4)− (SABk − SMBj) which gives the condition
SMBk = SMBj in the text. The fee is found by noting the rst order condition with the condition that the
marginal benets be equal imply that SMBj = SABj − fj .
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given case can be less than the equilibrium populations in a dierent case. For example,
Figure 6.1 demonstrates a city able to cap its population chooses a population level less than
the other cases, and this holds for all cities. Therefore, there is more population living in
the hinterland in the system of cities able to cap city populations. In contrast, when there
is free mobility across cities every city has its largest equilibrium population. Finally, the
equilibrium population resulting from city creators setting fees is the ecient population set
by social planner.
Result 1: For a given number of inhabited cities and a large population such that the hinter-
land is inhabited; a system of cities with free mobility has cities that are all over-populated,
a system of cities with the quantity mechanism has cities that are all under-populated, and
a system of cities with fees has cities that are all eciently populated.
Result 1 demonstrates the ability of the price mechanism to solve the ineciency in the
allocation of population across cities that occurs when the system of cities have access to
either a quantity mechanism or no mechanism to limit migration. This result is surprising
and encouraging because it implies that if cities use zoning optimally to set a fee for migrants,
the population distribution may be ecient on the intensive margin.9
The fact that a system of cities with free mobility has cities that are over-populated
follows from the equilibrium conditions.
9There is a special case where the population in each city is the same across all cases. In this special case
all cities are homogeneous, the total population is divisible by the shared population that maximizes average
product in a city, and the hinterland is uninhabited. In this special case each city has the capped population,
the average benets are equal, the marginal benets are equal, and the fee in all cities in equilibrium is zero.
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Proof
SABj(Nj,2) = SAB0 by case 2 equilibrium condition
= SMB0 by denition hinterland




by denition SMB and SAB
⇒ SABj(Nj,2) ≤ SABj(Nj,1)
⇒ Nj,2 ≥ Nj,1
The result that the system of cities with free mobility over-populates cities relative to
other cases is well documented in the literature. Arnott in his 1979 paper proposes that no
stable equilibrium exists in which some cities are less than optimal size."10
The result that the population distribution created by the planner can also be created
in a competitive equilibrium where fees are charged by city creators is similar to Knight's
optimal highway toll. Knight demonstrated that the ecient distribution of trac between a
slow uncongestible road and a fast congestible road could be achieved by allowing the owner
of the congestible road to charge a toll. The toll the prot-maximizing entrepreneur charges
is exactly the tax Pigou suggested to align private and social incentives. Similar intuition
holds in this paper as well, the planner sets the distribution across cities to equalize the
marginal benets by setting a tax, and this distribution can be decentralized by allowing
city creators, similar to Knight's entrepreneur's, to charge a fee. The model extends this
intuition in the following sections by investigating the distribution of population when the
number and set of cities inhabited are endogenous.
10However, recently Albouy and Seegert in their 2010 paper loosen Arnott's assumptions that cities are
homogeneous and that the total benet produced within a city is consumed within a city to demonstrate
that cities can be ineciently small even with free mobility. The assumption that the total benet produced
within a city is consumed within a city is maintained in this section but loosened in section ACW.
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6.3 Extensive Margin: How Many Cities to Create
Individuals in the rst stage make a binary decision between creating a city or not based
on their expected utilities in either case. The order in which cities are created is taken as
given in this section and is determined in section 6.4. An individual's expected utility of
creating or not creating a city depends on the second stage outcomes, hence the number
of cities created can be heterogeneous across cases because the second stage outcomes are
heterogeneous across cases.
6.3.1 Case One: Planner Optimization
The planner creates K cities when the total benet produced by eciently allocating the
population across K cities is larger than the total benet produced by eciently allocating
the population across K − 1 cities or K + 1 cities.
6.3.2 Case Two: No Mechanism-Free Mobility
In this case the second stage ensures the per-resident benet each individual receives is
equal across all inhabited cities. Individuals decide to create a city if by doing so increases
the equilibrium per-resident benet. Therefore, this case creates the number of cities that
maximize the shared per-resident benet.
6.3.3 Case Three: Quantity Mechanism-Limited Mobility
In this case individuals compare the per-resident benet they would receive in the second
stage with the maximum per-resident benet in the city they would create. In this case
there are two subcases, either the hinterland is inhabited or it is not. If the hinterland is not
inhabited the maximum number of cities is created, given the exogenous total population.
Each city, with the exception of one, has population that maximizes its per-resident benet.
The possible exception is for the last city created which could have a population less than
its per-resident benet maximum if it is able to produce a per-resident benet greater than
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the hinterland. If the hinterland is inhabited either the population living in the hinterland
is less than the population that maximizes the per-resident benet in the next possible city
or the maximum per-resident benet in the next city is less than the hinterland benet.
6.3.4 Case Four: Price Mechanism-Intermediate Mobility
Individuals in a system of cities with a price mechanism have an incentive to create cities
in the rst stage as long as the equilibrium fee they would be able to charge is nonnegative.
The equilibrium fee is the within-city wedge which is zero at the capped population and
positive for larger populations.
6.3.5 How Many Cities Analysis
Intuitively, the third case with the ability to cap populations creates the most cities
and the second case with free mobility creates the fewest cities because in equilibrium the
third case under-populates its cities and the second case over-populates its cities. However,
whether the price mechanism in case four is able to create the ecient number of cities is not
obvious. In the second stage allowing city creators to set a fee aligned the social and private
incentives but in the rst stage the public and private incentives do not seem to be aligned.
However, to be able to create an additional city and charge a positive fee necessitates an
increase in total benet produced within the system of cities. Therefore, the price mechanism
is able to create the ecient number of cities.
Result 2: For a given ordering of city creation; a system of cities with free mobility creates
the fewest cities, a system of cities with the quantity mechanism creates the most cities, and
a system of cities with the price mechanism creates the ecient number of cities.
The intuition for result 2 is formalized in the appendix (section J) and demonstrated
below by simulating the number of cities each case produces.
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6.3.6 System of Cities Simulation
Result 2 is demonstrated by simulating the number of cities that each case produces as
total population increases.11 The calibrated model is a general function representing the
economies and diseconomies of scale given in equation (6.9). Cities are heterogeneous in
the level of Ai, a multiplicative factor on the economies of scale, and in Qi, an additively
separable factor. Following Albouy and Seegert (2010), the multiplicative factor represents
production amenities and the additively separable factor represents consumption amenities.
A wide range of parameter values for this functional form are used in the simulations, only
constrained such that the average benet is a single-peaked function. The simulation is
performed using an algorithm similar to the add-routine algorithm described in Kuehn and






Figure 6.2 plots the number of cities created as total population increases in the cases with
the quantity mechanism, free mobility, and the social planner. For small levels of total
population, the dierence in the number of cities among cases is small. However, as the
total population increases the dierence in cities created diverges. In the special case where
all cities are homogenous each case creates the same number of cities. However, as cities
become more heterogeneous the dierence between the number of cities created in each case
increases.
11The simulations are done for 10, 000 dierent values of total population and 10, 000 dierent parameter
values. In addition the simulation is run with the microfounded calibrated model in Albouy and Seegert
(2010).
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6.4 Extensive Margin: Which Cities to Create
This section determines the order cities are inhabited.12 City sites are modeled to be
heterogeneous in their production amenities Aj and quality of life amenities Qj according
to equation (6.9). The benet that a city or system of cities receives from these amenity
levels depends on the ability of the city to limit migration. Therefore, individuals value the
production amenities and quality of life amenities based on their ability to limit migration.
Cities in this model are heterogeneous in two-dimensions, but to order the cities, the
two-dimensional space must be projected into a one-dimensional eective benet space. This
section produces two mappings from Aj x Qj space to Ãj space that are similar to the equiva-
lent and compensating variation introduced by John Hicks in 1939 . The equivalent variation
maps points in price-wealth space onto a xed price line. Similarly, the rst mapping in this
section maps production and quality-of-life-amenity space onto a xed quality of life line,
holding population xed. Therefore, this mapping gives the amount of change in quality of
life amenities needed to oset a change in production amenities such that the individuals
would receive the same benet with the same level of population. The projection in this
mapping is the indierence curve between production and quality of life amenities, given
below in equation (6.10).13
Qj = C̄ − AjNαj,i +BN
β
j,i (6.10)
The slope of the indierence curve is Nαj,i which, by result 1, implies that the indierence
curve is steepest for the system of cities with free mobility and attest in the system with
the quantity mechanism. The indierence curves, drawn in Figure 6.3, demonstrate that
barriers to migration cause individuals and the social planner to value amenities dierently.
12In the static model presented here, it could be welfare improving to create multiple cities lower on the
priority list instead of a city higher on the priority list. However, these equilibria are eliminated because they
are not robust to dynamic models where the total population in the city is increasing with the assumption
that once a city is created it cannot be uninhabited or to do so would incur a large cost.
13The equivalent variation and the indierence curve projection are well suited for individual comparisons.
However, changes in amenity levels change the fee the city creator is able to charge in case four, which is
not an individual level comparison but a city wide comparison as shown in the compensating variation.
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Result 3: Systems of cities with the quantity mechanism over-value quality of life amenities
and systems of cities with free mobility over-value production amenities.
The second mapping compares the equilibrium level of benet for two dierent production
amenity levels allowing equilibrium populations to dier. This is similar to the compensating
variation that compares utility levels, allowing individuals to choose dierent bundles for
dierent relative prices. The compensating and equivalent variation benets for systems of
cities with free mobility and the system with the quantity mechanism are graphed in Figures
6.4 and 6.5. The compensating variation for the system of cities with free mobility is zero
because population in equilibrium perfectly compensates for dierences in amenity levels.
In contrast, the compensating variation is larger than the equivalent variation for systems
of cities with the quantity mechanism because individuals capitalize the full benet of the
additional amenities by adjusting the cap on population.
The compensating variation for the system with the price mechanism compares the dif-
ference in the fees collected by the city creator. The fees collected increase with the level
of production amenities because both the fee and the number of migrants paying the fee
increases. The increase in fees collected is given by the dierence in the two rectangles
depicted in Figure 6.8.
The compensating variation for the social planner can be conceptualized for a single
person or for all individuals. For comparison with systems of cities with free mobility and
the quantity mechanism, the single person compensating variation is used and depicted in
Figure 6.6. When the social planner is considering the next city to create, the objective is to
maximize the total benet and the relevant comparison is across all individuals. When a city
with more production amenities is created, it provides a higher level of average benet for
more individuals, resulting in a total benet that is represented graphically as two rectangles
in Figure 7.4. Figure 6.8 demonstrates that the compensating variations for the system of
cities with the price mechanism and the social planner are the same, which implies that
although they have dierent objectives, they value production and quality of life amenities
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in the same way.
Result 4: Systems of cities with the price mechanism value amenity levels in the same way
as the social planner and produce the same ranking of cities.
The compensating and equivalent variation projections provide an ordering of cities given
estimates of the quality of life and production amenities that characterize each city. Table 1
lists the ordering using the equivalent variation projection for the system of cities with the
planner, free mobility, and the quantity mechanism. The population of the city in each case
is given in columns 1 and 2. Population is estimated using the calibrated model from Albouy
and Seegert (2010) and the amenity levels from Albouy (2009) . The cities in Table 1 are
ordered by which cities case 2 (the quantity mechanism) most over-values (relative to the
social planner). The rst city in Table 1 is Portland, Maine, which is the most over-valued
city in a system with the quantity mechanism relative to the social planner. The eective
benet, given in dollars, of each city is given in columns 3, 5, and 7. The ranks of each city
for each case are given in columns 4, 6, and 8 and the dierences in ranks among the cases
are given in columns 9, 10, and 11.
Columns 1 and 2 demonstrate result 3 that the cities over-valued by systems with the
quantity mechanism are those with relatively large quality of life amenities relative to their
production amenities. For example, Houston, Texas is valued most highly by systems of
cities with free mobility, but is valued least by systems with the quantity mechanism. The
social planner values Houston at an intermediate level. This ranking reects the fact that
Houston has relatively more production amenities than quality of life amenities.
In contrast, Portland, Oregon is ranked higher by the system of cities with the quantity
mechanism than the system of cities with free mobility. This ranking holds even though
Portland, Oregon has an estimated level of production amenities that is higher than its
quality of life amenities. However, relative to the indierence curve, Portland has higher
quality of life amenities. These two cities are of particular interest because they are often
used as examples of the extremes in land-use policies; Houston has very few zoning laws and
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Portland is noted for its strong land-use planning. The relative rankings in Table 1 suggest
that the strength of these cities' zoning laws may not be a coincidence but a result of the
relative preference of individuals.
Figure 6.3 plots a few cities and their amenity levels and possible indierence curves
for the social planner, system of cities with free mobility and system of cities with the
quantity mechanism all going through San Luis Obispo, CA. San Luis Obispo, CA has slightly
more production amenities than Denver, CO and signicantly more quality of life amenities.
Therefore in all three cases San Luis Obispo, CA is preferred over Denver, CO. In contrast,
Seattle, WA and San Diego, CA are preferred over San Luis Obispo, CA even though they
have less quality of life amenities (but make up for it with signicantly more production
amenities). Honolulu, HI has more quality of life amenities than San Luis Obispo, CA but less
production amenities. The social planner prefers San Luis Obsipo, CA over Honolulu, HI but
systems of cities with the quantity mechanism prefer Honolulu, HI. The quantity mechanism
prefers Honolulu, HI because it over-values (relative to the social planner) the quality of
life amenities that Honolulu, HI oers. Similarly, Stockton, CA is preferred over San Luis
Obispo, CA by systems of cities with free mobility but not by the social planner because
systems of cities with free mobility over-value (relative to the social planner) production
amenities.
6.5 Across-City Wedge
This section allows for across-city externalities by relaxing the assumption (maintained in
the previous sections) the benets produced within a city remain in the city. There are many
real-world examples where benets produced within cities are combined into a common pool
from which cities receive benets; examples include federal income taxation and land rents
if land owners do not live in the city where they own land. The transfer of benets from
some cities to others is dened as the across-city wedge (ACW ). This section demonstrates
that if across-city wedges exist then the price mechanism is unable to solve the ineciencies
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in a system of cities.
The across-city wedge is dened in equation (6.11) where PAB is the average benet in
the city net the across-city wedge and is assumed to be single-peaked. The across-city wedge
is allowed to dier with population and across cities; therefore, there are cities that are net
beneciaries and cities that are net providers. Let cities that are net providers be in the set
S = {1, 2, 3...I} and cities that are net beneciaries be in the set Sc = {I+1, I+2, I+3...J}.
PABj(Nj) = SABj(Nj)− ACWj(Nj) (6.11)
Result 5: For a given number of inhabited cities and a total population large enough such
that the hinterland is inhabited in all cases, if the across-city wedge is positive for city j
then the social planner allocates more population to city j than the system of cities with the
price mechanism, and if the across-city wedge is negative for city j then the social planner
allocates less population to city j than the system of cities with the price mechanism.
Proof:
PMBj(Nj,4) = SAB0 Equilibrium condition for case 4.
= SMBj(Nj,p) Equilibrium condition for planner.
SMBj(Nj,4)− ACWj = SMBj(Nj,p) Denition across-city wedge
SMBj(Nj,4) > SMBj(Nj,p) Given j ∈ S
⇒ Nj,4 < Nj,p
SMBj(Nj,4) < SMBj(Nj,p) Given j ∈ Sc
⇒ Nj,4 > Nj,p
When across-city wedges exist the price mechanism is no longer able to eciently distribute
population across a given number of cities. Similarly, when the across-city wedge exists
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individuals with the price mechanism value cities dierently than the social planner. As a
result individuals may create a dierent set of cities both in number and type. For example,
the system of cities the with price mechanism values cities that create large surpluses to
individuals and have small across-city wedges. Therefore, the across-city wedge dierentiates
how individuals with the price mechanism value cities in comparison to the social planner.14
If the across-city wedge is federal taxation, this implies that the system of cities with the
price mechanism over-values cities with large quality of life amenities and under-value cities
with large production amenities relative to the social planner.
6.5.1 Second Best World
If across-city wedges encompass fundamental aspects of society, such as federal taxation
and land rents, then limiting the across-city wedge may not be possible. The across-city
wedge decreases the equilibrium population of net provider cities and increase the equilib-
rium population of net beneciary cities. Therefore, if across-city wedges cannot be limited
then cities within a system should be given dierent abilities to limit migration to counter
the eects of the across-city wedge. Specically, cities that are net providers should be con-
strained in their ability to limit migration and cities that are net beneciaries should be
encouraged to limit migration.
Result 6: For a given number of inhabited cities and a total population large enough such
that the hinterland is inhabited in all cases, the equilibrium population levels Nj,2, Nj,3, and
Nj,4 are nonincreasing functions of the across-city wedge.
Result 6 follows directly from the equilibrium conditions and the denition of the across-
city wedge.
Implication 1: Cities that are net providers should have a restricted set of zoning policy tools
to allow more mobility to these cities to counter the eects of the across-city wedge.
Implication 2: Cities that are net beneciaries should be allowed a wide range of zoning policy
14The social planner does not consider across-city wedges because they are transfers across cities and do
not change the total production in the system of cities.
144
tools to create more restrictive mobility to these cities to counter the eects of the across-city
wedge.
6.6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a tractable strategic urban model in which individuals endogenously
create and move among cities to maximize their own benet. The model emphasizes the
importance of barriers to migration on individual's incentives. If able, individuals limit the
population of the city in which they live. Doing so can maximize the per-resident benet
to individuals within the city, but not the total benet across cities, causing cities to be
ineciently small in equilibrium. In contrast, if individuals are unable to limit migration,
cities become ineciently large. The ecient population for a city can be achieved by a
decentralized system of individuals able to charge a fee to migrants entering the city. Con-
ceptually, residents of a city may charge a fee to migrants by articially limiting housing
supply with land-use policies. These results describing how to eciently distribute popu-
lation for a given number of cities corresponds to the economic intuition from Pigou and
Knight and are similar to results in the urban literature (Anas, 1992; Arnott, 1979).
This model extends the results in the urban literature, producing solutions to how many
and which cities should be created. Dierent barriers to migration cause dierent numbers
of cities and dierent sets of cities to be created. When there are large barriers to migration,
individuals produce too many cities. When there are no barriers to migration individuals
produce too few cities. When the barriers to migration are capitalized in fees charged to
migrants, the ecient number of cities are produced. This result is both surprising and
encouraging because it suggests that self-interested individuals with the ability to create
barriers to migration through a price mechanism do so eciently.
The model also demonstrates that the value of production and quality of life amenities
are valued dierently depending on the type of barriers to migration that exist. Quality of
life amenities are valued highly by systems of cities that have large barriers to migration,
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whereas production amenities are valued highly by systems of cities that have no barriers
to migration. When barriers to migration consist of fees to migrants, quality of life and
production amenities are valued in the same was as the benevolent social planner. These
results imply that land-use policies may act as a market for migrants among cities, causing
population to be optimally distributed across the optimal number and set of cities.
This model provides a framework for further research on the extensive margin of city
formation. For example, the model is built using homogeneous agents but could be extended
to heterogeneous agents. In addition, this paper (and most migration models) focus on
wages and cost of living as the sole determinants of migration. However, this model could
be extended to allow the proximity of individuals to dierent cities both geographically
and in preference-space to enter the model. Geographic proximity can be an important
factor in structuring migration patterns among cities. For instance, Chicago is a productive
city which oers high wages and a reasonable cost of living, which should encourage in-
migration from across the entire United States but receives migrants disproportionately from
the immediately adjacent states. This regionalism which is unaddressed in most models may
have important ramications for city creation and growth.
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Figure 6.1: Equilibrium Populations
Figure 6.2: Simulated Number of Cities Created
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Table 6.1: Free Mobility and Social Planner Ranking of Cities
Amenity Estimate Quantity Mech. Social Planner Free Market Dierence Rank
City Population QOL Production Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank 4- 6 6 - 8 4 - 8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Portland, ME 243537 0.058 -0.056 9174 114 9072 121 9037 122 -7 1 -8
NorfolkVirginia Beach 1569541 0.03 -0.092 8485 175 8413 180 8382 180 -5 0 -5
-Newport News, VANC
non-metropolitan areas, OR 1194699 0.057 -0.036 9498 77 9390 81 9355 83 -4 2 -6
SarasotaBradenton, FL 589959 0.073 -0.045 9408 88 9293 92 9257 93 -4 1 -5
ProvoOrem, UT 368536 0.013 -0.047 9163 116 9080 120 9051 120 -4 0 -4
Honolulu, HI 876156 0.165 0.049 11269 14 11080 17 11032 17 -3 0 -3
non-metropolitan areas, HI 335651 0.111 -0.016 10016 42 9873 45 9831 45 -3 0 -3
non-metropolitan areas, VT 608387 0.064 -0.041 9441 84 9331 87 9295 89 -3 2 -5
Bellingham, WA 166814 0.063 -0.045 9372 92 9263 95 9228 97 -3 2 -5
non-metropolitan areas, AZ 942343 0.035 -0.041 9339 96 9243 99 9211 99 -3 0 -3
Savannah, GA 293000 0.021 -0.053 9092 125 9007 128 8977 128 -3 0 -3
non-metropolitan areas, MT 774080 0.059 -0.062 9079 127 8979 130 8944 131 -3 1 -4
Albuquerque, NM 712738 0.048 -0.064 9008 135 8914 138 8880 139 -3 1 -4
Tucson, AZ 843746 0.054 -0.089 8620 165 8534 168 8500 168 -3 0 -3
Charlottesville, VA 159576 0.053 -0.089 8616 166 8531 169 8497 169 -3 0 -3
Flagsta, AZUT 122366 0.085 -0.105 8469 180 8378 183 8339 184 -3 1 -4
Bloomington, IN 120563 0.026 -0.105 8258 197 8196 200 8165 201 -3 1 -4
non-metropolitan areas, AK 367124 0.011 0.007 10042 39 9947 41 9919 41 -2 0 -2
Santa Fe, NM 147635 0.115 -0.02 9964 45 9820 47 9778 48 -2 1 -3
non-metropolitan areas, NH 1011597 0.018 -0.006 9853 50 9757 52 9728 52 -2 0 -2
non-metropolitan areas, CO 924086 0.088 -0.024 9804 53 9676 55 9637 56 -2 1 -3
Salt Lake CityOgden, UT 1333914 0.019 -0.016 9693 63 9598 65 9569 65 -2 0 -2
Fort CollinsLoveland, CO 251494 0.064 -0.03 9621 69 9507 71 9472 71 -2 0 -2
Tampa-St. Petersburg 2395997 0.013 -0.051 9097 124 9015 126 8986 127 -2 1 -3
-Clearwater, FL
Colorado Springs, CO 516929 0.053 -0.062 9058 130 8961 132 8926 134 -2 2 -4
Iowa City, IA 111006 0.027 -0.072 8802 151 8721 153 8691 153 -2 0 -2
Fort PiercePort St. Lucie, FL 319426 0.022 -0.076 8719 160 8642 162 8612 162 -2 0 -2
San Diego, CA 2813833 0.108 0.096 11840 9 11679 10 11638 10 -1 0 -1
BarnstableYarmouth, MA 162582 0.086 0.04 10846 22 10705 23 10667 23 -1 0 -1
West Palm Beach- 1131184 0.03 0.044 10716 26 10605 27 10575 27 -1 0 -1
Boca Raton, FL
Naples, FL 251377 0.098 0.024 10625 28 10480 29 10441 29 -1 0 -1
MilwaukeeRacine, WI C 1689572 -0.007 0.039 10505 31 10414 32 10389 32 -1 0 -1
Madison, WI 426526 0.05 -0.018 9769 56 9659 57 9625 57 -1 0 -1
non-metropolitan areas, CA 1249739 0.044 -0.017 9764 57 9657 58 9624 59 -1 1 -2
non-metropolitan areas, WA 1063531 0.034 -0.022 9647 67 9546 68 9515 70 -1 2 -3
Des Moines, IA 456022 -0.011 -0.023 9472 79 9394 80 9369 80 -1 0 -1
Rochester, NY 1098201 -0.026 -0.021 9452 82 9381 83 9358 82 -1 -1 0
non-metropolitan areas, UT 531967 0.014 -0.032 9412 87 9324 88 9296 87 -1 -1 0
non-metropolitan areas, FL 1222532 0.018 -0.039 9312 101 9224 102 9194 102 -1 0 -1
non-metropolitan areas, ME 1033664 0.021 -0.041 9289 102 9201 103 9171 104 -1 1 -2
non-metropolitan areas, ID 863855 0.008 -0.04 9260 104 9177 105 9149 105 -1 0 -1
non-metropolitan areas, WY 493849 0.012 -0.042 9241 106 9157 107 9128 108 -1 1 -2
non-metropolitan areas, VA 1640567 -0.028 -0.035 9215 108 9148 109 9125 109 -1 0 -1
VisaliaTularePorterville, CA 368021 -0.024 -0.038 9180 112 9112 113 9088 114 -1 1 -2
non-metropolitan areas, NM 783050 0.006 -0.047 9138 122 9058 123 9030 123 -1 0 -1
GreensboroWinston 1251509 -0.018 -0.049 9020 133 8952 134 8928 133 -1 -1 0
-SalemHigh Point, NC
ChicoParadise, CA 203171 0.047 -0.07 8906 145 8815 146 8781 146 -1 0 -1
GreenvilleSpartanburg- 962441 -0.019 -0.062 8803 150 8740 151 8715 151 -1 0 -1
Anderson, SC
Yuba City, CA 139149 -0.001 -0.067 8785 153 8715 154 8688 154 -1 0 -1
Redding, CA 163256 0.039 -0.077 8763 156 8679 157 8646 157 -1 0 -1
EugeneSpringeld, OR 322959 0.08 -0.086 8761 157 8661 158 8623 158 -1 0 -1
MedfordAshland, OR 181269 0.09 -0.099 8585 170 8487 171 8448 171 -1 0 -1
Tulsa, OK 803235 -0.014 -0.082 8493 174 8435 175 8410 175 -1 0 -1
Wilmington, NC 233450 0.071 -0.102 8468 181 8382 182 8345 183 -1 1 -2
Tallahassee, FL 284539 0.028 -0.095 8429 184 8359 185 8328 185 -1 0 -1
EvansvilleHenderson, INKY 296195 -0.026 -0.091 8302 191 8254 192 8230 192 -1 0 -1
Yuma, AZ 160026 0.004 -0.098 8294 193 8237 194 8210 194 -1 0 -1
Tuscaloosa, AL 164875 -0.009 -0.096 8281 194 8228 195 8202 195 -1 0 -1
MelbourneTitusville- 476230 0.005 -0.101 8249 200 8193 201 8165 200 -1 -1 0
Palm Bay, FL
BryanCollege Station, TX 152415 0.033 -0.116 8102 205 8046 206 8015 206 -1 0 -1
Knoxville, TN 687249 -0.007 -0.111 8042 210 7999 211 7973 211 -1 0 -1
Montgomery, AL 333055 0.001 -0.114 8021 213 7977 214 7951 215 -1 1 -2
Rocky Mount, 143026 -0.024 -0.109 8014 214 7976 215 7953 214 -1 -1 0
Lincoln, NE 250291 0.021 -0.12 7994 216 7947 217 7918 217 -1 0 -1
Gainesville, FL 217955 0.035 -0.129 7897 225 7854 226 7823 229 -1 3 -4
HickoryMorganton 341851 -0.004 -0.121 7888 226 7854 227 7828 228 -1 1 -2
Lenoir, NC
Punta Gorda, FL 141627 0.058 -0.142 7768 237 7732 238 7700 238 -1 0 -1
Grand Junction, CO 116255 0.07 -0.148 7712 243 7682 244 7650 246 -1 2 -3
Amarillo, TX 217858 -0.001 -0.137 7637 248 7626 249 7605 248 -1 -1 0
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Table 6.2: Free Mobility and Social Planner Ranking of Cities
Amenity Estimate Quantity Mech. Social Planner Free Market Dierence Rank
City Population QOL Production Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank 4- 6 6 - 8 4 - 8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
San Francisco 7039362 0.114 0.285 14966 1 14784 1 14745 1 0 0 0
OaklandSan Jose, CA
New YorkNorthern 21199864 0.033 0.21 13456 2 13328 2 13298 2 0 0 0
New JerseyLong Island
Santa Barbara- 399347 0.158 0.156 12997 3 12799 3 12753 3 0 0 0
-Santa MariaLompoc, CA
Los AngelesRiverside 16373645 0.065 0.143 12464 4 12322 4 12288 4 0 0 0
Orange County, CA
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence 5819100 0.045 0.145 12428 5 12297 5 12266 5 0 0 0
MANHMECT
Salinas-Monterey-Carmel, CA 401762 0.126 0.125 12378 6 12203 6 12160 6 0 0 0
ChicagoGary- 9157540 0.004 0.131 12056 7 11950 7 11924 7 0 0 0
-Kenosha, ILINWI
Hartford, CT 1183110 -0.029 0.134 11992 8 11904 8 11882 8 0 0 0
DetroitAnn Arbor 5456428 -0.037 0.115 11652 11 11569 11 11548 11 0 0 0
Flint, MI
SeattleTacoma- 3554760 0.049 0.094 11604 12 11476 12 11443 12 0 0 0
-Bremerton, WA
PhiladelphiaWilmington- 6188463 -0.036 0.1 11408 13 11326 13 11305 13 0 0 0
Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD
San Luis Obispo 246681 0.115 0.058 11242 15 11081 15 11040 16 0 1 -1
AtascaderoPaso Robles, CA
SacramentoYolo, CA 1796857 0.025 0.072 11159 18 11047 18 11017 18 0 0 0
Las Vegas, NVAZ 1563282 -0.023 0.077 11075 19 10988 19 10964 19 0 0 0
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 2968806 -0.023 0.075 11042 20 10955 20 10932 20 0 0 0
DenverBoulder- 2581506 0.045 0.058 10998 21 10877 21 10845 21 0 0 0
-Greeley, CO C
Portland-Salem, OR-WA 2265223 0.041 0.044 10754 24 10638 24 10606 25 0 1 -1
Reno, NV 339486 0.05 0.042 10753 25 10632 25 10598 26 0 1 -1
PhoenixMesa, AZ 3251876 0.018 0.035 10527 30 10423 30 10394 31 0 1 -1
AustinSan Marcos, TX 1249763 0.029 0.026 10417 33 10309 33 10279 33 0 0 0
RaleighDurham- 1187941 0.01 0.019 10236 34 10139 34 10111 34 0 0 0
-Chapel Hill, NC
non-metropolitan areas, CT 1350818 -0.013 0.022 10205 35 10119 35 10094 35 0 0 0
Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH-KY-IN 1979202 -0.039 0.026 10180 36 10107 36 10085 36 0 0 0
MiamiFort Lauderdale, FL 3876380 0.046 0.007 10165 37 10051 37 10019 37 0 0 0
non-metropolitan areas, RI 258023 0.035 0.006 10110 38 10003 38 9971 39 0 1 -1
Columbus, OH 1540157 -0.027 0.015 10040 40 9963 40 9940 40 0 0 0
non-metropolitan areas, NV 285196 -0.011 0.003 9899 48 9816 48 9791 47 0 -1 1
non-metropolitan areas, MA 569691 0.021 -0.005 9880 49 9782 49 9753 50 0 1 -1
Allentown-Bethlehem 637958 -0.029 -0.004 9721 59 9648 59 9625 58 0 -1 1
-Easton, PA
non-metropolitan areas, MD 666998 -0.03 -0.005 9701 60 9629 60 9606 60 0 0 0
Kansas City, MOKS 1776062 -0.03 -0.005 9701 61 9629 61 9606 61 0 0 0
RichmondPetersburg, VA 996512 -0.031 -0.005 9698 62 9626 62 9603 62 0 0 0
St. Louis, MOIL 2603607 -0.031 -0.006 9681 64 9610 64 9587 64 0 0 0
Albany-Schenectady- 875583 -0.021 -0.01 9651 66 9575 66 9551 66 0 0 0
Troy, NY
non-metropolitan areas, DE 158149 0.001 -0.019 9580 72 9495 72 9468 72 0 0 0
Lancaster, PA 470658 -0.018 -0.017 9546 73 9470 73 9446 73 0 0 0
Fresno, CA 922516 -0.012 -0.019 9534 74 9456 74 9431 74 0 0 0
Merced, CA 210554 -0.018 -0.018 9530 75 9454 75 9429 75 0 0 0
Green Bay, WI 226778 -0.009 -0.021 9512 76 9433 76 9407 76 0 0 0
non-metropolitan areas, SC 1616255 -0.02 -0.026 9391 90 9318 90 9294 90 0 0 0
Yakima, WA 222581 -0.01 -0.03 9361 93 9284 93 9258 92 0 -1 1
Orlando, FL 1644561 0.012 -0.035 9356 94 9270 94 9241 94 0 0 0
non-metropolitan areas, NY 1744930 -0.021 -0.03 9322 98 9250 98 9226 98 0 0 0
non-metropolitan areas, NC 2632956 -0.005 -0.034 9313 100 9234 100 9208 101 0 1 -1
non-metropolitan areas, WV 1809034 -0.056 -0.031 9182 110 9127 110 9107 110 0 0 0
Toledo, OH 618203 -0.038 -0.035 9180 111 9117 111 9095 111 0 0 0
Louisville, KYIN 1025598 -0.02 -0.046 9063 129 8994 129 8970 129 0 0 0
Baton Rouge, LA 602894 -0.026 -0.05 8975 139 8912 139 8888 138 0 -1 1
non-metropolitan areas, OK 1862951 -0.033 -0.05 8951 140 8890 140 8867 140 0 0 0
non-metropolitan areas, ND 521239 -0.035 -0.05 8943 141 8884 141 8861 141 0 0 0
non-metropolitan areas, NE 878760 -0.018 -0.054 8938 142 8872 142 8847 142 0 0 0
non-metropolitan areas, SD 629811 -0.001 -0.058 8933 143 8860 143 8833 143 0 0 0
Lexington, KY 479198 -0.002 -0.059 8913 144 8840 144 8814 144 0 0 0
New Orleans, LA 1337726 0.016 -0.065 8878 147 8800 147 8770 147 0 0 0
Charleston-North Charleston, SC 549033 0.05 -0.073 8867 148 8776 148 8742 148 0 0 0
Jacksonville, FL 1100491 0.008 -0.066 8833 149 8759 149 8731 149 0 0 0
Omaha, NEIA 716998 -0.007 -0.067 8763 155 8697 155 8670 155 0 0 0
Fort MyersCape Coral, FL 440888 0.058 -0.082 8749 159 8657 159 8622 159 0 0 0
Boise City, ID 432345 0.008 -0.077 8653 163 8583 163 8555 163 0 0 0
Cedar Rapids, IA 191701 0 -0.076 8641 164 8574 164 8547 165 0 1 -1
Springeld, IL 201437 -0.029 -0.078 8505 172 8452 172 8429 172 0 0 0
Benton Harbor, MI 162453 -0.027 -0.079 8495 173 8442 173 8419 173 0 0 0
Dover, DE 126697 -0.013 -0.083 8480 177 8422 177 8397 178 0 1 -1
CantonMassillon, OH 406934 -0.029 -0.08 8472 178 8420 178 8397 177 0 -1 1
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Table 6.3: Free Mobility and Social Planner Ranking of Cities
Amenity Estimate Quantity Mech. Social Planner Free Market Dierence Rank
City Population QOL Production Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank 4- 6 6 - 8 4 - 8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
DavenportMoline- 359062 -0.02 -0.082 8471 179 8416 179 8392 179 0 0 0
-Rock Island, IAIL
Spokane, WA 417939 0.002 -0.091 8402 186 8342 186 8314 187 0 1 -1
Lake Charles, LA 183577 -0.06 -0.079 8378 187 8338 187 8319 186 0 -1 1
AugustaAiken, GASC 477441 -0.044 -0.083 8370 188 8325 188 8304 188 0 0 0
San Antonio, TX 1592383 -0.016 -0.091 8337 189 8285 189 8260 189 0 0 0
Wausau, WI 125834 -0.046 -0.086 8313 190 8270 190 8250 190 0 0 0
Little Rock-North Little 583845 -0.003 -0.098 8269 196 8215 196 8189 196 0 0 0
Jackson, TN 107377 -0.048 -0.092 8207 202 8168 202 8148 202 0 0 0
State College, PA 135758 0.04 -0.113 8177 203 8115 203 8082 203 0 0 0
Tyler, TX 174706 -0.013 -0.103 8151 204 8105 204 8080 204 0 0 0
Roanoke, VA 235932 -0.015 -0.107 8079 207 8036 207 8011 207 0 0 0
Glens Falls, NY 124345 -0.015 -0.108 8062 208 8020 208 7996 209 0 1 -1
Lafayette, LA 385647 -0.03 -0.105 8058 209 8020 209 7997 208 0 -1 1
Scranton-Wilkes- 624776 -0.031 -0.107 8022 212 7985 212 7963 213 0 1 -1
Barre-Hazleton, PA
Athens, GA 153444 0.019 -0.12 7987 218 7941 218 7912 218 0 0 0
Sioux Falls, SD 172412 0.007 -0.118 7977 219 7934 219 7907 220 0 1 -1
La Crosse, WIMN 126838 -0.003 -0.116 7974 220 7934 220 7908 219 0 -1 1
Asheville, NC 225965 0.055 -0.13 7953 221 7900 221 7867 222 0 1 -1
Erie, PA 280843 -0.036 -0.112 7922 222 7891 222 7870 221 0 -1 1
Lakeland- 483924 -0.014 -0.117 7919 223 7884 223 7859 223 0 0 0
Winter Haven, FL
Oklahoma City, OK 1083346 -0.003 -0.12 7908 224 7872 224 7847 224 0 0 0
Manseld, OH 175818 -0.049 -0.112 7875 228 7850 228 7830 226 0 -2 2
St. Cloud, MN 167392 -0.049 -0.112 7875 229 7850 229 7830 227 0 -2 2
Shreveport- 392302 -0.029 -0.118 7848 230 7821 230 7799 230 0 0 0
Bossier City, LA
Muncie, IN 118769 -0.035 -0.117 7843 231 7817 231 7796 231 0 0 0
Columbus, GAAL 274624 -0.008 -0.123 7841 232 7810 232 7786 232 0 0 0
Mobile, AL 540258 -0.009 -0.123 7837 233 7807 233 7783 233 0 0 0
Panama City, FL 148217 0.031 -0.133 7817 234 7782 234 7752 234 0 0 0
Eau Claire, WI 148337 -0.025 -0.122 7797 235 7772 235 7750 235 0 0 0
Binghamton, NY 252320 -0.047 -0.118 7784 236 7763 236 7745 236 0 0 0
Fayetteville- 311121 0.005 -0.132 7741 239 7716 239 7692 241 0 2 -2
Springdale-Rogers, AR
AuburnOpelika, AL 115092 -0.019 -0.127 7736 240 7716 240 7694 239 0 -1 1
Monroe, LA 147250 -0.029 -0.125 7733 241 7714 241 7694 240 0 -1 1
Sioux City, IANE 124130 -0.025 -0.126 7731 242 7712 242 7691 242 0 0 0
Williamsport, PA 120044 -0.035 -0.126 7695 245 7680 245 7662 243 0 -2 2
WaterlooCedar Falls, IA 128012 -0.019 -0.13 7687 246 7671 246 7651 245 0 -1 1
Myrtle Beach, SC 196629 0.042 -0.146 7644 247 7628 247 7603 249 0 2 -2
Longview-Marshall, TX 208780 -0.036 -0.132 7593 250 7590 250 7579 250 0 0 0
Pensacola, FL 412153 0.014 -0.144 7577 251 7574 251 7565 251 0 0 0
Topeka, KS 169871 -0.018 -0.139 7543 252 7543 252 7543 252 0 0 0
Lynchburg, VA 214911 -0.031 -0.138 7513 253 7513 253 7513 253 0 0 0
OdessaMidland, TX 237132 -0.049 -0.135 7497 254 7497 254 7497 254 0 0 0
Terre Haute, IN 149192 -0.06 -0.134 7474 255 7474 255 7474 255 0 0 0
El Paso, TX 679622 -0.032 -0.141 7460 256 7460 256 7460 256 0 0 0
Florence, AL 142950 -0.04 -0.143 7399 257 7399 257 7399 257 0 0 0
Pueblo, CO 141472 0 -0.152 7395 258 7395 258 7395 258 0 0 0
Lubbock, TX 242628 0.003 -0.153 7389 259 7389 259 7389 259 0 0 0
Fort Walton Beach, FL 170498 0.067 -0.171 7326 260 7326 260 7326 260 0 0 0
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN 174367 -0.008 -0.156 7301 261 7301 261 7301 261 0 0 0
Sharon, PA 120293 -0.034 -0.151 7289 262 7289 262 7289 262 0 0 0
Columbia, MO 135454 0.025 -0.165 7272 263 7272 263 7272 263 0 0 0
Johnson City-Kingsport- 480091 -0.022 -0.156 7250 264 7250 264 7250 264 0 0 0
Bristol, TNVA
Ocala, FL 258916 -0.003 -0.162 7221 265 7221 265 7221 265 0 0 0
Fayetteville, NC 302963 0.03 -0.171 7192 266 7192 266 7192 266 0 0 0
Gadsden, AL 103459 -0.072 -0.149 7185 267 7185 267 7185 267 0 0 0
Billings, MT 129352 0.011 -0.168 7173 268 7173 268 7173 268 0 0 0
Altoona, PA 129144 -0.05 -0.155 7166 269 7166 269 7166 269 0 0 0
Jamestown, NY 139750 -0.063 -0.155 7119 270 7119 270 7119 270 0 0 0
St. Joseph, MO 102490 -0.026 -0.165 7088 271 7088 271 7088 271 0 0 0
Alexandria, LA 126337 -0.025 -0.168 7043 272 7043 272 7043 272 0 0 0
Danville, VA 110156 -0.056 -0.162 7029 273 7029 273 7029 273 0 0 0
Springeld, MO 325721 0.002 -0.176 7010 274 7010 274 7010 274 0 0 0
Goldsboro, NC 113329 -0.003 -0.175 7008 275 7008 275 7008 275 0 0 0
Fort Smith, AROK 207290 -0.018 -0.175 6954 276 6954 276 6954 276 0 0 0
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Table 6.4: Free Mobility and Social Planner Ranking of Cities
Amenity Estimate Quantity Mech. Social Planner Free Market Dierence Rank
City Population QOL Production Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank 4- 6 6 - 8 4 - 8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Hattiesburg, MS 111674 -0.024 -0.176 6915 277 6915 277 6915 277 0 0 0
Sumter, SC 104646 -0.026 -0.177 6891 278 6891 278 6891 278 0 0 0
Las Cruces, 174682 0.027 -0.19 6871 279 6871 279 6871 279 0 0 0
Clarksville- 207033 0.012 -0.192 6784 280 6784 280 6784 280 0 0 0
Hopkinsville, TN-KY
Dothan, AL 137916 -0.033 -0.183 6768 281 6768 281 6768 281 0 0 0
KilleenTemple, TX 312952 0.04 -0.208 6626 282 6626 282 6626 282 0 0 0
Anniston, AL 112249 -0.048 -0.189 6615 283 6615 283 6615 283 0 0 0
Laredo, TX 193117 0.009 -0.207 6529 284 6529 284 6529 284 0 0 0
Johnstown, PA 232621 -0.064 -0.193 6491 285 6491 285 6491 285 0 0 0
Wichita Falls, TX 140518 0.012 -0.212 6457 286 6457 286 6457 286 0 0 0
Abilene, TX 126555 0.014 -0.221 6318 287 6318 287 6318 287 0 0 0
BrownsvilleHarlingen- 335227 -0.041 -0.227 6018 288 6018 288 6018 288 0 0 0
-San Benito, TX
McAllenEdinburgMission, TX 569463 -0.069 -0.229 5882 289 5882 289 5882 289 0 0 0
Joplin, MO 157322 -0.01 -0.246 5821 290 5821 290 5821 290 0 0 0
WashingtonBaltimore, 7608070 -0.012 0.12 11820 10 11724 9 11699 9 1 0 1
DCMDVAWV C
StocktonLodi, CA 563598 -0.008 0.08 11176 17 11081 16 11056 15 1 -1 2
Atlanta, GA 4112198 -0.032 0.063 10813 23 10732 22 10710 22 1 0 1
DallasFort Worth, TX C 5221801 -0.033 0.057 10711 27 10631 26 10609 24 1 -2 3
Modesto, CA 446997 -0.016 0.047 10605 29 10518 28 10494 28 1 0 1
HoustonGalveston- 4669571 -0.06 0.049 10485 32 10420 31 10402 30 1 -1 2
-Brazoria, TX C
ProvidenceFall River- 1188613 -0.008 0.009 10008 43 9923 42 9897 42 1 0 1
-Warwick, RIMA
CharlotteGastonia- 1499293 -0.009 0.009 10005 44 9920 43 9894 43 1 0 1
-Rock Hill, NCSC
ClevelandAkron, OH C 2945831 -0.017 0.005 9911 47 9831 46 9806 46 1 0 1
Memphis, TNARMS 1135614 -0.044 0.007 9850 51 9782 50 9761 49 1 -1 2
Indianapolis, IN 1607486 -0.038 0.005 9838 52 9767 51 9746 51 1 0 1
Bakerseld, CA 661645 -0.058 0.006 9784 54 9723 53 9704 53 1 0 1
BloomingtonNormal, IL 150433 -0.064 0.007 9780 55 9721 54 9703 54 1 0 1
Nashville, TN 1231311 -0.001 -0.015 9639 68 9554 67 9527 67 1 0 1
LansingEast Lansing, MI 447728 -0.043 -0.008 9606 70 9541 69 9519 68 1 -1 2
Grand RapidsMuskegon- 1088514 -0.044 -0.008 9603 71 9537 70 9517 69 1 -1 2
-Holland, MI
HarrisburgLebanon- 629401 -0.033 -0.018 9477 78 9408 77 9386 77 1 0 1
-Carlisle, PA
JanesvilleBeloit, WI 152307 -0.045 -0.017 9451 83 9388 82 9367 81 1 -1 2
Reading, PA 373638 -0.052 -0.017 9427 85 9367 84 9347 84 1 0 1
non-metropolitan areas, IN 1791003 -0.055 -0.017 9416 86 9358 85 9338 85 1 0 1
non-metropolitan areas, GA 2744802 -0.039 -0.026 9324 97 9260 96 9238 95 1 -1 2
non-metropolitan areas, LA 1415540 -0.061 -0.026 9247 105 9193 104 9174 103 1 -1 2
non-metropolitan areas, IL 2202549 -0.056 -0.029 9215 107 9159 106 9140 106 1 0 1
non-metropolitan areas, KY 2828647 -0.063 -0.028 9207 109 9154 108 9135 107 1 -1 2
non-metropolitan areas, IA 1863270 -0.029 -0.037 9178 113 9112 112 9089 112 1 0 1
non-metropolitan areas, TN 2123330 -0.036 -0.036 9170 115 9107 114 9085 115 1 1 0
non-metropolitan areas, MN 1565030 -0.043 -0.035 9162 117 9102 116 9081 116 1 0 1
York, PA 381751 -0.041 -0.036 9153 119 9092 118 9070 118 1 0 1
non-metropolitan areas, TX 4030376 -0.039 -0.038 9127 123 9065 122 9044 121 1 -1 2
non-metropolitan areas, AR 1607993 -0.027 -0.046 9038 132 8973 131 8950 130 1 -1 2
PeoriaPekin, IL 347387 -0.063 -0.04 9009 134 8959 133 8940 132 1 -1 2
AppletonOshkosh- 358365 -0.02 -0.05 8996 136 8930 135 8906 135 1 0 1
-Neenah, WI
non-metropolitan areas, KS 1366517 -0.02 -0.05 8996 137 8930 136 8906 136 1 0 1
Pittsburgh, PA 2358695 -0.038 -0.047 8982 138 8923 137 8901 137 1 0 1
non-metropolitan areas, MO 1798819 -0.021 -0.056 8894 146 8830 145 8806 145 1 0 1
Columbia, SC 536691 -0.003 -0.071 8712 161 8645 160 8618 161 1 1 0
Sheboygan, WI 112646 -0.024 -0.067 8703 162 8644 161 8620 160 1 -1 2
Beaumont 385090 -0.093 -0.063 8525 171 8492 170 8477 170 1 0 1
Port Arthur, TX
Greenville, NC 133798 -0.024 -0.084 8424 185 8372 184 8348 182 1 -2 3
Decatur, AL 145867 -0.069 -0.082 8297 192 8261 191 8244 191 1 0 1
Jackson, MS 440801 -0.02 -0.095 8258 198 8209 197 8185 197 1 0 1
Chattanooga, TNGA 465161 -0.021 -0.095 8254 199 8206 198 8182 199 1 1 0
Albany, GA 120822 -0.06 -0.097 8082 206 8051 205 8032 205 1 0 1
Duluth-Superior, MN-WI 243815 -0.065 -0.099 8032 211 8003 210 7985 210 1 0 1
Houma, LA 194477 -0.048 -0.105 7994 217 7962 216 7943 216 1 0 1
Biloxi-Gulfport- 363988 -0.008 -0.128 7759 238 7735 237 7712 237 1 0 1
Pascagoula, MS
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Table 6.5: Free Mobility and Social Planner Ranking of Cities
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Daytona Beach, FL 493175 0.032 -0.14 7706 244 7683 243 7655 244 1 1 0
UticaRome, NY 299896 -0.057 -0.125 7633 249 7626 248 7612 247 1 -1 2
Anchorage, AK 260283 0.024 0.075 11205 16 11093 14 11063 14 2 0 2
Kokomo, IN 101541 -0.111 0.032 10027 41 9988 39 9976 38 2 -1 3
RichlandKennewick- 191822 -0.049 0.015 9964 46 9897 44 9877 44 2 0 2
-Pasco, WA
Springeld, MA 591932 -0.007 -0.007 9749 58 9666 56 9640 55 2 -1 3
Rochester, MN 124277 -0.06 0 9678 65 9619 63 9600 63 2 0 2
non-metropolitan areas, MI 2178963 -0.05 -0.015 9467 80 9405 78 9385 78 2 0 2
Birmingham, AL 921106 -0.032 -0.019 9464 81 9395 79 9373 79 2 0 2
non-metropolitan areas, WI 1866585 -0.025 -0.025 9390 91 9319 89 9296 88 2 -1 3
DaytonSpringeld, OH 950558 -0.031 -0.028 9320 99 9252 97 9229 96 2 -1 3
non-metropolitan areas, PA 2023193 -0.054 -0.025 9288 103 9230 101 9211 100 2 -1 3
KalamazooBattle Creek, MI 452851 -0.053 -0.034 9143 121 9087 119 9067 119 2 0 2
BualoNiagara Falls, NY 1170111 -0.045 -0.039 9090 126 9031 124 9010 124 2 0 2
Huntsville, AL 342376 -0.055 -0.055 8791 152 8741 150 8721 150 2 0 2
Syracuse, NY 732117 -0.061 -0.055 8769 154 8722 152 8703 152 2 0 2
Lafayette, IN 182821 -0.009 -0.067 8756 158 8690 156 8664 156 2 0 2
Fort Wayne, IN 502141 -0.059 -0.065 8612 167 8567 165 8548 164 2 -1 3
South Bend, IN 265559 -0.042 -0.069 8607 168 8556 166 8534 166 2 0 2
ChampaignUrbana, IL 179669 -0.006 -0.077 8603 169 8540 167 8513 167 2 0 2
Wichita, KS 545220 -0.044 -0.076 8485 176 8437 174 8416 174 2 0 2
Corpus Christi, TX 380783 -0.019 -0.083 8458 183 8403 181 8379 181 2 0 2
Decatur, IL 114706 -0.086 -0.08 8269 195 8239 193 8224 193 2 0 2
YoungstownWarren, OH 594746 -0.052 -0.089 8242 201 8204 199 8184 198 2 -1 3
Lima, OH 155084 -0.066 -0.1 8012 215 7984 213 7966 212 2 -1 3
Waco, TX 213517 -0.037 -0.114 7885 227 7857 225 7836 225 2 0 2
non-metropolitan areas, OH 2548986 -0.057 -0.018 9393 89 9335 86 9316 86 3 0 3
non-metropolitan areas, AL 1504381 -0.068 -0.03 9156 118 9106 115 9088 113 3 -2 5
SaginawBay City- 403070 -0.066 -0.031 9147 120 9096 117 9078 117 3 0 3
-Midland, MI
non-metropolitan areas, MS 1869256 -0.062 -0.036 9079 128 9027 125 9008 125 3 0 3
Rockford, IL 371236 -0.069 -0.018 9350 95 9298 91 9281 91 4 0 4
Jackson, MI 158422 -0.068 -0.036 9058 131 9008 127 8991 126 4 -1 5
Macon, GA 322549 -0.058 -0.074 8467 182 8425 176 8406 176 6 0 6
Figure 6.3: Equivalent Variation Indierence Curves
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Figure 6.4: Free Mobility: Equivalent and Compensating Variation
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Figure 6.5: Quantity Mechanism: Equivalent and Compensating Variation
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Figure 6.6: Social Planner: Equivalent and Compensating Variation
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Figure 6.7: Social Planner Total Population: Compensating Variation
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(a) Market Mechanism Fees Collected Pre-
Shock
(b) Market Mechanism Fees Collected Post
Shock
(c) Market Mechanism Compensating Variation (d) Social Planner Compensating Variation
Total Population
Figure 6.8: Compensating Variation Social Planner and Market Mechanism
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CHAPTER VII
The Optimal Population Distribution Across Cities and
the Private-Social Wedge
Cities dene civilization and yet are often perceived as too large. Positive urban ex-
ternalities from human capital spillovers  seen by Lucas (1988) as the key to economic
growth  and from greater matching and sharing opportunities (Duranton and Puga, 2004),
provide the agglomeration economies that bind rms and workers together in cities. These
centripetal forces are countered by centrifugal forces that keep the entire population from
agglomerating into one giant megacity. Such centrifugal forces include the urban disameni-
ties of congestion, crime, pollution, and contagious disease, all thought to increase with
population size. Many economists, including Tolley (1974); Arnott (1979); Upton (1981);
Abdel-Rahman (1988); Fenge and Meier (2002), have argued that because migrants to cities
do not pay for the negative externalities that they cause, free migration will cause cities
to become ineciently large from a social point of view. This view is presented as fact in
O'Sullivan's (2003) Urban Economics textbook, and is easily accepted as it reinforces an-
cient (e.g. Biblical) negative stereotypes of cities. Ultimately, this view provides support
for policies to limit urban growth, such as land-use restrictions, and disproportionate federal
transfers towards rural areas.
The canonical argument explaining why cities are too large is analogous to the argu-
ment explaining why free-access highways become overly congested, rst presented in Knight
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(1924). The cost migrants pay to enter a city is equal to the social average cost rather than
the social marginal cost. This is illustrated in Figure 1, except that costs are translated to
benets using a minus sign. The social marginal benet curve, drawn in terms of population,
crosses the average benet curve at its maximum, A, and thus the marginal benet curve is
lower than the average benet curve beyond this size. Migrants, who ignore externalities and
thus respond to the average benet, will continue to enter a city until the average benet of
migration equals the outside option at B. This population level is only stable when benets
are falling with city size, and thus cities can never be too small.
The analogy of a city to a simple highway, which obviously appeals to urban economists,
is misleading for three fundamental reasons. First, the land sites that cities occupy may
dier in the natural advantages they oer to households and rms, such as a mild climate
or proximity to water. Thus, in a multi-site economy it may be ecient to add population
to an advantageous site beyond its isolated optimum at A when the alternative is to add
population to an inferior site. Analogously, it makes sense to over-congest a highway when
the alternative is a dirt road. Thus, the outside marginal benet from residing in another
city may be below the peak benet at A, so that the social optimum is at a point such as
C, where the social marginal benet is equal to the lower outside benet.
Second, access to a city and its employment or consumption advantages is not free:
migrants must purchase land services and bear commuting costs to access these advantages.
Thus, unlike a free-access highway, migrants must pay a toll to access a city's opportunities,
and this toll is highest in cities oering the best opportunities. Thus many of the benets of
urbanization are appropriated by pre-existing land owners rather than by incoming migrants,
whose incentive to move may be below the social average benet.
Third, workers must pay federal taxes on their wage incomes, which increase with a
city's advantages to rms but decrease with a city's advantages to households (Haurin, 1980;
Roback, 1982). Thus, federal taxes create a toll that is highest in areas oering the most
to rms and the least to households, slowing migration to these areas. These eects are
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modeled by Albouy (2009) with exogenous amenities, but are modeled here with amenities
that are endogenous to city population. If urban size benets rms but harms households,
then federal taxes impose tolls that are highest in the largest cities, strongly discouraging
migration to them.
Land income and federal taxes together drive a wedge between the private and social
gains that accrue when a migrant enters a city. Migrants respond to the private average
benet, illustrated by the dotted line in gure 1, putting the city population at point E with
free migration, or point D if migrants manage to maximize private benets in the city. In
this example, cities can be vastly undersized, producing a welfare loss seen as large as the
shaded area.
To the extent that individuals pay for land services and federal taxes, payments to land
and labor may be viewed as common resources. Because both rents and wages increase
with city size, cities can be too small in a stable market equilibrium as migrants have
no incentive to contribute to these common resources: migrants will articially prefer less
advantageous sites to avoid paying higher land rents and federal taxes. In essence, inter-
city migration decisions involve cross-city scal externalities, which un-internalized, lead to
ineciently small cities. This may be amplied if big-city residents have greater positive net
externalities than small-city residents for non-scal reasons, e.g. if big-city residents have
lower greenhouse-gas emissions than small-city residents (Glaeser and Kahn, 2010).
We begin our argument in section 7.1 using a basic representation of cities, which may
be viewed as clubs with external spillovers. In section 7.2 we provide a microeconomic
foundation to this representation with a system of cities based on the monocentric-city model
of Alonso (1964); Muth (1969); Mills (1967) to give form to our functions and concreteness
to our simulations. Urban economies of scale are modeled through inter-rm productivity
spillovers that lead to increasing returns at the city level, while urban diseconomies are
modeled through generalized commuting costs.1 In addition, city sites are heterogeneous in
1This model can be expanded to incorporate other realistic features of cities, e.g. non-central rm
placement in Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002), without losing the main point.
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the natural advantages they provide to rms in productivity or to households in quality
of life. This model is calibrated as realistically as possible to demonstrate the theoretical
results concretely and to illustrate their plausibility in the reality. Section 7.3.3 improves on
existing work by allowing the number of cities to vary, analyzing dierences on the extensive"
margin, i.e. the number of sites occupied, as well as on the intensive" margin, i.e. on how
the population is distributed across a xed number of occupied sites. The distribution of
natural advantages across sites is modeled using Zipf's Law.
Throughout the analysis we consider four types of population allocations. We begin with
the standard problem of how a city planner maximizes the average welfare of the inhabitants
of a single city, ignoring the eects on the outside population and internalizing any cross-city
externalities. Second, we consider the welfare optimum for an entire population, whereby a
federal planner allocates individuals across heterogenous sites, determining the number and
size of cities. We put particular emphasis on the case where individuals are equally well o
in all cities, as would be implied by free mobility. Third, we look at the equilibrium that
occurs when populations are freely mobile, but in a private ownership economy where they
must rent land and pay federal taxes. Fourth, we consider political equilibria in a private
ownership economy that could arise when local governments restrict population ows into
their city, ignoring the eects on other cities. These four cases share a symmetry illustrated
below:
Multiple Authority Single Authority
Planned Economy City Planner Federal Planner
Private Ownership Political Equilibrium Competitive Equilibrium
We nd that the ecient population distribution tends to concentrate the population in the
fewest number of cities, fewer than would be allocated by isolated city planners. Meanwhile,
equilibrium forces disperse the population ineciently, causing inferior sites to be inhabited,
with local political control potentially exacerbating this problem. Examples throughout the
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paper are illustrated graphically using the calibrated model from section 7.2. The simula-
tion, which allows the number of cities to be endogenous, demonstrates that there may be
(roughly) 40 percent too many occupied sites, with welfare costs equal to 1 percent of GDP.
There is a substantive literature on systems of cities or regions, pioneered by Buchanan
and Goetz (1972); Flatters, Henderson, and Mieszkowski (1974), developed extensively by
Henderson (1977), and given comprehensive treatments by Fujita (1989); Abdel-Rahman and
Anas (2004). Helpman and Pines (1980) argues that it is best to assume that households
own a diversied portfolio of land across cities and model sites that dier in their inherent
quality of life, but treat output per worker as xed. Hochman and Pines (1997) model federal
taxes in cities that oer dierent xed wage levels.
Our work attempts to improve on this literature by carefully dening social and pri-
vate benets at both intra and inter-urban scale, and their associated solution concepts.
The cities in the system are remarkably heterogeneous as they may dier in both natural
advantages to rms (inherent productivity) and households (quality of life), and exibly
incorporate increasing returns to scale, through an arbitrary agglomeration parameter, and
decreasing returns to scale, through an arbitrary commuting-cost parameter.2 The quantita-
tively important institutions of land ownership and federal taxation are also simultaneously
addressed. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this research is that it provides some
empirical content to an issue that has largely remained completely theoretical.
2The modeling of natural advantages helps to ll in a gap in the literature mentioned by Arnott (2004,
p. 1072). regarding the Henry George Theorem:
The HGT is derived on the assumption that land is homogenous, but in reality locations
dier in terms of fertility, natural amenities such as visual beauty and climate, and natural
accessibility such as access to the sea or a navigable river. How do these Ricardian dierences in





A homogenous population, numbering NTOT , must be allocated across a set of sites, J̄
= {0, 1, 2, ..., J̄}, indexed by j, with the population at each site given by Nj, such that
J̄X
j=0
Nj = NTOT , Nj ≥ 0 for all j (7.1)
The non-negativity conditions reect that some sites may be uninhabited. The population
allocation is written in vector form as N = (N0, N1, ..., NJ). Assume that the social welfare





where SBj(Nj) is the social benet, net of costs, of having Nj people living on site j,
normalized such that an uninhabited site produces no benet SBj(0) = 0. The social
benet includes the value of goods produced by residents and the amenities they enjoy net
of the disamenities they endure such as commuting costs. Some benets only aect residents
inside the city  such as climate amenities, transportation costs, or congestion  while
others  such as global pollution, technological innovations, and federal tax payments 
may aect residents of other cities. Region j = 0 is assumed to be a non-urban area with
SB0(N) = b0N , where b0 is a constant.
By denition, the social average benet of residing in city j, SABj(Nj) ≡ SBj(Nj)/Nj.






= 0 for some nite N cpj > 0, for all j (7.3)
making the SABj function single-peaked. Urban scale economies dominate diseconomies for
populations less than N cp while the opposite holds for populations greater than N cp. This
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single peak at N cpj designates the choice of a city planner (hence cp") whose objective is to
maximize the social average benet within the city, assuming all city benets are internalized.









where the within-city wedge, the second term, captures the eect of an additional migrant
on infra-marginal inhabitants of city j through scale economies. Therefore SMBj is larger
than SABj when SABj is increasing, smaller than SABj when it is decreasing, and equal
at N cpj .
SMBj(N
cp
j ) = SABj(N
cp
j ) (CP)
City planners are solely concerned with their city and do not coordinate with other city





j 6= NTOT , for J ⊆ J̄ . We focus here on situations where NTOT is
large relative N cpj , making integer problems unimportant.
The federal optimum, which determines the ecient population distribution, maximizes




j ) = SMBk(N
fp
k ) = µ (FP)
across any two sites j and k that are inhabited, where µ ≥ 0 is the multiplier on the
population constraint, and N fpj refers to the population chosen by the federal planner.
Conditions CP and FP characterize the city and federal planner equilibria on the inten-
sive margin or how population is distributed across cities. This paper adopts the extensive
margin, how many cities are created, algorithm created in Seegert (2011a) where planners
inhabit and populate cities in a two-stage game. In the rst stage planners decide (simul-
taneously for the city planners) which cities to create. In the second stage population is
164
distributed according to conditions CP and FP respectively. The subgame perfect equi-
librium of this dynamic game characterizes the extensive margin which can be found by
backward induction.34
In the model cities are heterogenous in the amount of social benet they produce for a
given population level. Modeling systems of cities with heterogeneity is important because
the city planner's system, which is often used in the literature, diers from the federal
planner's when heterogeneity exists.5
DEFINITION: City j is superior to city k if SBj(Ni) > SBk(Ni) for all Ni
RESULT 1: When cities are heterogeneous, in that some cities are superior to others, the
city planner optimum is not ecient.
SMBk(N
cp
k ) = SABk(N
cp





k ) < SABj(N
cp
k ) City j superior to city k.
< SABj(N
cp





j ) Denition N
cp
j .
⇒SMBk(N cpk ) < SMBj(N
cp
j )
COROLLARY 1: When cities are heterogeneous, in that some cities are superior to
others, the city planner optimum allocates too few people to superior cities.
3The federal planner eciently inhabits sites J fp using a backward induction algorithm: for every J ⊆
J̄ , the ecient population allocation Ñfp(J ) can be determined using (FP), and the associated second-order




4Given constraint (7.1) the federal planner chooses the ecient set of cities to inhabit and allocation
across these cities, therefore the solution does not have an integer problem.
5However, when cities are homogeneous the planner systems coincide. To show this, let N cp satisfy (7.3)
for all, then by homogeneity, all cities will have the same SMBj(N
cp),and through the absence of an integer
problem N cp/NTOT = J
∗, the optimal number of cities. With homogeneity, and equal allocation of N will
satisfy (FP), however the global optimum also maximizes each individual SAB.
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From the city planner system of cities welfare can be improved by moving a resident away
from the inferior city k to the superior city j, since SABj(N
cp
j ) > SABk(N
cp
k ), therefore
N fpj > N
cp
j .
6 Figure 1 illustrates this dierence: here SAB1 is given by the solid curve and
SAB2, by the outside option, where point A gives the city planner solution, and point C,
the federal planner. Figure 2 illustrates an example with 2 cities where city 1 is superior to
city 2, and where N fp1 > N
cp




2 . The city planner solution is given by
points A and B, and the federal planner by point C. In both gures, the deadweight loss of
the city planner solution is equal to the area between the SMP curves, from the ecient to
the inecient population levels.
7.1.2 Private Ownership and Individual Incentives
Residency in a city may aect the income or the amenities of residents in other cities
because of across-city spill-overs. This produces a wedge between the average social and
private benet of residing in a city, which we dene as the across-city wedge:
ACWj(N) ≡ SABj(N)− PABj(N) (ACW)
where PABj(N) is the private average benet, which like the SAB is assumed to be twice
continuously dierentiable, strictly quasi-concave, and single-peaked as in (7.3). The across-
city wedge may distort PAB relative to SAB even if the magnitude of the wedge is zero.
For example, federal income taxes create a wedge between the social and private average
benets by distorting the marginal benet of income by (1 − τ). Even if the amount each
city was taxed was rebated lump sum back to the city the distortion would remain because
the observed marginal eect is distorted. We normalize the sum of across-city wedges to zero






such that the sum of the private average benets equal the sum of social average benets.7
X
j
NjACWj(Nj) = 0 (7.5)
In the competitive equilibrium all individuals are mobile across cities. Therefore the across-
city mobility condition, equation CE, and the stability condition, equation 7.6, characterize
the competitive equilibrium. The across-city mobility condition ensures no individual can
be made better o by moving across cities. The stability condition rules out population
distributions that are not robust to a slight deviation.8
PABj(N
ce
j ) = PABk(N
ce











The competitive equilibrium may not maximize the welfare of city residents. We dene a
political equilibrium, denoted with pe", as the population level existing residents or city
developers would limit the size of a city to maximize private average benet levels within a
city. The political equilibrium is given by point D in gure 1 and is analogous to the city
planner optimum, except that across-city externalities are internalized.9
PABj(N
pe
j ) = PMBj(N
pe
j ) (PE)
Conditions CE, 7.6, and PE characterize the competitive and political equilibria on the
intensive margin. This paper adopts the extensive margin algorithm created in Seegert
(2011a) where individuals create and populate cities in a two stage game.10 In the rst
7This normalization assumes that the across-city wedge is shifts production but does not create or destroy
production in the economy.
8The stability condition can be replaced by restricting the set of allowable equilibria to be trembling hand
perfect, as demonstrated by Seegert (2011a).
9As with the city-planner problem, the political equilibrium is subject to integer problems.
10For a dynamic model of city formation see Seegert (2011b).
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stage individuals decide simultaneously whether to create a city and which city to create.
In the second stage individuals in the competitive equilibrium move across cities such that
conditions CE and 7.6 hold and in the political equilibrium such that condition PE holds.
The subgame perfect equilibrium of this dynamic game characterizes the extensive margin
which can be found by backward induction.
7.1.3 Private versus Ecient Incentives
The competitive equilibrium condition CE equalizes the private average benets while the
federal planner equalizes the social marginal benets across cities. Equation 7.7 decomposes
the dierence between the ecient and the competitive allocation into the dierence between
the social and private average benets, dened as the across-city wedge, and the dierence
between the marginal and average benet, dened as the within-city wedge. Collectively
these two wedges dene the private-social wedge.
Private− Social Wedge = SMBj(N)− PABj(N) = WCWj(N) + ACWj(N) (7.7)
These two wedges are illustrated in gure 3 to the right of N cp where both wedges are
positive. The previous literature emphasizes the locational eciency gains from eliminating
the within-city wedge however this point no longer holds in a system of heterogeneous cities,
see result one. With homogeneity and ignoring integer problems, locational ineciencies arise
because all points to the right of N cp = N fp are potentially stable competitive equilibria
while no points to the left are. This leads to the textbook maxim that "cities are not too
small" (O'Sullivan 2009) while they can be too big. However, result two demonstrates this
point breaks down when across-city wedges exist.
RESULT 2: If the across-city wedge is increasing with population and cities are homoge-
neous then the stable competitive equilibrium is ineciently small.
In the competitive equilibrium cities are created until adding a new city would lower
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the shared private average benet. When cities are homogeneous this implies the unique
competitive equilibrium is the political equilibrium depicted as point B in gure 4. The
ecient population occurs at A because homogeneity implies N cp = N fp. If the across-city
wedge is increasing in population point B is to the left of point A. Therefore the competitive
equilibrium, at point B, is smaller than the ecient population level, given by point A.
Despite the fact that across-city wedges distort the private average benet total produc-
tion in the system of cities remains constant.11 If a single city is given the population N cp its
PAB will be given by point C which is lower than its SAB, and its across-city wedge given
by the distance between A and C. If all cities coordinate to achieve point A the across-city
wedge will cause the PAB curve to rise. In this scenario each city would benet from lim-
iting its population and attain point D to maximize its private average benet while still
receiving the spillover benets from larger cities. Yet, if all cities did this the equilibrium
will return to point B as the spill-overs are lost and the PAB curve shifts back down.
COROLLARY 2: If the across-city wedge is increasing with population and cities are
homogeneous then the competitive equilibrium produces too many cities.
When cities are homogeneous the federal planner's optimum is the city planner's optimum
and the number of cities the federal planner produces is J fp = Ntot/N cp. As noted above the
competitive equilibrium produces cities with populations that equal the political equilibrium
which produces J ce = Ntot/Npe. Therefore Npe < N cp implies that J ce > J fp.
RESULT 3: If the private-social wedge at the federal planner optimum is larger for supe-
rior cities then the competitive equilibrium will produce superior cities that are ineciently
small.
Let cities be ordered by their superiority such that city 1 is superior to city 2 and
city i is superior to city j. Assume toward contradiction that the competitive equilibrium
11Federal income taxes are an intuitive example of an across-city wedge that distorts the economies of
scale within a city but that could be rebated lump sum to the cities such that the total benet produced
within a city is retained.
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population is larger than the federal planner population for some city i while the reverse is
true for some city j such that city i is superior to city j. This condition can be written as
PABi(N
fp
i ) > PABi(N
ce
i ) and PABj(N
fp
j ) < PABj(N
ce
j ) because the stability condition
ensures populations are to the right of the peak of the private average benet.
PABj(N
fp
j ) > PABi(N
fp
i ) by assumption PSWi > PSWj.
> PABi(N
ce
i ) by assumption toward contradiction.
= PABj(N
ce
j ) denition competitive equilibrium.
> PABj(N
fp
j ) by assumption toward contradiction.
Contractiction
Therefore when the private-social wedge at the federal planner optimum is larger for
superior cities, cities {1, 2, ...h}, for some 1 ≤ h ≥ J , in the competitive equilibrium are
ineciently small while cities {h+ 1, 2, ...J} are ineciently large.
The following section creates a parametric system where economies of scale, urban costs,
and the private-social wedge are modeled explicitly to determine under what conditions
superior cities are ineciently small in the competitive equilibrium. Result three demon-
strates that the private-social wedge being larger for superior cities is a sucient condition
for superior cities to be ineciently small. The parametric model uses the canonical Alonso-
Muth-Mills monocentric city model to provide insights into result three, explicitly showing
how federal income taxes and land rent produce an across-city wedge that can lead to inef-
ciently small superior cities in the competitive equilibrium.
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7.2 Parametric System of Monocentric Cities
7.2.1 City Structure, Commuting, Production, and Natural Advantages
In each city, individuals reside around a central business district (CBD) where all urban
production takes place. The city expands radially from the CBD with the conventional
assumptions that urban costs are a function of distance z from the CBD. Each resident
demands a lot size with a xed area, normalized to one, so that a city of radius z contains
a population N = π(z)2.
The urban costs in the city are modeled as a time cost of commuting. The time an
individual uses to commute comes out of the single unit of labor the individual supplies
to the market. An individual who lives at a distance z supplies h(z) = 1 − c̃hzχh units of
labor where c̃h is a positive scalar and χh is the nonnegative elasticity of the time cost of
commuting with respect to distance. The aggregate labor supply in a circular city is given
by H(N) = N − chN1+φh where ch ≡ c̃hπ−1/2(1 + φh)−1 and φj = 2χh is the elasticity with
respect to population. We extend traditional models that implicitly assume the elasticities
with respect to distance, χh = 1 by allowing it to be exible. This exibility accounts for
xed costs, variable density, and other factors that cause the observed elasticity to dier
from unity. Additional urban costs such as a material cost of commuting and a depreciation
of average land quality within the city are easily included according to equation 7.8 where w
is the wage in the city and I represents the number of urban costs that are denoted in terms
of the numeraire. These additional costs are left out of this section for notational ease but







The wage reects the scale economies within the city and are modeled with an agglomeration
parameter α following Dixit (1973) but which encompasses local information spill-overs and
search and matching economies as reviewed in Duranton and Puga (2004).
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Aggregate city production is F (Aj, N) = AjN
αH(N), where Aj is the natural advantage
of city j in productivity. The local scale economies are given by Nα, with α ∈ (0, 1/2) which
are external to rms but internal to cities, such that rms exhibit constant returns but cities
exhibit increasing returns. Therefore rms make zero prot and pay a wage w = AjN
α.
Individuals consume land, the produced good x which is tradeable across cities and has a
price normalized to one, and the level of quality of life amenities within the city, Qj. Utility
is given by U(x,Qj), which is strictly increasing and quasi-concave in both arguments. The
level of quality of life amenities is assumed to be uniform within a city and independent





compensating dierential in terms of the numeraire.
7.2.2 Planned Economies
The city planner and federal planner tradeo the economies of scale and urban costs
within cities, though with dierent objectives. The city planner chooses the population for
their city that maximizes the social average benet at the point at which the economies of
scale exactly equal the urban costs.13





The population at the peak of the social average benet occurs at the point where the
social marginal benet intersects the social average benet. The social marginal benet is
the sum of four terms; FMP is the marginal product that accrues to the rm; AEj is the
agglomeration externality, which goes to rms for which the household does not work; and
12The model is robust to allowing quality of life amenities to depend on population.
13The microfounded social average benet satises the three assumptions in the theory section that it is
twice continuously dierentiable, strictly quasi-concave, and single peaked.
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The federal planner concerned with maximizing the total benet across cities equalizes the
social marginal benet across all cities. The dierence between the federal planner and the









7.2.3 Private Ownership and Individual Incentives
With private ownership, individuals receive income from labor and land, and pay for
taxes, rent, and tradable consumption. Firms pay a wage wj = AjN
α
j per labor unit,
because factor and output markets are competitive, and a worker at distance z supplies
h(z) units of labor. Labor income is taxed at the federal rate of τ ∈ [0, 1] leaving workers
with (1− τ)AjNγh(z).14 Federal taxes are redistributed in the form of federal transfers Tj,
which may be location dependent. When federal transfers are not tied to local wage levels,
federal taxes turn a fraction τ of labor income into a common resource, reducing individuals'
incentive to move to areas with high wages.15
The rent gradient within the city is determined by the within-city mobility condition
which states in equilibrium the location costs, the urban costs plus the land rent, must be
14It is appropriate to use the marginal tax rate since we are considering marginal changes in labor income
due to migration decisions. See Albouy (2009) for further discussion.
15Empirically, Albouy (2009) nds that federal transfers are not strongly correlated with wage levels in
the United States, however Albouy (2012) nds that they are negatively related in Canada, increasing the
size of the across-city scal spill-overs.
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equal across all distances z within a city.1617
rj(z) = wc̃h(z
χh − zχh) (7.12)
The rent at the central business district, rj(0), gives the full location cost, given by the height
of the cylinder in gure ??. Figure 5 depicts the rent gradient, which declines to rj(zj) = 0
at the edge of the city, where we normalize the opportunity cost of land to zero.18 The rental
income of residents in city j is
Rj = (1− ρ)r̄j + ρR̄ (7.13)
where R̄ = 1
Ntot
PJ
j=0 Nj r̄j is the average rent paid in all cities, and ρ ∈ [0, 1] is an exogenously
xed parameter that captures the proportion of an individual's portfolio that is diversied
across all cities, as opposed to the land holdings only within the city the individual lives.
Much of the previous literature has focused on the special case where ρ = 0 implying in-
dividuals receive the average rental income in the city they live in. This assumption while
seemingly innocuous actually imposes unrealistic distortions in mobility across cities. For
example, a new migrant to city j inherits a free plot of land at the average distance and
gives up any other land holdings without payment. Consequently, this assumption provides
a perverse incentive for individuals to move to cities with high average rent because they
16Because land is not used in production, wages do not negatively capitalize consumption amenities as in
Roback (1982)  see Albouy (2009) for details. However, when not all sites are inhabited, individuals may











= r(0) Downtown rent
18More generally, we discuss land rents that are dierential land rents. Assuming that the opportunity
cost of land is greater than zero adds little to the model unless the opportunity cost varies with Q or A.
For instance it may be possible that sunnier land is more amenable to urban residents, but also contributes
to agricultural productivity, raising the opportunity cost as well. Given the low value of agricultural land
relative to residential land, these eects are likely to be of small consequence.
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inherit the land for free. When ρ = 1, migrants to a city have to pay rent on any plot they
occupy, but still receive income from land, albeit in an amount unrelated to their location
decision. This assumption treats individuals anonymously and causes migrants to pay rent
to access the advantages of a city. As ρ increases a higher share of rent is redistributed across
cities, rather than only within the city, and land income can be thought of as a common
(federal) resource.19
Income net of location costs is equal for all individuals within a city causing them to
consume the same level of the tradeable good x and the quality of life consumption xQ. This
level of consumption is dened as the private average benet within the city.
PABj = (1− τ)AjNαj

1− (1 + ρφh)chNφh

+ ρR̄ + Tj + x
Q
j (7.14)
The competitive equilibrium is characterized by the across-city mobility condition which en-
sures individuals do not have an incentive to move. Therefore in the competitive equilibrium
the private average benet is equal across all cities. The political equilibrium is dened as
the peak of the private average benet which occurs at the point that the private marginal
benet intersects the private average benet. When cities are heterogeneous in their pro-
duction and quality of life amenities the political equilibrium and competitive equilibrium
19If migrants owned plots of land in an origin city, they would still sell the land when moving to the
destination city, since they can only live in one city at a time. This would unnecessarily complicate the
analysis through income eects, and require us to consider the origin as well as destination of migrants. The
situation with ρ = 1 may also be characterized as one of a migrant from a typical city in the economy, as R̄
denotes the average rent on a plot of land anywhere. One could also assume that land is owned by the federal
government or absentee landlords. In these cases rental earnings are the same and zero for all individuals.
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dier.20
7.2.4 Private versus Ecient Incentives
Notice that when ρ and τ equal zero the private average benet, equation 7.14 equals
the social average benet, equation 7.1. In this case the population allocation of the city
planner and political equilibrium are the same but may not be ecient as they may dier
from the federal planner's population allocation. When ρ or τ are not zero some of the
benet produced within a city is distributed across all cities either through tax transfers or
land rent income. In this case the social average benet and private average benet will
dier by the across-city wedge.
Across-City Wedge = τAjN
α





The federal planner equalizes the social marginal benet across cities while the competitive
equilibrium equalizes the private average benet across cities. The dierence between the
social marginal benet and the private average benet is dened as the social-private wedge.
The private-social wedge is the combination of the within-city wedge and the across-city
wedge.
Private-Social Wedge = SMBj − PABj = WCWj + ACWj
= (α + τ)AjN
α
j − (τ(1 + ρφh) + α + φh(1− ρ))chAjN
α+φh
j − ρR̄− Tj
20The dierence between the private average benet and the private marginal benet is dened as the
private within-city wedge.
Private Marginal Product =
(α+ 1)AjN
γ





j + Tj + ρR̄














. This transfer subsidizes the agglomeration externality AEj and punishes for
higher urban costs represented by the average rent r̄j. In addition the transfer rebates the







.21 When ρ and τ equal zero the across-city wedge is zero and the private-
social wedge equals the within-city wedge.









In this case the private-social wedge equals the agglomeration externality, AE, minus the
average rent in the city. This result is the Henry George theorem (Arnott and Stiglitz,
1979) which states that land taxes are a sucient tax to produce the optimal level of public
good. In this model the public good is the agglomeration externality given by AE. In this
case without a land tax population could grow to any population level greater than the
city planner's optimum as individuals consider the average and not marginal benet within
the city. The conscatory land tax limits the competitive equilibrium population size to
the city planner level. The literature has focused on this condition because when cities are
homogenous (and there is no across-city wedge) conscatory land taxes provide the ecient
allocation of population. However, if cities are heterogeneous with respect to production
and consumption amenities and all cities impose conscator land taxes the competitive
equilibrium population levels are ineciently small for the superior cities, see result one.
When taxes or intercity land income are introduced into the model the private-social
wedge is the combination of the across-city and within-city wedge and therefore is no longer
21In a closed-city context, Wildasin (1985) notes that the time costs of commuting are implicitly deducted
from federal taxes, although the material costs are not, and argues that taxes lead to excessive sprawl by
reducing the time-cost of commuting. This mechanism does not work in a closed-city setting with xed lot
sizes, but it does matter in an open-city setting by leveling the slope of the wage gradient, causing it to hit
zero at a further distance, implying a larger population.
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the simple combination of the public good and land rents. In a system of heterogeneous
cities the superior cities will be undersized in the competitive equilibrium if the private-
social wedge is increasing with the level of amenities provided, by result three. Taking the
partial derivative of the private-social wedge with respect to the production amenity level Aj


















In the parametric example the sucient condition from result three holds when the tax rate,
τ , or the land income portfolio diversication parameter, ρ, exceed their threshold values
given in equation 7.2.4. The following section calibrates this parametric model to determine
in a realistic environment whether taxes and land rent income are large enough forces to
cause superior cities to become undersized.
22In the calibration section a condition is provided from taking the total derivative.
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PSW = (α+ τ)AjN
α
j − (τ(1 + ρφh) + α+ φh(1− ρ))chAjN
α+φh




= (α+ τ)Nαj − (τ(1 + ρφh) + α+ φh(1− ρ))chN
α+φh
j
0 < (α+ τ)− (τ(1 + ρφh) + α+ φh(1− ρ))chNφhj
φhchN










To test whether the private-social wedge satises the conditions in result 3 the model is
calibrated using data from the Census Bureau, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the American
Community Survey (ACS), the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and
empirical studies by Rosenthal and Strange (2004); Albouy and Ehrlich (2011). The model
is fully calibrated by nine parameters. The economies of scale in the model are calibrated by
the agglomeration factor α, the population of the typical city, and the wage in the typical
city. The urban costs in the model are split between commuting costs as a fraction of income
and the elasticities with respect to population φi, where we consider three urban costs the
time commuting cost, the material commuting cost, and the land depreciation cost.
According the to bureau of labor statistics May 2009 Occupational Employment and
Wage Estimates in the United States the average annual salary is $43, 460. From Rosenthal
and Strange (2004) survey on agglomeration they dene a consensus range between .03 and
.08, from which α is chosen to equal .05. The typical urban resident, the median resident,
lives in Cleveland, OH with a population of 2, 091, 286 according to the census bureau's
annual estimates of population. From these three points the scalar A is found by taking the
average annual wage and dividing by the typical city size to the agglomeration parameter α,
A = Average Annual WageTypical City Sizeα .
About 10 percent of the working day and 5 percent of income is spent commuting accord-
ing to the American Community Survey and Survey of Income and Program Participation.
The authors' calculations nd the elasticity of commuting with respect to population to
be .1 implying φh = φm = .1. The cost parameters are found by setting chN
φh = .1 and
cmN
φm = .045 ∗ Average Annual Wage. The land depreciation elasticity and cost parame-
ters are calculated to match the land rent gradient and land share of income which by the
authors' calculation are .216 and .05 respectively.
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As a robustness check the elasticity and and cost parameters for the land depreciation
urban cost is calculated for dierent land rent gradients and land share of incomes. In table
XX the land share of income is increased from 2.5% to 6% holding xed the land rent gradient
at .216. As the land share of income is increased the elasticity φl decreases and the cost
parameter cl increases. In addition the within-city wedge decreases, the across-city wedge
increases, and the resulting private-social wedge decreases. In table XX the land share of
income is increased holding xed the land gradient at .5 and all of the previous results hold.
In table XX the elasticity of land value with respect to population is varied from .2 to .7
holding the land share of income xed at 4.4%. As the elasticity increases φl increases and cl
decreases. The within-city wedge in levels is at but in percentage decreases, the across-city
wedge increases, and the resulting private-social wedge increases. In table XX the elasticity
of land value with respect to population is increased over the same range with the land share
of income xed at 2.5% and all of the previous results hold.
7.3.2 Calibrated Microfounded Model
The superior cities in a system of heterogeneous cities will be undersized in the competi-
tive equilibrium if the private-social wedge is increasing with the level of amenities within the
city. In the micro-foundation section a partial equilibrium condition was derived by taking
the partial derivative of the private-social wedge. In this section the calibration produces









Given the calibration ∂PSW
∂A
> 0 for all values of ρ ∈ [0, 1] and τ ∈ [0, 1]. Allowing dA > 0
and assuming that dN > 0 then ∂PSW
∂N
> 0 is a sucient condition for the private-social
wedge to be larger for superior cities. Figure ?? graphs the level of ρ and τ such that
∂PSW
∂N
> 0. From this gure if ρ > .812 then for all values of τ the condition is satised.
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Similarly, if τ > .216 the condition holds for all values of ρ.
7.3.3 Calibrated System of Heterogeneous Cities
In this section we simulate a system of heterogenous cities using the calibrated model. The
simulation demonstrates how the private-social wedge skews the distribution of population
across cities (intensive margin) and the distribution of cities that are inhabited (extensive
margin). When the private-social wedge is large the competitive equilibrium will inhabit
more cities and underpopulate them relative to the federal planner. The misallocation of
population in the competitive equilibrium leads to a deadweight loss of $170 billion or around
4% of income with the baseline calibration.
A. City Formation. The distribution of population across cities is calculated following
Seegert (2011a) which focuses on the impact of migration constraints on the distribution of
cities. The process of creating and inhabiting cities is done with a two-stage dynamic game
where the resulting population distribution is a subgame perfect equilibrium. In the rst
stage the federal planner decides how many cities to inhabit. In the second stage the federal
planner decides the population distribution across the cities equalizing the social marginal
benet. By backward induction the federal planner chooses the number of cities in the rst
stage that maximizes total production given the population distribution that will obtain in
the second stage.
In the competitive equilibrium's rst stage individuals simultaneously decide whether
to create a new city in which they must live or wait and migrate to an existing city in
stage two. In the second stage individuals simultaneously decide which city to live in. By
backward induction the resulting distribution of population in the second stage will equalize
the private average benet, otherwise some individual could have done better and moved
to the city with the larger private average benet. In the rst stage individuals considering
the resulting distribution of population in the second stage continue to create new cities to
maximize the resulting equalized private average benet.
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B. Heterogeneity Calibration. The heterogeneity in city amenities is calculated using the
actual distribution of cities in the United States. The distribution of amenities is calculated
to provide each city in the data the same level of private average benet. This distribution
is then used to determine the amenity levels for the next 200 hypothetical cities'.
The actual distribution of cities in the United States follows Zipf's law. The underlying
economics of why the distribution follows Zipf's law remains an open question. Krugman
in his 1996 paper conjectures that the reason cities follow Zipf's law is that the underlying
distribution of amenities follow Zipf's law. The simulated distribution of amenities in this
paper support this conjecture as the distribution of amenities follows Zipf's law.
log(Rank) = 11.332− 1.073
(−77.06)
log(population/1000) (7.15)
log(Rank) = 280− 30.258
(−112.96)
log(Aj) (7.16)
C. Extensive Margin Results. The baseline calibration, ρ = 1 and τ = .33, leads to a stark
dierence between the distribution of cities in the competitive equilibrium and the ecient
allocation and is reported in table XX column 1. The competitive equilibrium inhabits 361
cities and the largest city is about 19 million. In contrast, the ecient distribution inhabits
only 20 cities with the largest being 68 million. The dierent calibrations are reported in
columns 2 through 7 and demonstrate this stark contrast is a result of the large wedge caused
by ρ = 1 and τ = .33 and a relatively low level of urban costs. The relatively low level of
urban costs creates an incentive for the federal planner to create fewer cities with larger
populations than the competitive equilibrium.
The creation and growth of cities is an important research area that is relatively un-
derstudied. The notable exceptions are Fujita, Anderson, and Isard (1978) which produces
normative models, Seegert (2011a) discussed above, and Seegert (2011b) which creates a
positive dynamic model based solely on individual incentives.
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7.4 Conclusion
The above analysis does not prove that cities are necessarily too small, but it does call
into question the necessity of cities being too large in an economy where federal taxes are
paid and residential land must be purchased. As a result, the ability of local governments
to reduce city sizes by restricting development through impact fees, green belts, and zoning
may do much to reduce overall welfare, as they will likely neglect across-city spillovers, scal
and otherwise, and allow a small minority to monopolize the best sites, forcing others to
occupy naturally less superior sites.
Many other factors certainly play a role in determining ecient city sizes, among them,
the ability of governments to provide adequate regulation, public goods, and infrastructure to
make a large city function well. This may be a particular challenge in developing countries,
where rapidly growing cities suer disproportionately from negative externalities such as
dirty air, infectious disease, and debilitating trac. Moreover, in these cities the marginal
resident, perhaps a poor rural migrant, may not pay federal taxes or for their land costs by
working in the informal sector and squatting on land they have no property rights to. Thus,
the problem of under-sized cities may be a relatively new one historically, seen primarily
in the developed world, but one that will become increasingly important as property rights
develop, federal governments tax increasingly, and urbanization rises.
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Figure 7.3: Two City Example
























2nd City Social Average Benefit
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Equilibrium
(d) ρ = 1, τ = .33
Figure 7.5: Across-City Wedge: Taxes and Land Rents
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SAB; .6 Elasticity Rent Population
SAB; .4 Elasticity Rent Population
SAB; .216 Elasticity Rent Population
Income Net Urban Costs
Population
Note: By chance all three of these curves peak at the same population, 2.091 million.
Note: This graph varies the land quality parameters holding fixed the share of income to land at five percent.











SAB; .216 Elasticity Rent Population
SAB; .4 Elasticity Rent Population
SAB; .6 Elasticity Rent Population
Income Net Urban Costs
Population
Note: This graph varies the land quality parameters holding fixed the share of rent in income.
(b) Fixed: Share of Rent Income









SAB; 4.3 Percent Land Share
SAB; 5 Percent Land Share
SAB; 6.3 Percent Land Share
Note: This graph varies the land quality parameters holding the elasticity of
rent with respect to population fixed at .216, to match the land share values
Income Net Urban Costs
Population










SAB; 4.3 Percent Land Share
SAB; 5 Percent Land Share
SAB; 6.3 Percent Land Share
Population
Note: This graph varies the land quality parameters holding fixed the elasticity of rent and population at one half.
Income Net Urban Costs
(d) Fixed: Elasticity Rent at 0.5
Figure 7.6: Robustness Vary Land Quality
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(a) Zipf's Law With Production Amenities














(b) Zipf's Law With Quality of Life Amenities
Figure 7.7: Zipf's Law
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Table 7.1: Production Amenities
Observed
Case Baseline 135 City Large Urban φ = .5 τ = .2
Case Case Costs Case Case
Economic Parameters (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Agglomeration Parameter γ 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
Commuting Parameter φ 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Land Heterogeneity Parameter α 0.250 0.250 0.600 0.250 0.250
Avg. share of time lost to commuting 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Avg. share of material cost of commuting 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045
Heterogeneous Land weight 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150
Size of typical city (millions) 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091
Avg. value of labor ($1000s) 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000
Fixed PAB 14500 14500 14500 12000 12000
Tax/Ownership Parameters
Marginal tax rate τ 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.200
Land ownership parameter ρ 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.500 1.000
Implied Values
Competitive Population Largest City 19,069,796 19,110,000 18,580,000 19,090,000 19,110,000 19,110,000
Ecient Population Largest City 68,620,000 65,640,000 38,000,000 51,270,000 44,550,000
Competitive Population Smallest City 55,176 80,000 120,000 100,000 80,000 90,000
Ecient Population Smallest City 1,560,000 4,580,000 560,000 670,000 550,000
Competitive Population Median City 244,694 240,000 400,000 260,000 240,000 250,000
Ecient Population Median City 7,365,000 9,100,000 2,600,000 3,195,000 3,040,000
Number of Competitive Cities 366 361 212 352 362 358
Number of Ecient Cities 20 14 51 38 42
Net Production Competitive Cities 3.747E+12 3.505E+12 3.749E+12 3.231E+12 3.097E+12
Net Production Ecient Cities 3.921E+12 3.646E+12 3.960E+12 3.196E+12 3.163E+12
Deadweight Loss Level (Dierence) 1.732E+11 1.408E+11 2.107E+11 9.661E+10 6.600E+10
Deadweight Loss Percentage (Dierence) 4.623% 4.018% 5.622% 2.990% 2.131%
Table 7.2: Quality of Life Amenities
Observed
Case Baseline Large Urban φ = .5 τ = .2 Large Costs
Case Costs Case Case φ = .5
Economic Parameters (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Agglomeration Parameter γ 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
Commuting Parameter φ 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Land Heterogeneity Parameter α 0.250 0.600 0.250 0.250 0.600
Avg. share of time lost to commuting 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Avg. share of material cost of commuting 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045
Heterogeneous Land weight 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150
Size of typical city (millions) 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091
Avg. value of labor ($ 1000s) 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000
Fixed PAB 15000 15000 15000 15000 15000
Tax/Ownership Parameters
Marginal tax rate τ 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.200 0.330
Land ownership parameter ρ 1.000 1.000 0.500 1.000 0.500
Implied Values
Competitive Population Largest City 19,069,796 19,250,000 19,160,000 19,220,000 19,220,000 19,020,000
Ecient Population Largest City 41,680,000 22,500,000 32,950,000 34,850,000 16,540,000
Competitive Population Smallest City 55,176 190,000 340,000 330,000 350,000 240,000
Ecient Population Smallest City 3,250,000 1,050,000 2,960,000 2,990,000 1,240,000
Competitive Population Median City 244,694 325,000 450,000 450,000 520,000 650,000
Ecient Population Median City 8,850,000 1,980,000 5,890,000 6,060,000 2,365,000
Number of Competitive Cities 366 300 234 234 219 152
Number of Ecient Cities 24 79 32 31 54
Net Production Competitive Cities 4.157E+12 4.136E+12 4.152E+12 4.070E+12 3.517E+12
Net Production Ecient Cities 4.244E+12 4.167E+12 4.210E+12 4.129E+12 3.526E+12
Deadweight Loss Level (Dierence) 8.689E+10 3.082E+10 5.725E+10 5.862E+10 9.381E+09
Deadweight Loss Percentage (Dierence) 2.090% 0.745% 1.379% 1.440% 0.267 %
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Transit Time and Metro Population: Residualized Regression in Logarithms
Transit Time and Metro Population
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Average Annual Work Hours and Metro Population: Residualized Regression in Logarith
Average Annual Work Hours and Metro Population
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Inferred Land Rents: Residualized Regression in Logarithms
Inferred Land Rents and Metro Population
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Measured Land Rents: Residualized Regression in Logarithms
Measured Land Rents and Metro Population
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Table 7.3: Land Share Robustness
Benchmark Land Land Land Land Land
case Share 2.5 % Share 4.3% Share 5 % Share 6.3% Share 8%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic Parameters
Agglomeration Parameter γ 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
Commuting Parameterφ 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Land Heterogeneity Parameter α 0.250 0.286 0.246 0.241 0.235 0.217
Avg. share of time lost to commuting 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Avg. share of material cost of commuting 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045
Heterogeneous Land weight 0.150 0.056 0.146 0.182 0.248 4.018
Size of typical city (millions) 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091
Avg. value of labor ($ 1000s) 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000
Tax/Ownership Parameters
Marginal tax rate τ 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330
Land ownership parameter ρ 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Implied Values
Share of income to dierential land rents sR 0.044 0.025 0.043 0.050 0.063 0.800
Elasticity of land value to population εr,N 0.220 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.216
Commuting share of rent 0.328 0.580 0.337 0.290 0.230 0.018
Typical Within-City Social Wedge (SMB-SAB) 50.000 434.000 73.998 -65.999 -326.002 -15065.961
Typical Across-City Wedge (SAB-PAB) 1,349.62 1,222.20 1,338.29 1,383.24 1,466.65 6,188.39
Typical Social-Private Wedge (SMB-PAB) 1,399.62 1,656.19 1,412.29 1,317.24 1,140.65 -8,877.57
Typical Within-City Private Wedge (PMB-PAB) 1,247.45 1,717.55 1,279.79 1,109.55 793.39 -17,130.40
Top Within-City Social Wedge (SMB-SAB) 180.55 909.40 243.84 -16.67 -501.11 -28,017.56
Top Across-City Wedge (SMB-PAB) 2,922.56 2,450.29 2,871.94 3,037.40 3,345.25 20,843.49
Top Social-Private Wedge (SMB-PAB) 3,103.11 3,359.69 3,115.78 3,020.74 2,844.14 -7,174.07
Top Within-City Private Wedge (PMB-PAB) 1,233.08 2,121.51 1,316.95 1,000.80 412.41 -33,045.73
Typical City-Planner Population (millions) 2.802 49.703 3.268 1.440 0.399 0.001
Typical Political Equilibrium Population (millions) 0.142 3.554 0.161 0.066 0.016 0.001
Typical Within-City Social Wedge Percent (SMB-SAB) 0.304% 2.393% 0.448% -0.416% -2.220% 28.147%
Typical Across-City Wedge Percent (SAB-PAB) 8.199% 6.740% 8.102% 8.712% 9.988% -11.561%
Typical Social-Private Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 8.503% 9.133% 8.550% 8.296% 7.768% 16.586%
Typical Within-City Private Wedge Percent (PMB-PAB) 7.579% 9.471% 7.748% 6.988% 5.403% 32.004%
Top Within-City Social Wedge Percent (SMB-SAB) 1.150% 4.805% 1.536% -0.114% -4.030% 24.376%
Top Across-City Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 18.620% 12.946% 18.095% 20.704% 26.905% -18.135%
Top Social-Private Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 19.770% 17.750% 19.631% 20.591% 22.874% 6.242%
Top Within-City Private Wedge Percent (PMB-PAB) 7.856% 11.209% 8.298% 6.822% 3.317% 28.751%
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Table 7.4: Land Share Robustness With Elasticity = 0.5
Benchmark Land Land Land Land Land
case Share 2.5 % Share 4.3% Share 5 % Share 6.3% Share 8%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic Parameters
Agglomeration Parameter γ 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
Commuting Parameterφ 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Land Heterogeneity Parameter α 0.250 0.800 0.630 0.607 0.580 0.505
Avg. share of time lost to commuting 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Avg. share of material cost of commuting 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045
Heterogeneous Land weight 0.150 0.028 0.075 0.093 0.128 2.136
Size of typical city (millions) 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091
Avg. value of labor ($ 1000s) 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000
Tax/Ownership Parameters
Marginal tax rate τ 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330
Land ownership parameter ρ 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Implied Values
Share of income to dierential land rents sR 0.044 0.025 0.043 0.050 0.063 0.800
Elasticity of land value to population εr,N 0.220 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
Commuting share of rent 0.328 0.580 0.337 0.290 0.230 0.018
Typical Within-City Social Wedge (SMB-SAB) 50.000 434.000 74.000 -66.000 -325.996 -15066.028
Typical Across-City Wedge (SAB-PAB) 1,349.62 1,321.76 1,541.66 1,625.49 1,780.42 10,494.19
Typical Social-Private Wedge (SMB-PAB) 1,399.62 1,755.76 1,615.66 1,559.49 1,454.43 -4,571.83
Typical Within-City Private Wedge (PMB-PAB) 1,247.45 1,575.55 1,035.55 825.55 435.56 -21,674.50
Top Within-City Social Wedge (SMB-SAB) 180.55 -1,249.86 -2,392.91 -2,943.31 -3,999.11 -66,416.40
Top Across-City Wedge (SMB-PAB) 2,922.56 4,709.11 5,712.05 6,206.29 7,157.03 63,548.06
Top Social-Private Wedge (SMB-PAB) 3,103.11 3,459.25 3,319.15 3,262.98 3,157.92 -2,868.34
Top Within-City Private Wedge (PMB-PAB) 1,233.08 -2,090.37 -3,479.61 -4,271.53 -5,819.52 -99,359.33
Typical City-Planner Population (millions) 2.802 6.780 2.491 1.806 1.086 0.004
Typical Political Equilibrium Population (millions) 0.142 1.686 0.502 0.351 0.202 0.001
Typical Within-City Social Wedge Percent (SMB-SAB) 0.304% 2.314% 0.409% -0.370% -1.883% 124.267%
Typical Across-City Wedge Percent (SAB-PAB) 8.199% 7.047% 8.522% 9.121% 10.283% -86.558%
Typical Social-Private Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 8.503% 9.361% 8.931% 8.751% 8.400% 37.709%
Typical Within-City Private Wedge Percent (PMB-PAB) 7.579% 8.401% 5.724% 4.632% 2.516% 178.775%
Top Within-City Social Wedge Percent (SMB-SAB) 1.150% -7.082% -16.066% -21.413% -34.524% 58.586%
Top Across-City Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 18.620% 26.684% 38.351% 45.152% 61.786% -56.056%
Top Social-Private Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 19.770% 19.602% 22.285% 23.739% 27.262% 2.530%
Top Within-City Private Wedge Percent (PMB-PAB) 7.856% -11.845% -23.362% -31.076% -50.239% 87.645%
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Table 7.5: Wedges Free Land Under Alternate Calibrations
Benchmark Land Land Land Land Land
case Share 2.5 % Share 4.3% Share 5 % Share 6.3% Share 8%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic Parameters
Agglomeration Parameter γ 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
Commuting Parameterφ 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Land Heterogeneity Parameter α 0.250 0.286 0.246 0.241 0.235 0.217
Avg. share of time lost to commuting 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Avg. share of material cost of commuting 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045
Heterogeneous Land weight 0.150 0.056 0.146 0.182 0.248 4.018
Size of typical city (millions) 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091
Avg. value of labor ($ 1000s) 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000
Tax/Ownership Parameters
Marginal tax rate τ 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330
Land ownership parameter ρ 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Implied Values
Share of income to dierential land rents sR 0.044 0.025 0.043 0.050 0.063 0.800
Elasticity of land value to population εr,N 0.220 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.216
Commuting share of rent 0.328 0.580 0.337 0.290 0.230 0.018
Typical Within-City Social Wedge (SMB-SAB) 50.000 434.00 74.00 -66.00 -326.00 -15065.96
Typical Across-City Wedge (SAB-PAB) 1,349.62 1065.51 1065.51 1065.51 1065.51 1065.51
Typical Social-Private Wedge (SMB-PAB) 1,399.62 1499.51 1139.51 999.51 739.51 -14000.45
Typical Within-City Private Wedge (PMB-PAB) 1,247.45 1675.04 1315.04 1175.05 915.04 -13824.92
Top Within-City Social Wedge (SMB-SAB) 180.55 909.40 243.84 -16.67 -501.11 -28017.56
Top Across-City Wedge (SMB-PAB) 2,922.56 1836.12 1836.12 1836.12 1836.12 1836.12
Top Social-Private Wedge (SMB-PAB) 3,103.11 2745.52 2079.96 1819.45 1335.01 -26181.45
Top Within-City Private Wedge (PMB-PAB) 1,233.08 2112.62 1447.06 1186.56 702.12 -26814.34
Typical City-Planner Population (millions) 2.802 49.703 3.268 1.440 0.399 0.001
Typical Political Equilibrium Population (millions) 0.142 10.450 0.495 0.204 0.052 0.001
Typical Within-City Social Wedge Percent (SMB-SAB) 0.304% 2.393% 0.448% -0.416% -2.220% 28.147%
Typical Across-City Wedge Percent (SAB-PAB) 8.199% 5.876% 6.451% 6.711% 7.256% -1.991%
Typical Social-Private Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 8.503% 8.269% 6.899% 6.295% 5.036% 26.156%
Typical Within-City Private Wedge Percent (PMB-PAB) 7.579% 9.237% 7.961% 7.400% 6.231% 25.828%
Top Within-City Social Wedge Percent (SMB-SAB) 1.150% 4.805% 1.536% -0.114% -4.030% 24.376%
Top Across-City Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 18.620% 9.701% 11.569% 12.516% 14.767% -1.597%
Top Social-Private Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 19.770% 14.505% 13.105% 12.402% 10.737% 22.779%
Top Within-City Private Wedge Percent (PMB-PAB) 7.856% 11.162% 9.117% 8.088% 5.647% 23.330%
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Table 7.6: Wedges No Tax Under Alternate Calibrations
Benchmark Land Land Land Land Land
case Share 2.5 % Share 4.3% Share 5 % Share 6.3% Share 8%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic Parameters
Agglomeration Parameter γ 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
Commuting Parameterφ 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Land Heterogeneity Parameter α 0.250 0.329 0.257 0.249 0.240 0.218
Avg. share of time lost to commuting 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Avg. share of material cost of commuting 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045
Heterogeneous Land weight 0.150 0.039 0.127 0.162 0.228 3.997
Size of typical city (millions) 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091
Avg. value of labor ($ 1000s) 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000
Tax/Ownership Parameters
Marginal tax rate τ 0.330 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Land ownership parameter ρ 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Implied Values
Share of income to dierential land rents sR 0.044 0.025 0.043 0.050 0.063 0.800
Elasticity of land value to population εr,N 0.220 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.216
Commuting share of rent 0.328 0.580 0.337 0.290 0.230 0.018
Typical Within-City Social Wedge (SMB-SAB) 50.000 500.00 140.00 0.00 -260.00 -15000.03
Typical Across-City Wedge (SAB-PAB) 1,349.62 755.05 872.03 917.08 1000.58 5722.58
Typical Social-Private Wedge (SMB-PAB) 1,399.62 1255.06 1012.03 917.08 740.58 -9277.45
Typical Within-City Private Wedge (PMB-PAB) 1,247.45 2862.97 2425.21 2254.97 1938.81 -15985.07
Top Within-City Social Wedge (SMB-SAB) 180.55 997.17 340.29 80.54 -403.13 -27918.13
Top Across-City Wedge (SMB-PAB) 2,922.56 1226.60 1640.45 1805.25 2112.42 19609.38
Top Social-Private Wedge (SMB-PAB) 3,103.11 2223.76 1980.74 1885.79 1709.29 -8308.75
Top Within-City Private Wedge (PMB-PAB) 1,233.08 3720.61 2933.20 2618.50 2031.59 -31423.62
Typical City-Planner Population (millions) 2.802 50.000 4.880 2.091 0.553 0.001
Typical Political Equilibrium Population (millions) 0.142 26.013 1.627 0.689 0.180 0.001
Typical Within-City Social Wedge Percent (SMB-SAB) 0.304% 2.708% 0.829% 0.000% -1.726% 28.234%
Typical Across-City Wedge Percent (SAB-PAB) 8.199% 4.090% 5.164% 5.643% 6.642% -10.771%
Typical Social-Private Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 8.503% 6.798% 5.993% 5.643% 4.916% 17.462%
Typical Within-City Private Wedge Percent (PMB-PAB) 7.579% 15.508% 14.362% 13.875% 12.870% 30.088%
Top Within-City Social Wedge Percent (SMB-SAB) 1.150% 5.119% 2.066% 0.527% -3.089% 24.425%
Top Across-City Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 18.620% 6.296% 9.958% 11.815% 16.188% -17.156%
Top Social-Private Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 19.770% 11.415% 12.023% 12.342% 13.098% 7.269%
Top Within-City Private Wedge Percent (PMB-PAB) 7.856% 19.098% 17.805% 17.138% 15.568% 27.492%
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Table 7.7: Wedges No Tax Free Land Under Alternate Calibrations
Benchmark Land Land Land Land Land
case Share 2.5 % Share 4.3 % Share 5 % Share 6.3 % Share 8 %
Economic Parameters
Agglomeration Parameter γ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Commuting Parameterφ
Land Heterogeneity Parameter α 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
Avg. share of time lost to commuting 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Avg. share of material cost of commuting 0.250 0.329 0.257 0.249 0.240 0.218
Heterogeneous Land weight 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Size of typical city (millions) 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045
Avg. value of labor ($ 1000s) 0.150 0.039 0.127 0.162 0.228 3.997
Tax/Ownership Parameters 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091
Marginal tax rate τ 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000
Land ownership parameter ρ
Implied Values 0.330 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Share of income to dierential land rents sR 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Elasticity of land value to population εr,N
Commuting share of rent 0.044 0.025 0.043 0.050 0.063 0.800
0.220 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.216
Typical Within-City Social Wedge (SMB-SAB) 0.328 0.580 0.337 0.290 0.230 0.018
Typical Across-City Wedge (SAB-PAB)
Typical Social-Private Wedge (SMB-PAB) 50.000 500.00 140.00 0.00 -260.00 -15,000.03
Typical Within-City Private Wedge (PMB-PAB) 1,349.62 600.00 600.00 600.00 600.00 600.00
1,399.62 1,100.00 740.00 600.00 340.00 -14,400.03
Top Within-City Social Wedge (SMB-SAB) 1,247.45 2,746.34 2,386.34 2,246.34 1,986.34 -12,753.70
Top Across-City Wedge (SMB-PAB)
Top Social-Private Wedge (SMB-PAB) 180.55 997.17 340.29 80.54 -403.13 -27,918.13
Top Within-City Private Wedge (PMB-PAB) 2,922.56 600.00 600.00 600.00 600.00 600.00
3,103.11 1,597.17 940.29 680.54 196.87 -27,318.13
Typical City-Planner Population (millions) 1,233.08 3,610.71 2,953.84 2,694.09 2,210.42 -25,304.58
Typical Political Equilibrium Population (millions)
2.802 50.000 4.880 2.091 0.553 0.001
Typical Within-City Social Wedge Percent (SMB-SAB) 0.142 50.000 4.880 2.091 0.553 0.001
Typical Across-City Wedge Percent (SAB-PAB)
Typical Social-Private Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 0.304% 2.708% 0.829% 0.000% -1.726% 28.234%
Typical Within-City Private Wedge Percent (PMB-PAB) 8.199% 3.250% 3.553% 3.692% 3.983% -1.129%
8.503% 5.959% 4.382% 3.692% 2.257% 27.104%
Top Within-City Social Wedge Percent (SMB-SAB) 7.579% 14.877% 14.132% 13.822% 13.185% 24.005%
Top Across-City Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB)
Top Social-Private Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 1.150% 5.119% 2.066% 0.527% -3.089% 24.425%
Top Within-City Private Wedge Percent (PMB-PAB) 18.620% 3.080% 3.642% 3.927% 4.598% -0.525%
19.770% 8.198% 5.708% 4.454% 1.509% 23.900%
7.856% 18.534% 17.930% 17.632% 16.938% 22.138%
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Table 7.8: Elasticity of Rent
Benchmark Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity
case Rent, Pop Rent, Pop Rent, Pop Rent, Pop Rent, Pop
0.2 0.216 0.3 0.4 0.5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic Parameters
Agglomeration Parameter γ 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
Commuting Parameterφ 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Land Heterogeneity Parameter α 0.250 0.225 0.246 0.360 0.495 0.630
Avg. share of time lost to commuting 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Avg. share of material cost of commuting 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045
Heterogeneous Land weight 0.150 0.158 0.146 0.109 0.087 0.075
Size of typical city (millions) 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091
Avg. value of labor ($ 1000s) 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000
Tax/Ownership Parameters
Marginal tax rate τ 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330
Land ownership parameter ρ 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Implied Values
Share of income to dierential land rents sR 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043
Elasticity of land value to population εr,N 0.220 0.200 0.216 0.300 0.400 0.500
Commuting share of rent 0.328 0.337 0.337 0.337 0.337 0.337
Typical Within-City Social Wedge (SMB-SAB) 50.000 73.998 73.998 74.001 74.000 74.000
Typical Across-City Wedge (SAB-PAB) 1,349.62 1,322.14 1,338.29 1,413.53 1,485.30 1,541.66
Typical Social-Private Wedge (SMB-PAB) 1,399.62 1,396.14 1,412.29 1,487.53 1,559.30 1,615.66
Typical Within-City Private Wedge (PMB-PAB) 1,247.45 1,293.55 1,279.79 1,207.55 1,121.55 1,035.55
Top Within-City Social Wedge (SMB-SAB) 180.55 322.41 243.84 -259.85 -1,120.58 -2,392.91
Top Across-City Wedge (SMB-PAB) 2,922.56 2,777.22 2,871.94 3,450.88 4,383.37 5,712.05
Top Social-Private Wedge (SMB-PAB) 3,103.11 3,099.63 3,115.78 3,191.02 3,262.79 3,319.15
Top Within-City Private Wedge (PMB-PAB) 1,233.08 1,441.22 1,316.95 484.76 -1,045.51 -3,479.61
Typical City-Planner Population (millions) 2.802 3.411 3.268 2.840 2.613 2.491
Typical Political Equilibrium Population (millions) 0.142 0.135 0.161 0.285 0.405 0.502
Typical Within-City Social Wedge Percent (SMB-SAB) 0.304% 0.455% 0.448% 0.427% 0.415% 0.409%
Typical Across-City Wedge Percent (SAB-PAB) 8.199% 8.127% 8.102% 8.155% 8.337% 8.522%
Typical Social-Private Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 8.503% 8.581% 8.550% 8.582% 8.752% 8.931%
Typical Within-City Private Wedge Percent (PMB-PAB) 7.579% 7.951% 7.748% 6.967% 6.295% 5.724%
Top Within-City Social Wedge Percent (SMB-SAB) 1.150% 2.052% 1.536% -1.611% -7.110% -16.066%
Top Across-City Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 18.620% 17.673% 18.095% 21.391% 27.813% 38.351%
Top Social-Private Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 19.770% 19.725% 19.631% 19.780% 20.703% 22.285%
Top Within-City Private Wedge Percent (PMB-PAB) 7.856% 9.171% 8.298% 3.005% -6.634% -23.362%
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Table 7.9: Elasticity of Rent With No Tax
Benchmark Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity
case Rent, Pop Rent, Pop Rent, Pop Rent, Pop Rent, Pop
0.2 0.216 0.3 0.4 0.5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic Parameters
Agglomeration Parameter γ 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
Commuting Parameterφ 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Land Heterogeneity Parameter α 0.250 0.233 0.257 0.384 0.535 0.686
Avg. share of time lost to commuting 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Avg. share of material cost of commuting 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045
Heterogeneous Land weight 0.150 0.137 0.127 0.093 0.074 0.064
Size of typical city (millions) 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091
Avg. value of labor ($ 1000s) 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000
Tax/Ownership Parameters
Marginal tax rate τ 0.330 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Land ownership parameter ρ 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Implied Values
Share of income to dierential land rents sR 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043
Elasticity of land value to population εr,N 0.220 0.200 0.216 0.300 0.400 0.500
Commuting share of rent 0.328 0.337 0.337 0.337 0.337 0.337
Typical Within-City Social Wedge (SMB-SAB) 50.000 140.00 140.00 140.00 140.00 140.00
Typical Across-City Wedge (SAB-PAB) 1,349.62 856.17 872.03 944.96 1012.76 1064.54
Typical Social-Private Wedge (SMB-PAB) 1,399.62 996.17 1012.03 1084.96 1152.76 1204.54
Typical Within-City Private Wedge (PMB-PAB) 1,247.45 2438.97 2425.21 2352.97 2266.97 2180.97
Top Within-City Social Wedge (SMB-SAB) 180.55 421.15 340.29 -190.47 -1136.43 -2599.50
Top Across-City Wedge (SMB-PAB) 2,922.56 1543.73 1640.45 2244.14 3257.91 4772.75
Top Social-Private Wedge (SMB-PAB) 3,103.11 1964.88 1980.74 2053.67 2121.47 2173.25
Top Within-City Private Wedge (PMB-PAB) 1,233.08 3061.89 2933.20 2046.46 333.24 -2537.26
Typical City-Planner Population (millions) 2.802 5.317 4.880 3.700 3.152 2.881
Typical Political Equilibrium Population (millions) 0.142 1.721 1.627 1.379 1.279 1.243
Typical Within-City Social Wedge Percent (SMB-SAB) 0.304% 0.840% 0.829% 0.795% 0.776% 0.766%
Typical Across-City Wedge Percent (SAB-PAB) 8.199% 5.140% 5.164% 5.364% 5.616% 5.827%
Typical Social-Private Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 8.503% 5.980% 5.993% 6.159% 6.392% 6.593%
Typical Within-City Private Wedge Percent (PMB-PAB) 7.579% 14.642% 14.362% 13.357% 12.570% 11.938%
Top Within-City Social Wedge Percent (SMB-SAB) 1.150% 2.578% 2.066% -1.145% -7.045% -17.216%
Top Across-City Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 18.620% 9.448% 9.958% 13.495% 20.196% 31.610%
Top Social-Private Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 19.770% 12.026% 12.023% 12.350% 13.151% 14.393%
Top Within-City Private Wedge Percent (PMB-PAB) 7.856% 18.740% 17.805% 12.306% 2.066% -16.804%
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Table 7.10: Elasticity of Rent With Free Land Assumption
Benchmark Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity
case Rent, Pop Rent, Pop Rent, Pop Rent, Pop Rent, Pop
0.2 0.216 0.3 0.4 0.5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic Parameters
Agglomeration Parameter γ 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
Commuting Parameterφ 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Land Heterogeneity Parameter α 0.250 0.225 0.246 0.360 0.495 0.630
Avg. share of time lost to commuting 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Avg. share of material cost of commuting 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045
Heterogeneous Land weight 0.150 0.158 0.146 0.109 0.087 0.075
Size of typical city (millions) 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091
Avg. value of labor ($ 1000s) 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000
Tax/Ownership Parameters
Marginal tax rate τ 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330
Land ownership parameter ρ 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Implied Values
Share of income to dierential land rents sR 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043
Elasticity of land value to population εr,N 0.220 0.200 0.216 0.300 0.400 0.500
Commuting share of rent 0.328 0.337 0.337 0.337 0.337 0.337
Typical Within-City Social Wedge (SMB-SAB) 50.000 74.00 74.00 74.00 74.00 74.00
Typical Across-City Wedge (SAB-PAB) 1,349.62 1065.51 1065.51 1065.51 1065.51 1065.51
Typical Social-Private Wedge (SMB-PAB) 1,399.62 1139.51 1139.51 1139.51 1139.51 1139.51
Typical Within-City Private Wedge (PMB-PAB) 1,247.45 1315.04 1315.04 1315.05 1315.04 1315.04
Top Within-City Social Wedge (SMB-SAB) 180.55 322.41 243.84 -259.85 -1120.58 -2392.91
Top Across-City Wedge (SMB-PAB) 2,922.56 1836.12 1836.12 1836.12 1836.12 1836.12
Top Social-Private Wedge (SMB-PAB) 3,103.11 2158.53 2079.96 1576.26 715.54 -556.79
Top Within-City Private Wedge (PMB-PAB) 1,233.08 1525.63 1447.06 943.37 82.65 -1189.68
Typical City-Planner Population (millions) 2.802 3.411 3.268 2.840 2.613 2.491
Typical Political Equilibrium Population (millions) 0.142 0.429 0.495 0.783 1.025 1.194
Typical Within-City Social Wedge Percent (SMB-SAB) 0.304% 0.455% 0.448% 0.427% 0.415% 0.409%
Typical Across-City Wedge Percent (SAB-PAB) 8.199% 6.549% 6.451% 6.147% 5.981% 5.890%
Typical Social-Private Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 8.503% 7.004% 6.899% 6.574% 6.396% 6.299%
Typical Within-City Private Wedge Percent (PMB-PAB) 7.579% 8.083% 7.961% 7.587% 7.381% 7.269%
Top Within-City Social Wedge Percent (SMB-SAB) 1.150% 2.052% 1.536% -1.611% -7.110% -16.066%
Top Across-City Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 18.620% 11.684% 11.569% 11.381% 11.650% 12.328%
Top Social-Private Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 19.770% 13.736% 13.105% 9.771% 4.540% -3.738%
Top Within-City Private Wedge Percent (PMB-PAB) 7.856% 9.708% 9.117% 5.848% 0.524% -7.988%
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Table 7.11: Elasticity of Rent With No Tax and Free Land
Benchmark Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity
case Rent, Pop Rent, Pop Rent, Pop Rent, Pop Rent, Pop
0.2 0.216 0.3 0.4 0.5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic Parameters
Agglomeration Parameter γ 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
Commuting Parameterφ 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Land Heterogeneity Parameter α 0.250 0.233 0.257 0.384 0.535 0.686
Avg. share of time lost to commuting 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Avg. share of material cost of commuting 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045
Heterogeneous Land weight 0.150 0.137 0.127 0.093 0.074 0.064
Size of typical city (millions) 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091 2.091
Avg. value of labor ($ 1000s) 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000
Tax/Ownership Parameters
Marginal tax rate τ 0.330 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Land ownership parameter ρ 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Implied Values
Share of income to dierential land rents sR 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043
Elasticity of land value to population εr,N 0.220 0.200 0.216 0.300 0.400 0.500
Commuting share of rent 0.328 0.337 0.337 0.337 0.337 0.337
Typical Within-City Social Wedge (SMB-SAB) 50.000 140.00 140.00 140.00 140.00 140.00
Typical Across-City Wedge (SAB-PAB) 1,349.62 600.00 600.00 600.00 600.00 600.00
Typical Social-Private Wedge (SMB-PAB) 1,399.62 740.00 740.00 740.00 740.00 740.00
Typical Within-City Private Wedge (PMB-PAB) 1,247.45 2,386.34 2,386.34 2,386.34 2,386.34 2,386.34
Top Within-City Social Wedge (SMB-SAB) 180.55 421.15 340.29 -190.47 -1,136.43 -2,599.50
Top Across-City Wedge (SMB-PAB) 2,922.56 600.00 600.00 600.00 600.00 600.00
Top Social-Private Wedge (SMB-PAB) 3,103.11 1,021.15 940.29 409.53 -536.43 -1,999.50
Top Within-City Private Wedge (PMB-PAB) 1,233.08 3,034.70 2,953.84 2,423.07 1,477.11 14.04
Typical City-Planner Population (millions) 2.802 5.317 4.880 3.700 3.152 2.881
Typical Political Equilibrium Population (millions) 0.142 5.317 4.880 3.700 3.152 2.881
Typical Within-City Social Wedge Percent (SMB-SAB) 0.304% 0.840% 0.829% 0.795% 0.776% 0.766%
Typical Across-City Wedge Percent (SAB-PAB) 8.199% 3.602% 3.553% 3.406% 3.327% 3.284%
Typical Social-Private Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 8.503% 4.443% 4.382% 4.201% 4.103% 4.051%
Typical Within-City Private Wedge Percent (PMB-PAB) 7.579% 14.326% 14.132% 13.546% 13.232% 13.062%
Top Within-City Social Wedge Percent (SMB-SAB) 1.150% 2.578% 2.066% -1.145% -7.045% -17.216%
Top Across-City Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 18.620% 3.672% 3.642% 3.608% 3.719% 3.974%
Top Social-Private Wedge Percent (SMB-PAB) 19.770% 6.250% 5.708% 2.463% -3.325% -13.243%






Figure A.1 depicts the Quandt Likelihood Ratio which determines the structural break
for the model. This gure demonstrates the break occurred in the early 2000s and is sta-
tistically signicant. Figure A.2 demonstrates that the regressions contain variables that
are stationary. The volatility measures are stationary because they are measures that have
ltered out the time trend and the Adjusted Dickey-Fuller test formally shows this. Finally,
gure A.3 is a scatter plot of the corporate tax rate by year for all states. This gure demon-
strates the data before and after 2000 look similar and formally have enough overlap to run
the weighted regressions.
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Figure A.1: Quandt Likelihood Ratio: Finding Structural Breaks
Figure A.2: Adjusted Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics: Stationarity
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The decomposition method introduced by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) provides
a method for estimating counterfactual distributions without assuming linearity (assumption
1). Similarly to the regression decomposition the estimated counterfactual distributions of
the volatility are used to decompose the contribution of each of the factors. The actual and
counterfactual distributions, given in equation B.1, dier by the densities they are integrated
over.1




Counterfactual Distribution f 10 (Log(Revenuei,t)) ≡
Z
f(Log(Revenuei,t)|z)h(z|D = 0)dz
The important insight of DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) is that the counterfactual
distribution can be written as a weighted function of the actual distribution. The weight
is the ratio of the conditional density functions which by Bayes' rule can be rewritten as
the ratio of propensity scores normalized by the number of observations in each group,
1In equation B.1 z represents all observable characteristics, tax and economic.
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ω = P (D = 1|z)/P (D = 0|z))(P (D = 1)/P (D = 0)).2 This realization by DiNardo,
Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) transforms a possibly impossible problem of integration over
many variables into a simple reweighting problem where the weights can be estimated by a
logit or probit model.
Counterfactual Distribution f 10 (Log(Revenuei,t)) ≡
Z
ωf(Log(Revenuei,t)|z)h(z|D = 1)dz
The increase in volatility of tax revenue can be decomposed using dierent counterfactual
distributions. The increase that cannot be explained by dierences in observable charac-
teristics is again attributed to the structural change, which captures the second hypothesis.
Formally, this is given by the dierence between the mean of the actual distribution of the
years after the structural break and the mean of the counterfactual distribution that would
have occurred if all of the observable characteristics had been similar to those after the
structural break. This is similar to the eect of the treatment on the treated (TOT).
The rest of the increase in volatility is what can be explained by observable characteristics.
The marginal eect that can be explained by economic factors is given by the dierence in the
means of the counterfactual distribution that would have occurred if all observable variables
would have been similar to the characteristics in the years after the structural break and the
counterfactual that would have occurred if only the tax variables would have been similar to
the characteristics of the states after the structural break. Similarly, the marginal tax eect
can be found by the dierence of the means of the two counterfactual distributions formally
given in equation B.2. The conditional weights ωx = P (D = 1|τ)/P (D = 0|τ))(P (D =
1)/P (D = 0)) and ωτ = P (D = 1|x)/P (D = 0|x))(P (D = 1)/P (D = 0)) are used to
2The weight is h(z|D = 0)/h(z|D = 1) where h(z|D = 1) = h(zj = z0)P (D = 0|zj = z0)/P (D = 0) by
Bayes' rule.
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This method controls for nonlinearities and is asymptotically more ecient than matching or
regression models (?). In this context controlling for nonlinearities will decrease the upward
bias in the structural factor estimates from the regression analysis. The typical concern
with this method is a selection bias, for example, when individuals choose their group based
on unobservable characteristics. This selection bias is a violation of the second assumption
above, E[ε|x, τ,D, I.state] = 0. While the selection bias is not an issue in this context
because states cannot choose their groups, the second assumption may still be violated
if endogenous variables are included. Finally, this method depends on the occurrence of
observations that look similar" in both groups of years, formally that there is sucient
overlap of independent variables. Overlap would be a problem if the set of state tax rates in
the early years were disjoint from the set of tax rates in the later years. Figure 4 is a scatter





In the text the expected utility is assumed to be fully characterized by the rst two
moments of the public and private good, which is sucient when the goods are jointly
normally distributed or when the utility function is quadratic. Generally, the expected utility
can be written as in equation C.1 below where Ω consists of the second moment and higher
that is necessary to fully characterize the joint distribution between public and private goods.
This composition of the expected utility is much more general than the case where the joint
distribution is normal but is not fully general because not every distribution can be uniquely
characterized by its moments. However, in the case that the joint distribution is normal the
distribution can be fully characterized by the rst two moments and Ω consists solely of the
second moments of the private and public good. If the utility function is additive, such that
U1,2 = 0, then the level of social welfare can be written as the second line in the equation
below.
Z
U(c(θ), G)f(c̄, R̄,Ω) ≡M((c̄, R̄,Ω)
(C.1)
= M((c̄,Ωc) +G((R̄,ΩR) When U1,2 = 0
(C.2)
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To generalize the formulas in the text to the case where higher moments are needed to
characterize the expected utility replace all of the partial derivatives of the second moment
with the partial derivative of Ω.
To demonstrate this transformation consider a Cobb Douglas utility where total con-
sumption is assumed to be distributed uniformly with mean µ and standard deviation σ.
Writing the utility function in terms of total consumption c and the shift parameter β gives








3σ] and zero every-
where else.
E[U(c, β)] = E[log(c) + αlog(β) + (1− α)log(1− β)]












dc+ αlogβ + (1− α)log(1− β)
M(µ, σ2, β) =
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√
3 + µ)(log(µ+ σ
√








+ αlogβ + (1− α)log(1− β)




In the text private consumption of the representative agent is decomposed into con-
sumption that is taxed and consumption that is untaxed such that the fraction β of total
consumption is taxed and (1−β) is untaxed. This decomposition changes the variables from
two consumption goods into total consumption and the fraction spent on taxable items. This
section demonstrates the change of variables and its benets.
First, start with two goods B,N such that the consumption of B is taxed and the
consumption of N is not taxed and the representative agent has utility V (B,N) over the
two goods. By denition B = βc and N = (1−β)c. The utility function can be written as a
function of β and c by substituting these equations in for B and N .1 The budget constraint
is given below written both as a function of B and N and β and c.
W = (1 + τc)B +N
= (1 + τc)βc+ (1− β)c
= c(1 + βτc)
1If the utility function is homothetic then the utility function can be written as V (B,N) = v(β)U(c)
otherwise V (B,N) = U(c, β).
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Now we want to know the welfare impact of a tax change. We can separate the impact into
the income eect and the substitution eect where the substitution eect is the deadweight






























The benet of writing the utility in terms of β and c is that U1
∂c
∂τc






























































































= V1β + V2(1− β)
Now show the deadweight loss calculation.









































































Total Dierentiate B.C. 0 = (1 + τcβ)dc+ τccdβ
= c− c βτc
1 + βτc






= −c+ (1− β) c
β
= −c− c(1− β)τc
1 + βτc




Calculations First and Second Order Importance
This appendix produces the deadweight loss calculations in the text.
Harberger Expenditure Function
L(p+ t, p, u) = E(p+ t, u)− E(p, u)− T (p+ t, p, u)
≈ E(p+ t, u) + ∂E(p+ t, u)
p




((p+ t)− (p+ t))2
− E(p+ t, u) + ∂E(p+ t, u)
p






































(p2 − p1)−G(R1, R2)










−G(R1, R2) Slutsky Decomposition
(E.1)
= (p2 − p1)(U1sx + U2sy)| {z }
Substitution Eect






y1)−G(R1, R2)| {z }
0






) = (p2 − p1)U1(sx − sx) = 0 Total derivative budget constraint
Expected Utility Representation
L̄ = M(c2, σ
2
c,2, β2) +G(R2, σ
2
R,2)−M(c1, σ2c,1, β1)−G(R1, σ2R,1)




































































Calculations Welfare Consequences Chapter
This appendix provides the calculations for the government optimization for the welfare
consequences of tax revenue volatility chapter.







































































= 0 envelope theorem
β
∂τc




















The use of the envelope theorem in simplifying the rst order condition of the volatility-
unaware government provides additional intuition for why deadweight loss is of second order
importance. The eects of raising the consumption tax rate can be split into an income eect,
transferring income from the individual to the government and a substitution eect due to
changes in the individual's consumption behavior, captured by ∂β ∂τc. The individual's
rst order condition with respect to β is the term that multiplies ∂β ∂τc causing this term
to be zero, at least to a rst order approximation. Therefore, the welfare cost of raising
the consumption tax rate due to behavioral changes in consumption is mitigated by the











































































































Conditions for Large Rushes
Corollary 1 provides the extreme case in which a city maybe formed and enter steady
state with one large rush may be an equilibrium of the model. It follows directly from result
3 and the rush condition (5.8). While this large rush is possible it is a very extreme case.
Corollary 1: A city is formed and enters steady state with one large rush if and only if
1) the rank function is initially increasing and later decreasing,
2) the constant present value of the rank function Θ for ranks greater than kθ is equal to
the average rank benet of the rush, and
3) the size of the rush J equals the population level such that population in the new city
produces the level of average product that equals the level of average product in the existing




Taking the derivative of the payo for a migrant (5.2) with respect to the time a person
migrates τ , it is possible to solve for the migration pattern to city 2. We know that for
migrants to be willing to mix over when to migrate to city 2 they must be indierent between
their options of migrating. This implies that the derivative of the payo to migrants with
respect to migrating time must be zero for all migrating times in the accelerated growth
period. The derivative is found using Liebnitz's rule and noting that the rank function is a
function of migrating time but that the average product y is a function of time not migrating
time.





dt = 0 (H.1)






is not a function of time.





q(τ) = 0 (H.2)
From this condition we can cancel out e−rτ and rearrange to get q(t) on one side, which
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To produce the second migration condition (5.9) in the paper take the derivative of the














































Microfoundations for Sequential Growth of Cities
The rst kΘ residents to a city receive a plot of land. The plot of land the resident receives
depends upon when they migrated to the city relative to other migrants, the resident's rank.
The city grows in a spiral around the central business district which uses P lots of land
for production. For tractability the city grows according to a simple Archimedean spiral
characterized by r = bθ, where r is the radius, θ is the angle, and b is a parameter. Each
plot of land is assumed to be formed by two lines radiating from the spiral's pole. The angle
between the two radiating lines is assumed to be constant and is denoted by θ̄ = 2π/s, where
s is the number of plots in a given rotation. The area of the plot of land given to resident







2θ2 if k ≤ s− P
2πb2
R θ̄(P+k)
θ̄(P+k−1) θ − πdθ if k > s− P











1 − r22dθ = 12
R θ̄(P+k)
θ̄(P+k−1) b
2θ2 − b2(θ − 2π)2dθ = 2πb2
R θ̄(P+k)







(1 + 3p2 + 6kp− 3p+ 3k2 − 3k) if k ≤ s− P
4b2π3
s2
(2k + s+ 1) if k > s− P
This gives the area of the plot of land for resident with rank k in terms of k and parameters.
Residents of a city must travel to the CBD to work. The expression below gives the distance
of a resident's commute, which is given by the shortest distance between their plot of land
and the pole of the spiral.
radiusk =
8>><>>:
0 if k ≤ s+ 1− P
b2π
s
(k − s− 1 + P ) if k > s+ 1− P
Residents have utility over both the area and distance to the CBD of their plot of land. This
utility is quantied in the rank function R(k). To calculate the rank function substitute
the resident's budget constraint, distance from the CBD and area of land into their utility
function.

















(1 + 3p2 + 6kp− 3p+ 3k2 − 3k)
γ









(k − s− 1 + P ))φ if Ω > k > s+ 1− P
Θi for k > Θi
When the rank function is 'hill-shaped' being the rst migrant is not as benecial as being
the second migrant. When this is the case by proposition 2 the new city is formed by a rush
of migrants. With the assumption that production in the CBD uses P = s+ 1 plots of land,
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s = 2bπ, and γ = 1 provides a rank function that can be written as follows.
R(k) = dπP + 2dπk −mkφ (I.2)
Given that the city is formed by a rush, the number of migrants that form the rush and
the time τ will be uniquely determined. Each migrant in the rush has rational expectations
and expects to receive the average rank benet. To ensure the rushing migrants, {1, J I},
do not have an incentive to deviate from rushing and migrate 'late' at time τ rush + dt the
expected rank payo must be greater than or equal to the rank payo for migrant J I + dk.
Similarly, to ensure that migrants not in the rush do not have an incentive to migrate early
with the rush the the rank payo for the migrant J I + dk must be greater than or equal to
the expected rank payo of the rush. Therefore the expected rank payo of the rush must





R(k)dk = R(J) (I.3)






R(k)dk = dπP + dπJ − m
φ+ 1
Jφ (I.4)
Set this equal to the rank benet of being migrant J .
dπP + dπJ − m
φ+ 1
Jφ = dπP + 2dπJ −mJφ (I.5)








With this closed form solution for the number of rushers it is possible to do comparative
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statics, to understand when rushes will be large and when rushes will small. Given the









> 0 if 2γ > φ and < 0 if 2γ < φ
∂J
∂s







Substituting the example in the microfoundations section where γ = 1 and φ = 2, the size





which is the equation provided in the paper.


























(dπp− y(N0 + vt))
The population in city 2 can be simplied by allowing the production amenity level A =









(2dπ −m)v − r(BN2o + dπp− AN0)





Result 2: For a given ordering of city creation; a system of cities with free mobility creates
the fewest cities, a system of cities with the quantity mechanism creates the most cities, and
a system of cities with the price mechanism creates the ecient number of cities.
Result 2 follows from the following arguments which demonstrate the planner produces
at least as many cities as the system of cities with free mobility and creates the same number
of cities as the system of cities with the price mechanism.
The planner produces at least as many cities as the system of cities with free mobility.
Assume toward contradiction that the planner produces K−n cities and the system of cities
with free mobility produces K cities. In equilibrium if K cities are created in the system
with free mobility then the per-resident benet with K cities must be larger than with K−n
cities. This implies the total benet produced in the system of cities with K cities is greater
than the system with K − n a contradiction. Therefore, the planner produces at least as
many cities as the system of cities with free mobility.
The system of cities with the price mechanism creates the ecient number of cities.
First, the distribution of population across a given number of cities is the same for the price
mechanism and the social planner. Second, assume toward contradiction the case where
social planner creates more cities than the system with the price mechanism. In this case the
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equilibrium fee that would be charged in the system with the price mechanism by denition
is negative. The equilibrium fee is negative when the population in the city is less than the
capped population. In the second stage there is no trembling hand perfect equilibria where
the population of a city is positive and less than the capped population, a contradiction.
Third, consider toward contradiction the case where the social planner creates fewer cities
than the system with the price mechanism. In this case the equilibrium fee that is charged
in the additional cities is positive by denition. However, if the fee is positive there is excess
total benet that is not being realized when the social planner creates the cities, which is
contradiction of the social planner's objective. Therefore the system of cities with the price
mechanism creates the ecient number of cities.1
1In two special cases the number of cities created is the same in all cases. The rst case is when all cities
are homogeneous. The number of cities created is the same because the population in the cities is the same
for all cases except for the system able to cap city sizes. The second case is when the total population is
large enough such that the maximum average benet in the K + 1 city is less than the hinterland benet.




The simulation uses an algorithm that solves the integer problem of how many cities to
create by reframing the intensive margin in a way that ensures a solution in a xed number
of steps. The rst step solves the population in each city for a given shared level of benet.
The population in each city is calculated for all values of the shared benet equal to the
discrete benets calculated for city 1. This step produces a matrix with rows representing
each value of the shared benet and each column representing a dierent city.
The second step constrains this matrix such that the sum of the populations across all
created cities is less than or equal to the total population. This constricts the matrix down
to a vector with rows representing each level of shared benet and each entry giving the
number of cities that would be created.
The third step performs the extensive margin optimization for each case. The social
planner's objective is to maximize the total benet produced. Therefore the algorithm
chooses the marginal benet level from the constrained set that produces the largest total
benet. Individuals with free mobility create the number of cities in the rst stage that
maximizes the shared average benet from the constrained set. Individuals that are able to
cap city size produces the maximum number of cities in the constrained set. Individuals that
are able to set fees create the number of cities in the rst stage such that the equilibrium fee
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charged in all cities is nonnegative.
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APPENDIX L
Endogenous Quality of Life
The model so far has taken quality of life, Qj, as exogenous, although it may depend
on the population level, N . The relationship could be negative, if higher population levels
bring about urban disamenities such as pollution, crime, congestion, or disease. At the
same time, a higher population level should increase the availability of non-tradeable private
goods, as well as public goods, through greater inter-jurisdictional choices, as in Tiebout
(1956). Theoretically, it is ambiguous whether a higher city population reduces quality
of life, although it is generally assumed: in this case, higher population leads to a lower
within-city-wedge.1
For now consider the simple case where Qj = Q
0
jN
κ, for some constant κ. In this case,
the social marginal benet gains an additional term




In the case where κ < 0, the social marginal benet is made lower by κ(−∂xQj /∂Q)Qj,
which should be added to the within-city wedge. Analyzing the quality of life of U.S. cities,
Albouy (2008) estimates that κ is close to zero, although it cannot control for whether
1It is also possible that a higher population could aect amenities in other cities, such as through lower
average levels of global pollution, or through greater shopping externalities.
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populations disproportionately inhabit sites with greater amenities not measured in the
data. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that κ takes on a large negative values and so we
calibrate the model in the third row of gure 6 in the case where κ = −.02. This adjustment
actually increases the tax wedge slightly, making the the disparity between the ecient and
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